amr
Thats just one definition of responsibility, another definition is:
Being a source or cause, God is the First Cause of all things, of Adam as Well, If God would not have gave Adam being, could Adam have sinned ? NO he could not have. So who was responsible for giving Adam being so that he could sin ?
God created Adam, of course. The question being asked is not determining who the source of all that exists is, but who is being held to account for the sin of Adam? A
blame is being sought by the question. Is God to blame? Adam?
The technical expressions “primary cause” and “secondary cause” came into use subsequent to biblical times. But their use summarizes distinctions found within the Bible. In Job 1:19 the house falls because of “a great wind”—a secondary cause; in Job 1:21 Job acknowledges God as the primary cause. Similarly, Exod 14:21 says that “the Lord drove the sea back by a strong east wind,” thereby acknowledging the Lord as primary cause and the strong east wind as secondary cause.
The instance in first Kings also shows us the truth of "secondary causation." Simply put, God Himself is not the one who enticed Ahab to sin. Rather, God brought this about through a secondary cause, namely, the lying spirit that was sent. The fact of secondary causes makes it easier to see how God can use circumstances to bring about a sin that is encompassed in His decree, and yet not be the positive cause of that sin.
One could multiply such examples.
God cooperates with all His creatures and causes them to act precisely as they do. There are real
secondary causes in the world, such as the powers of nature and the will of man, and these do not work independently of God. God works in every act of His creatures, not only in their good but also in their evil acts. He stimulates them to action, accompanies their action at every moment, and makes this action effective.
However, we should never think of God and man as equal causes; the former is the primary, and the latter only a secondary cause.
Neither should we conceive of them as each doing a part of the work like a team of horses. The same deed is in its entirety both a deed of God and a deed of man. Moreover, we should guard against the idea that this cooperation makes God responsible for man's sinful deeds. This doctrine is based on Scripture, e.g., Deut. 8:18; Ps. 104:20, 21, 30; Amos 3:6; Matt. 6:45; 10:29; Acts 14:17; Phil. 2:13.
Just as the architect of a building, who devises the plans, and then employs the workmen to construct the building, we can see that these workmen are not forced or compelled. Yes, they are induced by money, benefits, etc., but the workmen work freely and happily carrying out the detailed plans of the architect. Thus the architect is the
primary cause or will, while the workmen are the
secondary cause or will. To a much greater degree God directs, induces, permits, etc., all our actions as the
first cause. God wills righteously those things which men choose to do wickedly. We act according to our free agency as the second cause.
That the bad acts of moral agents can somehow be linked back to God is no more plausible than the limp arising from a deformity of our legs can be linked back to the power to move our legs, even though no limping would exist without that power.
For the non-Calvinist, God does not
cause sin; he only
permits it. Reformed have also used the term, but they have insisted that God’s permission of sin is no less efficacious than his ordination of good. In general, we Reformed deny that there is any “mere permission” in God. God’s permission is an
efficacious permission. Otiose
permission of sin separated from God’s will is repugnant both to the nature of the First Cause and to the divine and almighty foresight, to His nature and to Scripture. The Reformed use of
permit is mainly as a more delicate term than
cause, to suggest that God brings sin about with a kind of reluctance born of His holy hatred of it.
This usage by the Reformed reflects a biblical pattern. When Satan acts, he acts, in an obvious sense, by God’s permission. In this use, and in the Reformed theological use,
permission has no connotation of moral approval as it sometimes has in contemporary use. God allows him to take Job’s family, wealth, and health. But God will not allow Satan to take Job’s life (Job 2:6). So Satan is on a leash, acting only within limits set by God. In this respect, all sinful acts are similar. The sinner can go only so far before he meets the judgment of God.
It is appropriate, therefore, to use
permission to refer to God’s ordination of sin. But we should not assume, as non-Reformed do, that divine permission is anything less than sovereign ordination. What God permits or allows will happen. God could easily have prevented Satan’s attack on Job if he had intended to. That he did not prevent that attack implies that he intended it.
Certainly God has some prerogatives that he forbids to us, such as the freedom to take human life. But, for the most part, the moral laws that God imposes upon us are grounded in his own character (Ex. 20:11; Lev. 11:44–45; Matt. 5:45; 1 Pet. 1:15–16). God will not violate his own character.
What Scripture denies, yet is regularly overlooked by some posting herein and elsewhere, is that man has sufficient understanding of God’s character and his eternal plan (not to mention sufficient authority) to bring accusations against Him.
AMR