Ukraine Crisis

Idolater

"Foundation of the World" Dispensationalist χρ
Are you ready for what we have now?

Here's the point: With my idea, we might get a "real" Christian man by sheer luck. Under democracy, you're guaranteed to keep getting cowards, crooks and crazies. The cowards will keep appeasing the crooks until a criminal invades Poland.
This is either going to escalate to WWIII or it's not; A or ~A.

If it does, it will be because Putin wanted WWIII, even if unintentionally (in other words because he's an IDIOT of EPIC proportions), it will in no way be because we have the wrong American leader. It's just because of Putin.

And our American government I contend is the best Constitution that's ever been conceived, and the real solution to this kind of crisis is for us (the US) to restart annexing other countries. If we had done this in 1991-1992 there would be no invasion of Ukraine occurring right now, and we'd all probably be by now much more familiar with Russian idioms. Which is always a bonus, the 'cherry on top' of also not risking WWIII every time an immoral young man takes power, bides his time for over two decades, before exposing himself as a type of "man of sin". American constitutionalism can handle the Putins of history. Ask any Trump opponent, they'll tell you (because according to them Putin, Trump & Hitler are 'peas in a pod') that our Constitution can handle them without causing WWIII, no doubt about it.
 

annabenedetti

like marbles on glass
One of the salient features of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is that it was predicted—strongly, unequivocally, and quite publicly—by the Biden administration. The openly declared assessments, including by President Joe Biden himself, were so unequivocal that they could cause unease among those hearing them about a possible cry-wolf effect if Russia refrained from ever launching the war—and not having a war was, of course, a Western objective.

The administration’s posture was contrary to many predictions by assorted experts, pundits, and commentators that Russia would not invade, and that President Vladimir Putin was staging a show of force with the intention of achieving certain objectives short of war. Don’t expect many mea culpas from those who had made such a prediction. (An exception is Nina Khrushcheva, a professor at the New School—and great-granddaughter of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev—who admitted being “quite embarrassed” over having been proven wrong about this.) The administration’s firmly stated prognosis also went against a prevailing view in Europe that there would be no Russian invasion. . . .

So, the assessment of U.S. intelligence and U.S. policymakers appears to have been on the mark. Two general observations about intelligence and policy follow from this.

One concerns how this episode illustrates again the asymmetry in public and political reactions to intelligence successes and failures. When something untoward and highly visible happens overseas—a war, revolution, nuclear test, or something else—that was not preceded by loud and public U.S. government predictions, then many of the most immediate reactions in public commentary decry the “intelligence failure” involved. Or in a variation of the decrying, questions are raised about whether it was intelligence agencies that didn’t do their job or policymakers who didn’t listen to the intelligence agencies. Today, with some exceptions, one is not hearing nearly as much about the success in anticipating the Russian move.

It will be interesting to see if this episode is recalled the next time there is handwringing over an “intelligence failure.” Probably, it won’t. The usual pattern after a failure or perceived failure is to attribute the problem not to case-specific circumstances but instead to supposedly fundamental institutional problems.

The other observation is that even if intelligence were perfect and policymakers carefully listened to and accepted the intelligence, some untoward happenings simply cannot be prevented despite the best U.S. efforts. The Biden administration’s aggressive public use of intelligence in this instance evidently was a tactic to complicate and, if possible, avoid, the execution of Putin’s military plans by preemptively exposing what he was intending to do. The tactic was worth trying, even if in the end it did not prevent the invasion. The exposures were more likely to complicate the Russian plans, and maybe even to generate second thoughts about executing them, than to be taken as some kind of dare.

The episode recalls the 1967 Middle East War, when U.S. intelligence provided President Lyndon Johnson with excellent analysis about the likelihood of the war and the prospect that Israel would quickly win it. That intelligence success reportedly was what won Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms a seat at the president’s Tuesday lunch table, where much of Johnson’s national security decisionmaking took place. But despite Johnson’s considerable efforts, Israel was not dissuaded from launching the war.

Given what the United States and Western allies failed to do years ago, as NATO expanded and membership was held out to Ukraine and Georgia, the situation this month with Russia and Ukraine was similar to what Johnson faced in 1967.

The response of policymakers to intelligence—including not just paying attention to it but believing it and acting on it—is always at least as important as what the intelligence itself says. For Biden to go as far out on a limb as he did with the repeated public predictions of an attack is remarkable in its own right. It also forms a stunning contrast with his predecessor’s response to an earlier Russian transgression, which was to say publicly that he believed Putin rather than his own intelligence services.
 

Idolater

"Foundation of the World" Dispensationalist χρ
One of the salient features of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is that it was predicted—strongly, unequivocally, and quite publicly—by the Biden administration. The openly declared assessments, including by President Joe Biden himself, were so unequivocal that they could cause unease among those hearing them about a possible cry-wolf effect if Russia refrained from ever launching the war—and not having a war was, of course, a Western objective.

The administration’s posture was contrary to many predictions by assorted experts, pundits, and commentators that Russia would not invade, and that President Vladimir Putin was staging a show of force with the intention of achieving certain objectives short of war. Don’t expect many mea culpas from those who had made such a prediction. (An exception is Nina Khrushcheva, a professor at the New School—and great-granddaughter of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev—who admitted being “quite embarrassed” over having been proven wrong about this.) The administration’s firmly stated prognosis also went against a prevailing view in Europe that there would be no Russian invasion. . . .

So, the assessment of U.S. intelligence and U.S. policymakers appears to have been on the mark. Two general observations about intelligence and policy follow from this.

One concerns how this episode illustrates again the asymmetry in public and political reactions to intelligence successes and failures. When something untoward and highly visible happens overseas—a war, revolution, nuclear test, or something else—that was not preceded by loud and public U.S. government predictions, then many of the most immediate reactions in public commentary decry the “intelligence failure” involved. Or in a variation of the decrying, questions are raised about whether it was intelligence agencies that didn’t do their job or policymakers who didn’t listen to the intelligence agencies. Today, with some exceptions, one is not hearing nearly as much about the success in anticipating the Russian move.

It will be interesting to see if this episode is recalled the next time there is handwringing over an “intelligence failure.” Probably, it won’t. The usual pattern after a failure or perceived failure is to attribute the problem not to case-specific circumstances but instead to supposedly fundamental institutional problems.

The other observation is that even if intelligence were perfect and policymakers carefully listened to and accepted the intelligence, some untoward happenings simply cannot be prevented despite the best U.S. efforts. The Biden administration’s aggressive public use of intelligence in this instance evidently was a tactic to complicate and, if possible, avoid, the execution of Putin’s military plans by preemptively exposing what he was intending to do. The tactic was worth trying, even if in the end it did not prevent the invasion. The exposures were more likely to complicate the Russian plans, and maybe even to generate second thoughts about executing them, than to be taken as some kind of dare.

The episode recalls the 1967 Middle East War, when U.S. intelligence provided President Lyndon Johnson with excellent analysis about the likelihood of the war and the prospect that Israel would quickly win it. That intelligence success reportedly was what won Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms a seat at the president’s Tuesday lunch table, where much of Johnson’s national security decisionmaking took place. But despite Johnson’s considerable efforts, Israel was not dissuaded from launching the war.

Given what the United States and Western allies failed to do years ago, as NATO expanded and membership was held out to Ukraine and Georgia, the situation this month with Russia and Ukraine was similar to what Johnson faced in 1967.

The response of policymakers to intelligence—including not just paying attention to it but believing it and acting on it—is always at least as important as what the intelligence itself says. For Biden to go as far out on a limb as he did with the repeated public predictions of an attack is remarkable in its own right. It also forms a stunning contrast with his predecessor’s response to an earlier Russian transgression, which was to say publicly that he believed Putin rather than his own intelligence services.
It's remarkable for "intelligence" to mean something as simple and consequential as "there are tons of Russian troops, guns and materiel surrounding Ukraine right now".
 

marke

Well-known member
Meanwhile, back at AFPAC in Orlando, "young white men" are cheering on Russia and Putin:

Fuentes was labeled a "white supremacist" by the radical Marxist black supremacist hate group SPLC. Black supremacist racists hate whites and American patriotism and promote racist black causes and leaders. Even insiders of the racist organization are now speaking out against its culture of racism.


Some employees at the Southern Poverty Law Center say the legendary civil rights nonprofit group suffers from a “systemic culture of racism and sexism within its workplace.”

The claims have been followed by changes in its leadership and a company-wide review.

richard cohen reacts ala roy moore_00000622.jpg

Southern Poverty Law Center president resigns after a co-founder was fired

CNN spoke with three current employees of the organization who talked on condition of anonymity because of fears over possible retribution.

It was one of those employees who cited the systemic problems with racism and sexism, and a second employee agreed with that assessment.
 

marke

Well-known member

Biden did publicly state that it looked like Russia was preparing to invade Ukraine, but that was just a few days ago. How perceptive of him to tell us it looked to him like "it will happen in the next few days."


President Biden says the U.S. believes Russia is continuing to move more troops to the border with Ukraine and that the chances it will invade its neighbor are "very high."
"My sense is that it will happen in the next several days," Biden told reporters outside the White House Thursday as he left on a trip to Ohio.


What a shame he did not say anything about a potential invasion of Ukraine when he talked for two hours last December with his pal, Vladimir Putin.


The Biden team learned that Putin will advance his goals with “asymmetric” tactics, or military and non-military approaches that operate within a gray zone, to trip up the United States. In 2014 and onward, Russia leaked a phone call to embarrass US diplomats, spread fake news, and sowed disinformation, which culminated in unprecedented attacks on the 2016 election in the US. It’s led Biden to grapple with “How to Stand Up to the Kremlin,” as was the title of a 2018 essay he co-authored for Foreign Affairs. He argued that the US must “impose meaningful costs on Russia when they discover evidence of its misdeeds.” He also said that, despite Russia’s belligerent tactics, “Washington needs to keep talking to Moscow,” to avoid unintended escalations of conflict.

As president, Biden has again taken on the role of problem-solver. He spent two hours meeting with Putin in a video call in December as Russia had mobilized troops to its border with Ukraine. “Biden is personally very active on this stuff,” said Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia Group. “Biden runs those meetings. He understands the details.”


Perhaps he did learn a few things after he and Obama botched the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014.
 

marke

Well-known member
It's remarkable for "intelligence" to mean something as simple and consequential as "there are tons of Russian troops, guns and materiel surrounding Ukraine right now".
Second graders could have known as much as US intelligence operatives by looking at Russian troop buildups along the border and concluding like Biden did just a few days ago,

President Biden says the U.S. believes Russia is continuing to move more troops to the border with Ukraine and that the chances it will invade its neighbor are "very high."
"My sense is that it will happen in the next several days," Biden told reporters outside the White House Thursday as he left on a trip to Ohio.

 

Idolater

"Foundation of the World" Dispensationalist χρ
Second graders could have known as much
That was basically my point.
as US intelligence operatives by looking at Russian troop buildups along the border and concluding like Biden did just a few days ago,

President Biden says the U.S. believes Russia is continuing to move more troops to the border with Ukraine and that the chances it will invade its neighbor are "very high."
"My sense is that it will happen in the next several days," Biden told reporters outside the White House Thursday as he left on a trip to Ohio.

I know. So consider how the world might have changed if the Allies had this sort of intelligence before Germany invaded France, rather than just being surprised by the 'blitzkrieg'? It's extremely simple and yet extremely important.
 

annabenedetti

like marbles on glass

Germany OKs weapons for Ukraine in major shift on military aid

Germany has authorized the Netherlands to send Ukraine 400 rocket-propelled grenade launchers to aid in the fight against Russian invaders, according to two EU officials — marking an abrupt shift in Berlin’s military policy amid pressure from EU and NATO allies.

Until Saturday, Germany had clung to a longstanding practice of not permitting lethal weapons that it controlled to be transferred into a conflict zone.

That stance bewildered some European officials, even more so after Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion and launched missile strikes on Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital.

Germany’s shift comes as numerous Western allies are mobilizing to send Ukraine more guns, ammunition and even anti-aircraft defense systems as Russian forces bear down on major Ukrainian cities.
 

ok doser

lifeguard at the cement pond
As president, Biden has again taken on the role of problem-solver.
Biden as a problem solver?

Let's look at the assessment of the guy who knew him best, his boss for 8 years, Barack Obama. Obama said:

Never underestimate Joe's ability to f(oul) things up



He spent two hours meeting with Putin in a video call in December ...
Actually they only spoke for 17 minutes. Biden had to take frequent breaks, for a nap, for pudding, to have his Depends changed ...
 

marke

Well-known member

Germany OKs weapons for Ukraine in major shift on military aid

Germany has authorized the Netherlands to send Ukraine 400 rocket-propelled grenade launchers to aid in the fight against Russian invaders, according to two EU officials — marking an abrupt shift in Berlin’s military policy amid pressure from EU and NATO allies.

Until Saturday, Germany had clung to a longstanding practice of not permitting lethal weapons that it controlled to be transferred into a conflict zone.

That stance bewildered some European officials, even more so after Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion and launched missile strikes on Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital.

Germany’s shift comes as numerous Western allies are mobilizing to send Ukraine more guns, ammunition and even anti-aircraft defense systems as Russian forces bear down on major Ukrainian cities.
Biden opposed sending defensive weapons into Ukraine, relying instead on his ability to talk peace into Russia, not war. Biden and Obama botched the Russian invasion of 2014 and Biden is on track to botch this invasion as well. As late as Dec 30, 2021, Biden and US officials were not expecting Russia to actually invade Ukraine.



U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy ahead of Biden's call with Putin to reiterate Washington’s “unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity," the State Department said.

[IMG alt="Although the Ukrainian military has improved since 2014, experts disagree on how broad and deep these improvements are, and how much is possible when a country is still technically at war.
"]https://gdb.rferl.org/7A7F8AD1-701C-4559-86E9-2BED6633B3C8_cx0_cy3_cw0_w256_r1.jpg[/IMG]

SEE ALSO:

How Long Could Ukraine Hold Out Against A New Russian Invasion?​


Biden plans to speak with Zelenskiy soon after the call with Putin.

Weber said Ukraine’s membership in NATO or a bilateral military alliance between the United States and Ukraine “is either many years away or purely fantastical, so it's both easy for Biden to say it won't happen and gleefully be accepted by the Russian side as a concession.”

John Herbst, the former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, said Putin had sought another phone call “to build on the momentum” he perceived coming out of his last discussion with Biden on December 7.

Putin “still believes he can get a concession or two out of us,” Herbst said, adding that just holding the call itself is a “kind of concession” to the Russian leader.

Herbst said he doesn’t expect Russia to invade Ukraine.
 

ok doser

lifeguard at the cement pond

Germany OKs weapons for Ukraine in major shift on military aid

Germany has authorized the Netherlands to send Ukraine 400 rocket-propelled grenade launchers to aid in the fight against Russian invaders, according to two EU officials — marking an abrupt shift in Berlin’s military policy amid pressure from EU and NATO allies.

Until Saturday, Germany had clung to a longstanding practice of not permitting lethal weapons that it controlled to be transferred into a conflict zone.

That stance bewildered some European officials, even more so after Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion and launched missile strikes on Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital.

Germany’s shift comes as numerous Western allies are mobilizing to send Ukraine more guns, ammunition and even anti-aircraft defense systems as Russian forces bear down on major Ukrainian cities.
Speculation is already running rampant on Putin's response to Germany, expected to be in the form of either cutting off the gas supplies or a marked cost increase. This is why Germany has been hesitant.
Their economy can't survive without that energy.
Their population can't survive, especially in the winter, without that energy.
If Russia turns off the taps on the pipeline supplying Germany, German citizens will begin to die.
 

marke

Well-known member
Actually they only spoke for 17 minutes. Biden had to take frequent breaks, for a nap, for pudding, to have his Depends changed ...
I think Biden must have talked with Putin several times in Dec 2021, compromising with him on points in hopes he would back down.


During a 50-minute call on December 30, the two leaders held a “serious and substantive” exchange to set the groundwork for three sets of upcoming talks early next month, a senior Biden administration official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic matters, told reporters.


Biden and Putin spoke for about two hours over a secure video call earlier Tuesday.
 
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