The irony of the open theist's derisive claims that classical theism is a Greek pedigree seems lost to them, for they embrace the very Greek dualism they disavow. Whitehead's neoclassical process theism, which is the springboard of openism, was an admission by Whitehead himself to an updating of Plato. The open theist's "Greek!" canard is an old straw man usually constructed when someone wishes to reject some aspect of orthodox theology. The time is overdue to drop the ad hominem stereotypes, caricatures and straw-men attacks on the classical orthodox view of God and to reveal the radical departure of these neoclassical views from the I AM of Moses, Jesus, Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Luther and Wesley. Individuals have every right to deviate substantially from the orthodox view, but they have no right to consider themselves orthodox when they do.
What I would like to say here is this is a dialogue on the nature of God and within the Christian context. This is Christian theology in action.
Those who say Jesus is not God, or He was married, or a liar, is not part of Christian theology, as no true Christian believes these untruths.
I will not derail the thread by responding to my comment here; my propose is to illustrate the difference in a true dialogue in Christian theology and one, irrelevant to Christian theology.
As to the quoted material, I would argue Christians have right to deviate substantially from the orthodox view, and still be good Christians. Perhaps not orthodox, but true Christians.
As to the quoted material, I would argue Christians have right to deviate substantially from the orthodox view, and still be good Christians. Perhaps not orthodox, but true Christians.
I suppose it depends upon what "substantially" would mean.
For me, there are seven essentials that divide Christian from non-Christian:
1. the Trinity: the Godhead eternally exists in three personal subsistences—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—and that these three are one God, having precisely the same nature, attributes, and perfections, and worthy of precisely the same homage, confidence, and obedience
(Matt. 28:18-19; Mark 12:29; John 1:14; Acts 5:3-4; 2 Cor. 13:14; Heb. 1:1-3; Rev. 1:4-6)
2. the full deity and humanity of Christ—one Person, two natures—one fully human nature, one fully divine nature —natures that cannot be mixed, confused, divided, or separated
(Luke 1:30-35; John 1:18; 3:16; Heb. 4:15; Luke 2:40; John 1:1-2; Phil. 2:5-8)
3. the spiritual lostness of the human race
All confessions and creeds are subordinate to the norming norm, Scripture. In fact, the WCF makes that point quite clear.
WCF 1.10: "The supreme judge by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture. (Matt. 22:29, 31, Eph. 2:20, Acts 28:25) "
The judgments of the church about weighty matters within Scripture are found in creeds and confessions. They are the authoritative confessions of the communion of saints in the covenantal body of Christ. After all, if we believe the essential truths of the Scriptures to be perspicuous, then ecumenical confession of creeds and confessions follows since they are but written forms of the confession of faith (hermeneutical consensus) of the universal church. And while it follows that infallibility necessitates inerrancy, it does not follow that fallibility necessitates errancy. A fallible church may create inerrant documents. Not unexpectedly, not a few of those that complain about creeds and confessions are the one's who disagree with their content. Men are seldom opposed to creeds and confessions, until creeds and confessions have become opposed to them.
Perhaps one day open theists will actually publish a confession of faith as a communion under the auspices of its church authorities. Better to stand for something than fall for anything.
Cut them a little slack--it took 1600 years to get to the WCF.
But of course you are right--creeds and confessions are statements by humans of their understanding of things of God. And whether they are written or spoken, every Christian has one, or they can't have professed publicly their belief in Christ. The thief on the cross had one: "And we indeed are suffering justly, for we are receiving what we deserve for our deeds; but this man has done nothing wrong.”
It's unfortunate (I think) that many people go to their confession and finding what they want, stop there, without going on to the scripture proofs to see what scripture actually says.
It's unfortunate (I think) that many people go to their confession and finding what they want, stop there, without going on to the scripture proofs to see what scripture actually says.
Yes it is. Sadly many who read confessions and creeds, esp. the WCF for example, skim over the 3,200+ Scripture proofs provided in support of the context being discussed to determine the veracity of things being said.
While these proofs are not a "part" of the confession in terms of adoption or subscription, but there are two considerations which show they are a part of the confession in terms of evaluating the reformed tradition. First, in general, the reformed view of verbum Dei teaches that what is founded on the word of God is the word of God in a secondary sense. This makes the scriptural basis a fundamental aspect of theological formulation. The Scripture proof process reflects the exegetical tradition and the exegetical tradition is built on the text of Scripture. Secondly, more specifically, the divines of the Westminster Assembly were bound by vow to scriptural authority in all deliberations. The eventual inclusion of the proofs reflects the scriptural authority upon which the Assembly's formulations were based.
Back in 2006 or so the OPC recently published a book titled, The Confession of Faith and Catechisms, that contains all the proof texts. There is an index to the proof texts from the CF, LC, SC in the back of that book.
And before someone chimes in about proof-texting, let me note that people complaining about proof-texting are attributing their pitiful experience with opponents who drop verses without meaningful context or explanation (like John 3:16--"hey! it proves that people have free-will!") as if just referencing the text was the silver bullet. Real proof-texting is contextual, exegetical, and applicational.
Furthermore, let me note that the New Testament employs proof-texting effectively, especially the books initially intended for Jewish audience. One thinks of Matthew's "fulfilment" motif, or Hebrews "Holy Ghost" statements. It is a type of ad verecundiam, where not only the text is appealed to, but its plain meaning is undisputed within a tradition. It is a valid form of argument in intramural discussion. Furthermore what we call proof-texting today is not what the term meant in the historical context of 17th century Reformed Scholasticism.
The folks who think the Westminster Standards are "drawing huge swaths of doctrine out of individual words or individual phrases in seemingly isolated verses," obviously haven't studied either the Standards or the Scriptures adduced in them. That's just the truth. These are ignorant (not well informed) people. And I'm sorry they are both factually and feelingly in error, or that this assessment may seem insulting to them. It's not meant to be. But this is exactly why the church is today in such a state. Folks who otherwise claim a fierce dedication to Scripture are bringing a whole lot into the Scripture, instead of truly coming to the Scripture to be taught. If we challenge most of them, they will say they have no time, or they are satisfied that the understanding they have received (from men they trusted!) is the truth. They want to be "Bereans" but they are locked in to a grid of pre-understanding that is quite powerful and intoxicating.
I've "trimmed" again.So what you are saying is that we have to sin to know how to sin? If so, then how do we sin in the first place? You admit that eating of the tree was sin, right? but you say eating of the tree allowed us to be able to sin. In which case we couldn't have sinned by eating of the tree until we had already eaten of the tree, right?
Satan had to have led them to it, as far as I can discern. Somewhere along the line Satan fell, something went wrong. "How?" I've no idea, but the Serpent lied to Adam and Eve that they wouldn't surely die. There would have been no questioning of God without a 'nature' to do so and that nature was already in the serpent.
Also, I think you have latched onto an idea that is unusual--that free will is a sinful condition. It's funny to me, because the Calvinism I've been exposed to says just the opposite--that sin causes a loss of free will. Iow, in the garden, Adam and Eve could either sin or not sin. After they sinned, they fell into a depraved state where they could only sin, thus they have no more free will. The definition of free will in that case includes the ability to do according to God's will and the ability not to do so. Your working definition is (correct me here if I get it wrong, but think first about whether I might have gotten it right): free will means only being able to do what God doesn't want.
This is why I don't like 'free' describing the will, and neither do a good number of Calvinists (and even Arminians). When we say 'free' it has a negative connotation.
It sounds positive, but the second question MUST be asked: "What is it free from?" We know the will is bound to one of two masters from Matthew 6. For me the quick answer is that we are either 'free' from sin and death through Christ, OR we are free from God in our state of sin but that 'freedom' is a curse that leads to death. Hence, you are correct that when I say sinful man is 'free' it does indeed mean 'free' from God and is no good thing. That is it. I know of no other thing we are 'free from' except as it relates to God or sin.
I think that's a bad example of what you're trying to refute (and it's irresponsible of open theists to require such a refutation). Telling Abraham "now I know" in Gen 22:12 is a better one. Or saying about Sodom: "I will go down to see whether they have done altogether according to the outcry that has come to me. And if not, I will know." (Gen 18:21) Both of these imply that God is looking for a particular response, and that knowing the heart is not quite good enough for Him--He wants to see some action to back it up. Abraham's faith was what He was praised for, but his actions were the evidence of the faith, ala James. Is it possible that God needs to see the actions to know for sure? That's what the scripture seems to indicate. Are we afraid of what scripture really says in these two places? We shouldn't be afraid of the truth. (Don't get me wrong--I'm not saying I have the truth, but I'm saying we should allow scripture to tell us what the truth is, even if we don't like it.)
If I am destined to get a pony, perhaps. If not, then God knows something that isn't and never will be. Again, maybe it is useful to know such information, but it means God knows something that is not the truth. If He uses that information to interact with us, our interaction will be somewhat incomprehensible. (Imagine the conversation: God: "Derf, how is _____, your pet pony doing? Derf: "I don't have a pet pony. Surely You know that." God: "Well of course I know that. But if you did, its name would be _____." Derf: "I'm really glad to know that.")
This makes you an open theist but the 'logic' behind this thinking is flawed and against other very clear pedantic (clear teaching scriptures about the nature of God) scriptures. If God had to 'go down' to know, then He isn't omnipresent. "If" God were not omnipresent, He cannot, logically, be God. Why? Because if God is not omnipresent, He is the product of creation because of its restriction. Men do not understand that they are erroneously applying their finite limitation, in mind and conception, to God. Most of the time, it is the one who cannot think Metaphysically that does this. As such, I have a lot of love and patience for an Open Theist, but they are quite wrong about this. Demonstrable? Perhaps only to a few that can think in metaphysical terms and that is only about a quarter of us. Therefore, I think God does give anthropomorphic language that all might grasp a concept, but to over-assert them is incorrect. "If I go down" was for Abraham's benefit. If God didn't know, He cannot be God specifically because it is ONLY a physical limitation. Let me say this again: If God is limited by physical limitation, He is then ruled by the physical universe and the product of a physical universe. Such quickly leads others like this, to Mormonism and Process Theology.
"Knowing the heart and mind as well as the future means God knows before. He is rather being relational to Abraham in an anthropomorphic way that Abraham would become involved. God isn't being dishonest, He is interacting in time and thus 'will know' is about Abraham's future reality, in clear and accurate conveyance.
In your words, if something is "already part of His infinite expression", at what point was it not? If the answer is "never", then God is as much a part of the movie as we are, and He can't change anything. If the answer is "at some point along the line", then God can change destiny--He is sovereign over it rather than the other way around.
Trying to 'be nice to God' because He is bored is 'human' thinking. We know God is not a man, nor (and especially) does He think like one. We don't have to 'save' God from boredom. His nature is unchanging. Man is the only one that needs/must change. Do you enjoy your own company? God does, completely.
I don't claim to know how time works, or how sequence outside of time works, but God deciding to do something, like: "Let us make man in our image" suggests that He at least does things in some kind of order or sequence (AMR touched on this point and I think agrees with it, though I don't know if he would admit it). If His future is as settled as ours, and it would have to be for your statements to make sense, then He could not at any point not know He would make man in His image. Therefore He is locked into His own destiny as much as we are locked into ours. For instance, "before" He predestined us to glory, He already knew that we would be predestined to glory. I think the open view helps with this conundrum. At the same time, it introduces another, probably worse one, which is: what is God's starting point? But is it any better to put forward one solution that we don't understand in place of another one we don't understand? Only if the bible leans one way or another--without our presuppositions getting in the way (if that's possible). And the appeal to Judaic understanding isn't very strong considering how they received their messiah.
God is relational to us, in time, so will interact with us in succession as we understand it but the line I drew goes in two directions. It doesn't only go in one direction and cannot. Again, this would be a 'physical' constraint. Why can't God be physically constrained? Because the entirety of the physical universe is made by God who is Spirit, not a physical being. MOST problems in theology, and moreso with Open Theism, are because of a misunderstanding and misapprehension of thinking God is only part of this physical universe. If/once one is able to comprehend this verse: John 4:24 They will begin to realize that God cannot be constrained by any physical parameter.
Lon;4594366]At this point, I'm not talking as a Calvinist, but as a Christian. Scripture reading is its own authority and carries self-authenticating truth. The Urantia book is not inspired, not given by God, not profitable for teaching, correction, rebuking, or training in righteousness. 2 Timothy 3:16 I've no idea where you are, because your attacks and rejection was rather esoteric and disconnective, but your choice to remove yourself from Christian circles was/is your choice with not very much God in it, that I can see. It is akin to driving without a map. You may or may not get to your destination, but since it is a bit complicated, the likelihood is rather slim. The rest of us use maps, electronic or otherwise. John 14:6 There is no other way. Only a fool, frankly, drives a long distance shunning maps. He may be about scenery but that man has no destination but is carried about by every wind. Scripture, itself, tells you to read it and keep reading, such as in James, where the man who stops reading it, stops doing what it says, is like a man who no longer knows what he looks like if he doesn't use a mirror. James and the other Apostles are/were trying to tell you something. You ignore or reject them to your own demise.
So there is a distinction between the Calvinist and Christian? Just to remind you're not the only one in these debates that has ever read the scripture, I would say you are the one with wrong divisional skills 2Cor 3:6, It's better not to read the map if one can't discern it's symbols (trying to tell you something) and end up back at the start over and over again. The scripture does teach spiritual truth, through singularity and plurality that is wrote in figurative lives that dramatize the same precept (Galatians 4:24-28) over and over about the Kingdom and Temple made without hands Luke 17:20-21, And the one made with hands which is only a outward allegory pointing inwardly, The spiritual lesson isn't about two separated physical siblings, And you're the one education in the field of theology yet you can't discern that Pearl.
:doh: Great, Zeke, there went most of Christianity with just you, Caino, and Freelight and a few other Urantia followers left :Z Cult mentality always amazes me "Just us! Not you!" When you flip that around, it would be "Most of us, not sure about you, but we are trying to follow the map God gave us and suggest strongly, you do the same.
So its a outward based percentage game as well is it? I don't recall the historic version supporting the broad road being the crowd to follow. I don't read the Urantia by the way, I do converse with Freelight in the light of the spirit being "all" things to "all" peoples which escaped out of the exclusive box you're theology built for it. Romans 11:32-35.
The thing is you must doom those who disagree with you're interpretation, which exposes the heart of the matter as does 2Cor 3:6 and 1Cor 13.
This makes you an open theist but the 'logic' behind this thinking is flawed and against other very clear pedantic (clear teaching scriptures about the nature of God) scriptures. If God had to 'go down' to know, then He isn't omnipresent.
Depends on what "go down" means. Did the LORD go down to Sodom? Surely He did if He said He was going to, despite your contention that He didn't need to. How did He go down to Sodom? One suggestion is that He went down in judgment--a viable "going down", imo, but the text of Gen 18 doesn't really fit the idea that well, because of the reason the LORD gave--He knew their sin was very grievous, but He wanted to do something to "see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it". If God says He's going to "do" something, it is probably anthropomorphic to a point, but there's also a point where it's not--where it actually means SOMETHING, even if it's difficult to figure out what it means. What we need to do is to figure out what He means by His anthropomorphic language, rather than disregard it entirely by saying it doesn't fit with His nature/description.
I would propose the possibility that He "went down" by sending His angels there to see what would happen if they spent the night in the street--giving the men of the town an opportunity to show how bad they were, and possibly (though not very likely) to allow them a chance to do better. We know the result--the angels were threatened, then Lot was threatened. We also know that there was an opportunity to find 10 righteous people, as the angel communicated to Lot to get all of his people, whether sons (did Lot have any yet??) sons-in-law (2 at least), and daughters (2 at least). If Abraham stopped at 10, but he knew there were only 6 in Lot's family, why did he stop? Maybe because he was "knew" there would be more? Speculation Alert: Assuming the minimum number of people implied by the angels' question in Gen 19:12, along with the statements about sons-in-law, and assuming either a couple of servants or the sons' (notice the plural) wives (if the potential sons were married) we easily get to 10. But only 4 were saved, and the sons-in-law were scornful of the warning, in which they demonstrated they were not of the righteous, so didn't help in the (failed) count to 10. end speculation ))
Such a proposal puts the Sodom episode on the same footing (omniscience-wise) as Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac--God wanted to "see" the outworking of the wickedness in the one case, and the outworking of the faithfulness in the other. The best answer to why that was necessary is that God deals with us in time, rather than in future reality. Does it mean God doesn't know the future reality? Depends on how literally you want to take the scriptures here. (This is different, by the way, than asking Adam "where are you?", because God didn't tell us why He was asking. Here He told us why He was going to "go down".)
"If" God were not omnipresent, He cannot, logically, be God. Why? Because if God is not omnipresent, He is the product of creation because of its restriction.
I don't think this follows logically. If I build a house, I am not part of that house just because I'm not omnipresent with respect to all areas of that house.
Men do not understand that they are erroneously applying their finite limitation, in mind and conception, to God. Most of the time, it is the one who cannot think Metaphysically that does this. As such, I have a lot of love and patience for an Open Theist, but they are quite wrong about this. Demonstrable? Perhaps only to a few that can think in metaphysical terms and that is only about a quarter of us.
Trying to 'be nice to God' because He is bored is 'human' thinking. We know God is not a man, nor (and especially) does He think like one. We don't have to 'save' God from boredom. His nature is unchanging. Man is the only one that needs/must change. Do you enjoy your own company? God does, completely.
I'm not trying to "be nice to God" any more than you are when you say God knows the future exhaustively. What I'm trying to point out is that if God never, ever, made a decision that wasn't predetermined (including the decision to predetermine something), God is as much a "Truman" as you and I are.
God is relational to us, in time, so will interact with us in succession as we understand it but the line I drew goes in two directions. It doesn't only go in one direction and cannot. Again, this would be a 'physical' constraint. Why can't God be physically constrained? Because the entirety of the physical universe is made by God who is Spirit, not a physical being. MOST problems in theology, and moreso with Open Theism, are because of a misunderstanding and misapprehension of thinking God is only part of this physical universe. If/once one is able to comprehend this verse: John 4:24 They will begin to realize that God cannot be constrained by any physical parameter.
This may be so, but I doubt anybody can do any different. We all deal with the finiteness of our thinking--including you, as you pointed out before. Is it impossible that some of that finiteness has come into play in your description of God? is it possible to over-exaggerate God's attributes? Some of the problems with theology might be because we have separated God so far from us with thoughts of what He must be like as an infinite being that we can't comprehend, that we are prone to say things beyond our mental capacity. At least beyond mine. I think also beyond yours (no offense meant). But are these things in the bible, except as concepts that are potentially misconstrued by both sides?
Only a God who remains eternally and essentially the same can have a counsel that stands for ever (Isa 46:10) and a covenant that is everlasting (Isa 55:3, Jer 32:40, Heb 13:20). Herein exactly lies the glory of the Christian doctrine of God, that the unchangeable One is the One in control of the change of the universe. Accordingly, the Protestant orthodox state three implications of this immutability: first God is changeless in essence, not liable to any conversion into another essence, to any alteration, to any change of place, not been “moved” or brought into being by another (i.e., God is unmoved means precisely that he is the first mover who imparts motion, which is to say existence to all that is; second, he is immutable in his attributes: his goodness cannot cease to be good, his holiness cannot cease to be holy, his omniscience cannot cease to know all things; and third, he is immutable in his decree, his purpose, his promises (Num 23:19; Mal 3:6–7). It is clear that divine immutability does not mean stasis or inactivity.
Whereas all change is an activity, not all activity is a change. God is eternally active, eternally and without alteration begetting and proceeding in the divine essence itself. Since the divine activity is constant and continuous it implies no change in God: it is an immutable activity.
Considering open theism, we can concede there are passages in Scripture that speak of God as changeless to provide some exegetical basis for a doctrine of divine immutability—but we further concede there are just as many which point to divine change, divine becoming, divine repentance. Where open theists does not do full justice to the classical position is in their assumption that classical theism has simply chosen, on the basis of a preconceived and unbiblical doctrine, to read texts in which God is said to change or repent as “figurative.” The charge might hold if there were no texts in which God is said to be constant and changeless. But such is not the case. There is even Num 23:19, in which God is said (didactically so) not to repent.
Hence, the issue thus concerns the logical and theological priority of one set of statements over another: Do we read statements concerning divine repentance as dependent for their meaning upon logically prior statements concerning the absence of change in God, or ought we to read statements concerning the divine constancy as meaningful only when qualified by a doctrine of actual divine repentance?
The question appears quite radically in the light of Mal 3:6–7, which declares both that God does not change and that God “will return” to his people when they return to him. Clearly, the return of God to his people is a sign of the changelessness or constancy of God toward those who keep his covenant: Israel, in breaking covenant, has experienced a loss of communion with God and will experience that communion again when she returns to covenant obedience. The text does not refer to a God whose presence is in fact everywhere somehow becoming absent and then subsequently returning. The “absence of God” is one of the ways in which Scripture refers to human alienation, without any hint of a doctrine that God changes location. Nor does the text refer to an ethical change in God: God’s “return” or repentance is predicated upon his changelessness.
Israel is not consumed and she is promised the experience of renewed communion on the basis of God’s ethical changelessness—“I the Lord do not change; therefore…” Indeed, the very nature of divine repentance of which the Scriptures speak is predicated upon God’s changeless purpose and promise, “I am God Almighty; walk before me and be blameless. And I will make my covenant between me and you.” There is a logical priority of ethical and intentional changelessness over the divine repentance. If this were not so, the divine repentance would be ethically meaningless and without relation to the divine purpose for Israel.
This logical priority of ethical immutability over references to divine repentance not only forcefully presses the conclusion that the change to which the repentance texts refer is in the creature—an interpretation that is not at all the result of a philosophical presupposition or a figurative reading, contra the open theist charge—it also raises the issue of the ground in God of this inalterable purpose. Ethical, intentional constancy, as noted above, must have an ontological basis. The constancy of the divine purpose, the consistency of the God who is what he is and will be what he will be, must also indicate a consistency, an immutability of the divine being. The continuity of purpose denoted by the divine repentance cannot be guaranteed by a God who becomes something that he was not. The issue is not so much whether Scripture declares ontological immutability, but that this concept is strongly implied.
Even if we set aside, for a moment, the question of an ontological immutability, there remains the issue of the logical relationship of divine repentance to those statements of Scripture which imply a kind of immutability in divine knowledge: the knowledge of God is not a matter of “discovery.” When God is said to “know” it is not a matter of God discovering something which he did not already know; or, in a more technical theological way of stating the case, God’s knowledge is never in potency. Unless we admit this view of the divine knowledge, we will be left with Marcion’s incompetent God of the OT who, in Gen 3:9, really did not know where Adam was; who, in Gen 18:21, really had to “go down” to Sodom to find out for himself what went on there; and who—if we extrapolate such views to the entirety of Scripture—invented the incarnation as a hasty response to a fall that he did not foresee.
But if we take seriously the teaching that God knows our words even before they are on our tongues (Ps 139:4) and has ordained the incarnation itself, the center and meaning of all history, before the foundation of the world, then we must assume that he foreknows human actions. Divine repentance, then, cannot mean that God changes his mind contingent upon a human act of which he had no prior knowledge. In effect, divine repentance indicates a consistency of divine willing (and knowing) viewed as a change of relationship by a repentant creature. Divine repentance rests upon the consistency—the immutability—of the divine promises. That is precisely the result of the classical exegesis of the “repentance” passages, not on the basis of arbitrary dogmatic decision but rather on the ground of logically prior scriptural passages didactically indicating divine constancy. A God who repents as human beings repent not only falls short of immutability, he also falls short of omniscience.
But, in spite of the above, we still have not solved the exegetical problem. What remains is the question of incarnation as divine change, a question of an entirely different order than the simple issue of repentance. Here, we do not have (or want to have) any contrary texts: “the Word became flesh and dwelt among us.” Open theism argues, literally, on the basis of this text, that “changing is something God can do.” In fact, Pinnock (one-third of the open theist triumvirate with Boyd and Sanders) using John 1:14, argued the underlying meaning of the incarnation to be “God can become something.” The question now is, can this text be read literally or does the literal reading of the text indicate a change in God?
Beloved, this is not a new question. The fathers of the church saw the problem and addressed it and so did the medieval scholastics. When the question was raised again in the seventeenth century by the Socinian opponents of traditional orthodoxy, the Protestant scholastics looked to the earlier literature and repeated the ancient answer: God did not “become” flesh in such a way as to cease to be anything other than God. The incarnation means no alteration of God’s purpose (it was ordained before the foundation of the world) and no alteration of the being of God. God remains God and yet, according to his eternal will, joins himself irrevocably to our humanity. But, the open theist will ask, is not this joining of natures, divine and human, indicative of a change in both? The church responded “No!” Jerome Zanchi (1516-1590) argued as follows:
We believe moreover that the Son of God became man, not by any change of him into flesh or by a change in the flesh or by a confusion of the divine nature with the human, but by the sole assumption of the human nature into the unity of the said person; and, as Athanasius says, not by conversion of the divinity into flesh but by the assumption of the humanity into God; so that in no way did it dismiss that which it was, but assumed that which it was not.
Indeed, the church responded (in 451 AD at Chalcedon) to numerous errors regarding the Person of Our Lord, all said errors traceable to the confusing, mixing, dividing, or separating the two natures of the Person, to wit:
Spoiler
Our Lord was fully God and fully man in an indissoluble union whereby the second person of the Trinity assumed a human nature that cannot be separated, divided, mixed, or confused.
One can best understand this mystical union (together united in one subsistence and in one single person) by examining what it is not, thus from the process of elimination determine what it must be.
The union of the divine and the human natures is not:
1. a denial that our Lord was truly God (Ebionites, Elkasites, Arians);
2. a dissimilar or different substance (anomoios) with the Father (semi-Arianism);
3. a denial that our Lord had a genuine human soul (Apollinarians);
4. a denial of a distinct person in the Trinity (Dynamic Monarchianism);
5. God acting merely in the forms of the Son and Spirit (Modalistic Monarchianism/Sabellianism/United Pentecostal Church);
6. a mixture or change when the two natures were united (Eutychianism/Monophysitism);
7. two distinct persons (Nestorianism);
8. a denial of the true humanity of Christ (docetism);
9. a view that God the Son laid aside all or some of His divine attributes (kenoticism);
10. a view that there was a communication of the attributes between the divine and human natures (Lutheranism, with respect to the Lord's Supper); and
11. a view that our Lord existed independently as a human before God entered His body (Adoptionism).
The Chalcedonian Definition is one of the few statements that all of orthodox Christendom recognizes as the most faithful summary of the teachings of the Scriptures on the matter of the Incarnate Christ. The Chalcedonian Definition was the answer to the many heterodoxies identified above during the third century.
Open theists that challenge this view (i.e., God does not change)—which cannot be the result of an exegetical word-study of John 1:14—are relying upon post-Kantian metaphysics, specifically from Hegelian ontology of God becoming. Notice now, that whereas the issue is not exegetical in relation to the verb “became” in John 1:14, it is indeed exegetical in relation to the larger context of Scripture, where God is the one “with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change” (James 1:17). It is only on the basis of an arbitrary philosophical decision in favor of a Hegelian ontology that the language of John 1:14 can be referred to a change in God; and, conversely, there is no necessary contradiction between the text of John 1:14 and the doctrine of an ontologically immutable God working a redemptive change in humanity by the assumption of (not the becoming of) flesh, in accordance with his eternal, immutable purpose. The incarnation was not a reaction on God’s part, not a bandage placed as an afterthought on the wounded creation, but the purpose of God in the very act of creation itself. Nor is the incarnation a sudden injection of redemptive power into a world otherwise left to its own devices—as it would indeed be if it implied a change in God.
The active immutability of God, the ever-living and eternally unchanging interpenetration of the divine persons, translates into the divine willingness, without a shadow of turning, to make us partakers of that gloriously inalterable and living incorruptibility. We are most fortunate that in the incarnation God is not engaged in a work of self-realization (per open theism) but in the redemptive working-out of his eternal glory: incarnation is, in its immutable purpose, God with us and for us.
Only a God who remains eternally and essentially the same can have a counsel that stands for ever (Isa 46:10) and a covenant that is everlasting (Isa 55:3, Jer 32:40, Heb 13:20). Herein exactly lies the glory of the Christian doctrine of God, that the unchangeable One is the One in control of the change of the universe. Accordingly, the Protestant orthodox state three implications of this immutability: first God is changeless in essence, not liable to any conversion into another essence, to any alteration, to any change of place, not been “moved” or brought into being by another (i.e., God is unmoved means precisely that he is the first mover who imparts motion, which is to say existence to all that is; second, he is immutable in his attributes: his goodness cannot cease to be good, his holiness cannot cease to be holy, his omniscience cannot cease to know all things; and third, he is immutable in his decree, his purpose, his promises (Num 23:19; Mal 3:6–7). It is clear that divine immutability does not mean stasis or inactivity.
Whereas all change is an activity, not all activity is a change. God is eternally active, eternally and without alteration begetting and proceeding in the divine essence itself. Since the divine activity is constant and continuous it implies no change in God: it is an immutable activity.
Considering open theism, we can concede there are passages in Scripture that speak of God as changeless to provide some exegetical basis for a doctrine of divine immutability—but we further concede there are just as many which point to divine change, divine becoming, divine repentance. Where open theists does not do full justice to the classical position is in their assumption that classical theism has simply chosen, on the basis of a preconceived and unbiblical doctrine, to read texts in which God is said to change or repent as “figurative.” The charge might hold if there were no texts in which God is said to be constant and changeless. But such is not the case. There is even Num 23:19, in which God is said (didactically so) not to repent.
Hence, the issue thus concerns the logical and theological priority of one set of statements over another: Do we read statements concerning divine repentance as dependent for their meaning upon logically prior statements concerning the absence of change in God, or ought we to read statements concerning the divine constancy as meaningful only when qualified by a doctrine of actual divine repentance?
The question appears quite radically in the light of Mal 3:6–7, which declares both that God does not change and that God “will return” to his people when they return to him. Clearly, the return of God to his people is a sign of the changelessness or constancy of God toward those who keep his covenant: Israel, in breaking covenant, has experienced a loss of communion with God and will experience that communion again when she returns to covenant obedience. The text does not refer to a God whose presence is in fact everywhere somehow becoming absent and then subsequently returning. The “absence of God” is one of the ways in which Scripture refers to human alienation, without any hint of a doctrine that God changes location. Nor does the text refer to an ethical change in God: God’s “return” or repentance is predicated upon his changelessness.
Israel is not consumed and she is promised the experience of renewed communion on the basis of God’s ethical changelessness—“I the Lord do not change; therefore…” Indeed, the very nature of divine repentance of which the Scriptures speak is predicated upon God’s changeless purpose and promise, “I am God Almighty; walk before me and be blameless. And I will make my covenant between me and you.” There is a logical priority of ethical and intentional changelessness over the divine repentance. If this were not so, the divine repentance would be ethically meaningless and without relation to the divine purpose for Israel.
This logical priority of ethical immutability over references to divine repentance not only forcefully presses the conclusion that the change to which the repentance texts refer is in the creature—an interpretation that is not at all the result of a philosophical presupposition or a figurative reading, contra the open theist charge—it also raises the issue of the ground in God of this inalterable purpose. Ethical, intentional constancy, as noted above, must have an ontological basis. The constancy of the divine purpose, the consistency of the God who is what he is and will be what he will be, must also indicate a consistency, an immutability of the divine being. The continuity of purpose denoted by the divine repentance cannot be guaranteed by a God who becomes something that he was not. The issue is not so much whether Scripture declares ontological immutability, but that this concept is strongly implied.
Even if we set aside, for a moment, the question of an ontological immutability, there remains the issue of the logical relationship of divine repentance to those statements of Scripture which imply a kind of immutability in divine knowledge: the knowledge of God is not a matter of “discovery.” When God is said to “know” it is not a matter of God discovering something which he did not already know; or, in a more technical theological way of stating the case, God’s knowledge is never in potency. Unless we admit this view of the divine knowledge, we will be left with Marcion’s incompetent God of the OT who, in Gen 3:9, really did not know where Adam was; who, in Gen 18:21, really had to “go down” to Sodom to find out for himself what went on there; and who—if we extrapolate such views to the entirety of Scripture—invented the incarnation as a hasty response to a fall that he did not foresee.
But if we take seriously the teaching that God knows our words even before they are on our tongues (Ps 139:4) and has ordained the incarnation itself, the center and meaning of all history, before the foundation of the world, then we must assume that he foreknows human actions. Divine repentance, then, cannot mean that God changes his mind contingent upon a human act of which he had no prior knowledge. In effect, divine repentance indicates a consistency of divine willing (and knowing) viewed as a change of relationship by a repentant creature. Divine repentance rests upon the consistency—the immutability—of the divine promises. That is precisely the result of the classical exegesis of the “repentance” passages, not on the basis of arbitrary dogmatic decision but rather on the ground of logically prior scriptural passages didactically indicating divine constancy. A God who repents as human beings repent not only falls short of immutability, he also falls short of omniscience.
But, in spite of the above, we still have not solved the exegetical problem. What remains is the question of incarnation as divine change, a question of an entirely different order than the simple issue of repentance. Here, we do not have (or want to have) any contrary texts: “the Word became flesh and dwelt among us.” Open theism argues, literally, on the basis of this text, that “changing is something God can do.” In fact, Pinnock (one-third of the open theist triumvirate with Boyd and Sanders) using John 1:14, argued the underlying meaning of the incarnation to be “God can become something.” The question now is, can this text be read literally or does the literal reading of the text indicate a change in God?
Beloved, this is not a new question. The fathers of the church saw the problem and addressed it and so did the medieval scholastics. When the question was raised again in the seventeenth century by the Socinian opponents of traditional orthodoxy, the Protestant scholastics looked to the earlier literature and repeated the ancient answer: God did not “become” flesh in such a way as to cease to be anything other than God. The incarnation means no alteration of God’s purpose (it was ordained before the foundation of the world) and no alteration of the being of God. God remains God and yet, according to his eternal will, joins himself irrevocably to our humanity. But, the open theist will ask, is not this joining of natures, divine and human, indicative of a change in both? The church responded “No!” Jerome Zanchi (1516-1590) argued as follows:
We believe moreover that the Son of God became man, not by any change of him into flesh or by a change in the flesh or by a confusion of the divine nature with the human, but by the sole assumption of the human nature into the unity of the said person; and, as Athanasius says, not by conversion of the divinity into flesh but by the assumption of the humanity into God; so that in no way did it dismiss that which it was, but assumed that which it was not.
Indeed, the church responded (in 451 AD at Chalcedon) to numerous errors regarding the Person of Our Lord, all said errors traceable to the confusing, mixing, dividing, or separating the two natures of the Person.
Open theists that challenge this view—which cannot be the result of an exegetical word-study of John 1:14—are relying upon post-Kantian metaphysics, specifically from Hegelian ontology of God becoming. Notice now, that whereas the issue is not exegetical in relation to the verb “became” in John 1:14, it is indeed exegetical in relation to the larger context of Scripture, where God is the one “with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change” (James 1:17). It is only on the basis of an arbitrary philosophical decision in favor of a Hegelian ontology that the language of John 1:14 can be referred to a change in God; and, conversely, there is no necessary contradiction between the text of John 1:14 and the doctrine of an ontologically immutable God working a redemptive change in humanity by the assumption of (not the becoming of) flesh, in accordance with his eternal, immutable purpose. The incarnation was not a reaction on God’s part, not a bandage placed as an afterthought on the wounded creation, but the purpose of God in the very act of creation itself. Nor is the incarnation a sudden injection of redemptive power into a world otherwise left to its own devices—as it would indeed be if it implied a change in God.
The active immutability of God, the ever-living and eternally unchanging interpenetration of the divine persons, translates into the divine willingness, without a shadow of turning, to make us partakers of that gloriously inalterable and living incorruptibility. We are most fortunate that in the incarnation God is not engaged in a work of self-realization (per open theism) but in the redemptive working-out of his eternal glory: incarnation is, in its immutable purpose, God with us and for us.
You know a lot about religion, but you know very little about the Gospel.
You have yet to expound on 2 Corinthians 5:18, 19. If God has Already reconciled the world unto himself by Jesus Christ, then what good is your Calvinist religion or any religion?
Non-Reformed theology, somewhere between heresy and a face palm.
The main cause for free will existing in Christianity is due to those freethinkers after St. Augustine who impressed people with an idea that men are in control. Theology outside of Reformed doctrine is more like a merger for atheist arrogance and Christian belief.
What specifically in my post above is at odds with what you believe? Given the topic of my post above, I have to ask if you are an open theist? :idunno:
Sigh. I suspect not a few of us would actually like to see you deal with any topic that you start threads about at a substantive level. Why not weigh in at something other than your usual superficial level? I am more than happy to compare what I have to say about your topics than it appears you are, for example:
Lastly, if you try to slow down a wee bit with the starting of so many redundant threads, you may actually discover you need not ask questions answered:
Non-Reformed theology, somewhere between heresy and a face palm.
The main cause for free will existing in Christianity is due to those freethinkers after St. Augustine who impressed people with an idea that men are in control. Theology outside of Reformed doctrine is more like a merger for atheist arrogance and Christian belief.
The main cause for free will existing in Christianity is due to those freethinkers after St. Augustine who impressed people with an idea that men are in control.
Ignoring the insults I have deleted, I cannot disagree with the above.
In fact, the idea that men consider themselves to be autonomous lies at the root of the notions of libertarian free will. According to the post-modernism that pervades this world today, the individual is not truly fulfilled by becoming ever more autonomous. Of course, to move too far in this direction is to risk psychosis, the ultimate form of human autonomy. The injunction that to find one’s self, one must lose one’s self, contains the truth any seeker of self-fulfillment needs to grasp.
The old Adamic nature loves itself above God and wants to be captain of its own destiny. To argue that man is a libertarian free moral agent and the determiner of his own destiny, and that therefore he has the power to checkmate his Maker, is to strip God of his power. To say that the creature has escaped the bounds assigned by his Creator, and that God is now practically suffering at the "free will" decisions of His creatures as a helpless Spectator before the sin and suffering entailed by Adam's fall, is to repudiate the express declaration of Holy Writ, namely, "Surely the wrath of man shall praise Thee: the remainder of wrath shalt Thou restrain" (Psalm 76:10). In a word, to deny the sovereignty of God is to enter upon a path which, if followed to its logical terminus, is to arrive at blank atheism.
Rather I and others embrace the absolute, irresistible, infinite sovereignty of the God of Scripture and affirm His right to govern the universe which He has made for His own glory, just as He pleases. I will affirm that God's right is the right of the Potter over the fallen lump of clay; that He may mold that clay into whatsoever form He chooses, fashioning out of the same lump one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor according to only nothing but His own will and nature, and that God is under no obligation to give an account of His matters to any.
Ignoring the insults I have deleted, I cannot disagree with the above.
In fact, the idea that men consider themselves to be autonomous lies at the root of the notions of libertarian free will. According to the post-modernism that pervades this world today, the individual is not truly fulfilled by becoming ever more autonomous. Of course, to move too far in this direction is to risk psychosis, the ultimate form of human autonomy. The injunction that to find one’s self, one must lose one’s self, contains the truth any seeker of self-fulfillment needs to grasp.
The old Adamic nature loves itself above God and wants to be captain of its own destiny. To argue that man is a libertarian free moral agent and the determiner of his own destiny, and that therefore he has the power to checkmate his Maker, is to strip God of his power. To say that the creature has escaped the bounds assigned by his Creator, and that God is now practically suffering at the "free will" decisions of His creatures as a helpless Spectator before the sin and suffering entailed by Adam's fall, is to repudiate the express declaration of Holy Writ, namely, "Surely the wrath of man shall praise Thee: the remainder of wrath shalt Thou restrain" (Psalm 76:10). In a word, to deny the sovereignty of God is to enter upon a path which, if followed to its logical terminus, is to arrive at blank atheism.
Rather I and others embrace the absolute, irresistible, infinite sovereignty of the God of Scripture and affirm His right to govern the universe which He has made for His own glory, just as He pleases. I will affirm that God's right is the right of the Potter over the fallen lump of clay; that He may mold that clay into whatsoever form He chooses, fashioning out of the same lump one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor according to only nothing but His own will and nature, and that God is under no obligation to give an account of His matters to any.
I don't think anyone in the debate between "freewill-ies" and Calvinists, if that's the proper distinction, has suggested that God is not absolutely, irresistibly, infinitely sovereign, nor that He doesn't have the right to govern as He pleases, nor that He can't mold a lump of clay into anything He wants it to be.
The argument, at least from what I understand, is about whether God, in His absolute, irresistible, infinite sovereignty made a man that could actually think on His own and rebel against His maker without God decreeing it from all eternity--noting that a decree from an absolute, irresistible, infinite God cannot be broken and therefore is a coercion to sin.
If therefore God formed a lump of clay into a man that could rebel, but didn't have to, then God's sovereignty or power or wisdom is not challenged. If we say that God couldn't do such a thing, His power IS challenged, and perhaps His sovereignty is, too. His power, because you are saying He is powerless to create a creature like that. His sovereignty, because you are saying He can't fix what is broken--He never allows anything to get to a broken state.
I would assert that God's power to create a creature that can rebel but didn't have to was patently manifest in the Garden. And I would assert that God's sovereignty is patently manifest in His offer of a savior to fix what man has broken--that man is destined to die for disobeying God, and God made it so he doesn't have to.
What you have done is to define "sovereignty" in such a way that only your belief system will fit the definition. But that isn't what sovereignty means. Sovereignty doesn't mean, in any sense that humans (except Calvinists) use, that everything that happens is what is intended. Rather that if anything happens that is not intended, the perpetrators are caught and punished with either banishment or death. The more sovereign a sovereign is, the better he is able to catch and punish the rebellious. God, being infinitely sovereign, catches all--no one escapes his hand. God, being infinitely sovereign, is able to punish everyone for their rebellion. Is not this the very picture of God, with the added element of mercy in providing His Son to take our punishment?
By the way, I disagree that the "old Adamic nature loves itself above God and wants to be captain of its own destiny", at least not the "oldest" Adamic nature. The oldest Adamic nature was very good: Gen 1:31. And God gave that oldest Adam the captaincy of his own destiny--he could eat or not eat of the tree. And it was very good!
The argument, at least from what I understand, is about whether God, in His absolute, irresistible, infinite sovereignty made a man that could actually think on His own and rebel against His maker without God decreeing it from all eternity--noting that a decree from an absolute, irresistible, infinite God cannot be broken and therefore is a coercion to sin.
First, I think that your argument does not allow Reformed Theology the nuance that it claims for itself.
The Westminster Confession affirms both that God man a man that could actually think on his own…
“ After God had made all other creatures, he created man, male and female, with reasonable and immortal souls, endued with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, after his own image; having the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfill it: and yet under a possibility of transgressing, being left to the liberty of their own will, which was subject unto change. Beside this law written in their hearts, they received a command, not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; which while they kept, they were happy in their communion with God, and had dominion over the creatures.”
WCF Article 4.2
…and affirms that God ordains all things that come to pass.
1. “God the great Creator of all things doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by his most wise and holy providence, according to his infallible foreknowledge, and the free and immutable counsel of his own will, to the praise of the glory of his wisdom, power, justice, goodness, and mercy.
2. Although, in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first Cause, all things come to pass immutably, and infallibly; yet, by the same providence, he ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently.
WCF Article 5.1-2
Now I know of Calvinist who do not make distinctions between God ordaining something and God ordaining to allow something to happen (though I do and probably don’t actually follow Calvin here), but even taking that “hard line” Calvinist position there isn’t much that either an Arminian or an Open Theist can offer that doesn’t leave God in some sense, in sovereign control of the fall.
In Arminianism God created the means of the fall, foresaw the certainty of the fall even before creating mankind, and allowed it anyway.
In Open Theism, God at the very least knew that the fall was possible and actively ordained the means by which it would occur, namely, the tree. Furthermore, God watched the fall happen being fully capable of preventing it.
Derf said:
If therefore God formed a lump of clay into a man that could rebel, but didn't have to, then God's sovereignty or power or wisdom is not challenged.
Which I would argue is the position the WCF takes, humanly speaking. From human perspectives, Adam did not have to rebel. From God’s perspective, even from the lest Calvinistic perspective, God dug the pit when He didn’t have to and then watched as they both fell into it.
Derf said:
If we say that God couldn't do such a thing, His power IS challenged, and perhaps His sovereignty is, too. His power, because you are saying He is powerless to create a creature like that.
For the record, I don’t think that Reformed thought teaches that God created mankind without the ability to choose.
Derf said:
I would assert that God's power to create a creature that can rebel but didn't have to was patently manifest in the Garden. And I would assert that God's sovereignty is patently manifest in His offer of a savior to fix what man has broken--that man is destined to die for disobeying God, and God made it so he doesn't have to.
“Didn’t have to” in what sense? From a human standpoint, you are right. Eve didn’t have to keep taking to the serpent, didn’t have to take the fruit and didn’t have to bite it. Adam didn’t have to accept the fruit from his wife for that matter. All were their own choices. God didn't force them to choose this.
From God’s perspective, however Ephesians 1:4-7 makes it pretty clear that we (believers) were chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world.
I don’t know how you can get from the possibility of eternal perfection for Adam and Eve (from God’s perspective) to the inevitability anyone being chosen in Christ (who was sent, in your words, to fix what was broken).
No fall means no Christ in which anyone need be chosen to be adopted as sons having been redeemed through His blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses.
If you don't know that you are going to have a leak then there is no need to call a plumber beforehand.
But that's what Eph 1 has God doing. Providing for the fix before He created that which would break.
:think:
The question you have to wrestle with is how could God have chosen anyone to be adopted as sons in Christ if there was no surety that Christ would ever need to be sent?
I think it claims the nuance under false pretenses--that they caveat "full control" in decrees with "not responsible" in effect. Though I applaud the Westminster divines for recognizing the problem and attempting to deal with it. I'll try to explain below...
The Westminster Confession affirms both that God made a man that could actually think on his own…
“ After God had made all other creatures, he created man, male and female, with reasonable and immortal souls, endued with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, after his own image; having the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfill it: and yet under a possibility of transgressing, being left to the liberty of their own will, which was subject unto change. Beside this law written in their hearts, they received a command, not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; which while they kept, they were happy in their communion with God, and had dominion over the creatures.”
WCF Article 4.2
…and affirms that God ordains all things that come to pass.
1. “God the great Creator of all things doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by his most wise and holy providence, according to his infallible foreknowledge, and the free and immutable counsel of his own will, to the praise of the glory of his wisdom, power, justice, goodness, and mercy.
2. Although, in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first Cause, all things come to pass immutably, and infallibly; yet, by the same providence, he ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently.
WCF Article 5.1-2
1. God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established. WCF Article 3.1
This was written by a group that struggled valiantly to figure out something--and were unsuccessful. I think they were unsuccessful because of a bad presupposition--the presupposition that God knows the future exhaustively--tied to a good presupposition--that God has the power to do whatever He wants to do.
Ordain means to "order" or "decree". If God decrees something, it is most certainly going to come to pass--no one could keep it from doing so. But to say that God is not the author of sin when He unchangeably decrees sin does not seem to me to define a God who knows no sin nor tempts anyone to sin. Don't you think decreeing that I will sin is worse than tempting me to sin? Yet God declares He doesn't even do the lesser. So if God therefore knows all things that are going to happen, not because He sees into the future, but because He creates the future (going on to the next statement of Article 5: 2 Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions, yet hath he not decreed anything because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions), then can He really claim He wasn't responsible for sin?
So He doesn't, according to the WCF, just allow things to come to pass, He CAUSES them to come to pass--He decrees ("orders" or "commands") that they will. Yet without responsibility. We recognize the responsibility of officials when they delegate to lower officials. Why don't we recognize responsibility of the highest official (God), when He DECREES what His subjects will do?
How far down into the weeds does this sovereignty go? I think you would say all the way. So every thought that we think and every evil inclination that we have was somehow decreed to happen before the foundation of the world without God taking any responsibility for it? If God decided all this before He created anyone to do the things that He decreed would be done, does it even make sense to suggest that someone else is at fault?
Now I know of Calvinists who do not make distinctions between God ordaining something and God ordaining to allow something to happen (though I do and probably don’t actually follow Calvin here), but even taking that “hard line” Calvinist position there isn’t much that either an Arminian or an Open Theist can offer that doesn’t leave God in some sense, in sovereign control of the fall.
Whew! lucky for you, you bailed out of Calvinism just in time. But I don't think you can claim that the Westminster Confession is some Hyper/Hardline Calvinism, can you?
In Arminianism God created the means of the fall, foresaw the certainty of the fall even before creating mankind, and allowed it anyway.
In Open Theism, God at the very least knew that the fall was possible and actively ordained the means by which it would occur, namely, the tree. Furthermore, God watched the fall happen being fully capable of preventing it.
Which I would argue is the position the WCF takes, humanly speaking. From human perspectives, Adam did not have to rebel. From God’s perspective, even from the lest Calvinistic perspective, God dug the pit when He didn’t have to and then watched as they both fell into it.
I'm not sure how to distinguish between "God's perspective" and "human perspective". Not that I don't think there is a difference--there might be. But we have only one perspective provided, and whether it's both God's and man's is somewhat in question, but I think we would all agree it's at least man's--it has all the elements of a personal narrative except first person pronouns. So then we develop what we might call "God's perspective" by reading back into the story what we think we've learned about God from other places in scripture.
If you mean "choose wrongly", I think Lon would disagree with you here, if I understood his posts about "free will". But I'll admit it his stance surprised me a bit, and I commented that it didn't seem to fall in line with other Calvinists.
“Didn’t have to” in what sense? From a human standpoint, you are right. Eve didn’t have to keep taking to the serpent, didn’t have to take the fruit and didn’t have to bite it. Adam didn’t have to accept the fruit from his wife for that matter. All were their own choices. God didn't force them to choose this.
From God’s perspective, however Ephesians 1:4-7 makes it pretty clear that we (believers) were chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world.
See what I mean? You have to read back into the Garden story to come up with "God's perspective". I'm not saying it's wrong, but it is potentially adding to scripture. We need to be careful...
I don’t know how you can get from the possibility of eternal perfection for Adam and Eve (from God’s perspective) to the inevitability anyone being chosen in Christ (who was sent, in your words, to fix what was broken).
It's not hard if one allows contingent events. If we were chosen in Him before the foundation of the world, could it be possible that it was a contingent choosing? Not if God sees all future as unalterable. But does He? Can He, without being bound by destiny Himself? Does scripture support it? I don't think so, though certainly some things might be unalterable--His purpose/counsel/whatever you want to call it.
No fall means no Christ in which anyone need be chosen to be adopted as sons having been redeemed through His blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses.
If you don't know that you are going to have a leak then there is no need to call a plumber beforehand.
But that's what Eph 1 has God doing. Providing for the fix before He created that which would break.
Knowing something would break when man was given free will is not quite the same thing as knowing plumbing would break in a "good" world when designed and built by a Master craftsman who never makes mistakes. That giving mankind freewill will inevitably lead to someone sinning is not that hard to imagine. And if the penalty for sin had to come from someone that's related--descended from the original sinner, perhaps--then I can see why God would need Adam to be the one that originally sinned, instead of Cain, for instance. If Cain's was the original sin, then if one of Seth's sons sinned, being not in Cain's line, would Jesus' death have been as propitious? I don't know the answer, but it seems like it would not have been. It seems like it would be propitious only for those in whichever line He chose Jesus to be born into. Since He was born into Adam's, it seems like all Adam's family are eligible.
The question you have to wrestle with is how could God have chosen anyone to be adopted as sons in Christ if there was no surety that Christ would ever need to be sent?
This is a very good point and worth wrestling with. I don't have a problem with there being a surety that someone would sin, as I mentioned above. With free will--the ability to choose between good and not good--certainly it would be unexpected if NOBODY chose the wrong path. But as I mentioned, unless Christ needed to die more than once, and become a part of two or three or a hundred or a million different families in order to die for each, it would make sense that Adam needed to be the one that sinned.
Compare to the angels. Christ didn't die for their sins, the ones that rebelled. I don't know why, but He didn't. But there were some that did not rebel. They seemed to have had some kind of freewill (God couldn't force someone to rebel without them not really rebelling), and they received or will receive the just punishment for their rebellion. Certainly this shows God's mercy to us. And it shows His justice on the rebellious angels. And it shows that some that had free will did not have to fall. And it shows that Jesus' sacrifice does not apply to those in whose line He didn't come (sorry for the double negative). (I don't know if angels have "lines" of any kind, but if he had to die for each angel individually, I can see why He wouldn't. Nor could He become one of each one of them and stay one of each one of them forever.)
Isaiah 45:9-10
"Woe to those who quarrel with their Maker, those who are nothing but potsherds among the potsherds on the ground. Does the clay say to the potter, 'What are you making?' Does your work say, 'The potter has no hands'? Woe to the one who says to a father, 'What have you begotten?' or to a mother, 'What have you brought to birth?'
