Honest struggles on God’s omniscience.

[Derf]

No, I'm not AI.

The ideas come from my own work and study, particularly around grief, identity, suffering, and Christian anthropology. The Fossett Framework is a model I've been developing to explore how relational rupture affects human identity and meaning-making.

That said, I understand why you asked. The internet is full of AI-generated content right now, and highly structured writing can sometimes read that way.

I'm less interested in whether the writing sounds like AI and more interested in whether the argument itself is worth discussing. If you disagree with any part of it, I'd be interested in hearing where.

Ok. The other reason is that I had difficulty seeing how your post was relevant to the thread topic. Maybe you can give a short description of your thoughts on the topic. (It's been awhile since I wrote my question to you, and I don't remember what you were getting at, just my initial impression.)

Iow, what does all that you wrote mean in terms of God's omniscience?

 

[JudgeRightly]

That's not how I understand the Gospel, nor our father Abraham (Romans 4:1, 4:12, 4:16). 1st Peter 1:20 God knew He was going to offer His only begotten Son before creation, this was the POINT of Abraham's test, so that God could preach the Gospel to our father Abraham (Acts 3:25, Galatians 3:8). The content of the Gospel, "a lamb without blemish and without spot" "was foreordained before the foundation of the world". But the preaching of the Gospel was to Abraham, "our father" because of his faith. So Abraham was integral to the Gospel from before the foundation of the World.

You are conflating two different things.

I have no problem with God foreordaining Christ as the Lamb before the foundation of the world. I have no problem with God promising blessing through Abraham’s seed. I have no problem with Genesis 22 preaching the gospel typologically through Isaac, the ram, and the provision of a substitute.

But none of that says God exhaustively foreknew Abraham’s obedience before the test.

1 Peter 1:20 says Christ was foreordained before the foundation of the world. It does not say Abraham’s individual free choice in Genesis 22 was already settled before Abraham made it. Galatians 3:8 says the gospel was preached beforehand to Abraham, saying, “In you all the nations shall be blessed.” It does not say Abraham’s obedience on Moriah was exhaustively foreknown before God tested him.

Abraham was the man God chose and used, and once God made promises to Abraham, God was faithful to those promises. But that does not mean Abraham was metaphysically necessary to the gospel from before creation, nor does it mean God would have been trapped if Abraham had refused or failed. God can judge, redirect, preserve the promised line, raise the dead, or otherwise keep His word without Abraham’s obedience being exhaustively foreknown and fixed before the test.

So yes, Abraham is central to the promises concerning the seed. Yes, Genesis 22 is typological. Yes, God intended to provide the Lamb.

But Genesis 22 still says God tested Abraham, Abraham obeyed, and then God said:

“Now I know that you fear God, since you have not withheld your son, your only son, from Me.”​

And the passage does not stop there. God then says, “By Myself I have sworn... because you have done this thing, and have not withheld your son, your only son,” and again, “In your seed all the nations of the earth shall be blessed, because you have obeyed My voice” (Genesis 22:16–18). That is the language of response, not the language of a merely staged event whose outcome was already exhaustively settled before Abraham obeyed.

The typology does not erase the test. The promise does not erase the contingency. Christ being foreordained does not make Abraham’s obedience a settled future free choice before Abraham obeyed. The certainty of Christ as the Lamb rests on God’s faithfulness and power, not on Abraham’s future obedience being exhaustively foreknown and fixed before the test. God does not need to eternally decree, exhaustively foreknow, or pre-fix every future free choice in order to bring about His plans; He is able to judge, redirect, preserve, provide, raise the dead, and fulfill His word without making human choices illusory.

 

[Douglas Fossett]

Ok. The other reason is that I had difficulty seeing how your post was relevant to the thread topic. Maybe you can give a short description of your thoughts on the topic. (It's been awhile since I wrote my question to you, and I don't remember what you were getting at, just my initial impression.)

Iow, what does all that you wrote mean in terms of God's omniscience?

Fair question.

My point wasn't to challenge God's omniscience. I fully affirm that God knows all things.

What I was trying to address was the idea that if God already knew humanity would sin and suffer, why create humans at all instead of beings who simply obeyed?

My response was that Scripture presents God as creating humans for genuine relationship rather than mere compliance. A robot can obey a command, but it cannot meaningfully love, trust, worship, or enter into relationship. Those things require freedom and the possibility of rejection.

So God's omniscience means He knew the consequences of creating relational beings, including the suffering that would result from humanity's rebellion. Yet Scripture also presents Him as willing to enter that suffering Himself through Christ rather than remain distant from it.

So my point wasn't that God's omniscience is limited. My point was that God appears to value genuine relationship enough to create beings capable of both communion and rebellion, knowing the cost involved.

That's the connection I was trying to make.

 

[Derf]

Fair question.

My point wasn't to challenge God's omniscience. I fully affirm that God knows all things.

What I was trying to address was the idea that if God already knew humanity would sin and suffer, why create humans at all instead of beings who simply obeyed?

My response was that Scripture presents God as creating humans for genuine relationship rather than mere compliance. A robot can obey a command, but it cannot meaningfully love, trust, worship, or enter into relationship. Those things require freedom and the possibility of rejection.

So God's omniscience means He knew the consequences of creating relational beings, including the suffering that would result from humanity's rebellion. Yet Scripture also presents Him as willing to enter that suffering Himself through Christ rather than remain distant from it.

So my point wasn't that God's omniscience is limited. My point was that God appears to value genuine relationship enough to create beings capable of both communion and rebellion, knowing the cost involved.

That's the connection I was trying to make.

The point of the thread topic, afaik, is that exhaustive foreknowledge (the usual definition of omniscience), doesn't allow for anyone to choose to have relationship with God, since all their choices, communion or rebellion, are known before they exist.

 

[Douglas Fossett]

The point of the thread topic, afaik, is that exhaustive foreknowledge (the usual definition of omniscience), doesn't allow for anyone to choose to have relationship with God, since all their choices, communion or rebellion, are known before they exist.

I think that's the heart of the disagreement.

I would distinguish between God's knowledge of a choice and God's causation of that choice.

Knowing an event will occur is not necessarily the same thing as determining that it occurs.

For example, if I somehow knew with certainty what choice a person would make tomorrow, my knowledge would not be the cause of that choice. The person would still be making it.

The Christian tradition has wrestled with exactly how God's exhaustive foreknowledge relates to human freedom, and I don't think all Christians answer it the same way. Some lean toward determinism, others toward libertarian freedom, and still others toward various compatibilist positions.

My point was narrower. If genuine relationship requires the possibility of both communion and rejection, then the biblical narrative seems to assume that human choices have meaningful significance even if God possesses exhaustive knowledge of them.

So the question for me becomes: Does foreknowledge itself eliminate meaningful agency, or does it simply mean that God knows the choices free creatures will make?

That's where I think the real debate lies.

 

[Derf]

I think that's the heart of the disagreement.

I would distinguish between God's knowledge of a choice and God's causation of that choice.

Knowing an event will occur is not necessarily the same thing as determining that it occurs.

I agree, but knowing an event will occur does mean the event is determined. For instance, I know Jesus will return, but I didn't determine His return. If everything future event is known infallibly by God, then all those events are indeed determined. Now, if you agree correct that God did not determine those events, but they are determined, then somebody else must have determined them. You might say that we determine our future events, but we did not exist when you say God already knew what we would do.

So we are left with the idea that someone who is not God determines every future event, and God only knows about it. Who is this person who appears to be greater than God?

For example, if I somehow knew with certainty what choice a person would make tomorrow, my knowledge would not be the cause of that choice. The person would still be making it.

I would suggest that if you knew the choice infallibly, then it's because you know that person and his mindset (will). But let's stretch it out a bit and discuss a person whom you don't know, say the child of your sister who isn't married yet (I'm assuming she won't have children until she's married), nor does she have any marital prospects yet. What college major will that child choose when he is grown to adulthood?

The Christian tradition has wrestled with exactly how God's exhaustive foreknowledge relates to human freedom, and I don't think all Christians answer it the same way. Some lean toward determinism, others toward libertarian freedom, and still others toward various compatibilist positions.

My point was narrower. If genuine relationship requires the possibility of both communion and rejection, then the biblical narrative seems to assume that human choices have meaningful significance even if God possesses exhaustive knowledge of them.

What you've assumed is that the biblical narrative says God has exhaustive knowledge of them. I disagree.

So the question for me becomes: Does foreknowledge itself eliminate meaningful agency, or does it simply mean that God knows the choices free creatures will make?

Go back to my previous assertion. If the choices are known, then it does eliminate free agency, whoever (besides the person) made the determination--and you can't make a determination when you don't exist.

That's where I think the real debate lies.

Check your assumptions, because they may trip you up.

 

[JudgeRightly]

What I was trying to address was the idea that if God already knew humanity would sin and suffer, why create humans at all instead of beings who simply obeyed?

He did not know that as a settled future fact, because man had not been created yet and Adam had not yet chosen.

The future doesn't exist as a settled reality sitting somewhere for God to observe. God cannot know something that does not exist. Before creation, Adam did not exist. His choice did not exist. His choice had not yet been made.

God knew it was a possibility for Adam to disobey, because He created him with the capability of doing so. But until Adam took a bite of the fruit of the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil, his action was not "necessary."

I would distinguish between God's knowledge of a choice and God's causation of that choice.

Knowing an event will occur is not necessarily the same thing as determining that it occurs.

For example, if I somehow knew with certainty what choice a person would make tomorrow, my knowledge would not be the cause of that choice. The person would still be making it.

The Christian tradition has wrestled with exactly how God's exhaustive foreknowledge relates to human freedom, and I don't think all Christians answer it the same way. Some lean toward determinism, others toward libertarian freedom, and still others toward various compatibilist positions.

My point was narrower. If genuine relationship requires the possibility of both communion and rejection, then the biblical narrative seems to assume that human choices have meaningful significance even if God possesses exhaustive knowledge of them.

So the question for me becomes: Does foreknowledge itself eliminate meaningful agency, or does it simply mean that God knows the choices free creatures will make?

The answer is, quite simply, yes, if that foreknowledge is infallible.

There's nothing complicated about this.

Let T stand for some future act, such as “you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 a.m.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy lays out the basic argument this way:

(1) Yesterday God infallibly believed T. [Supposition of infallible foreknowledge] (2) If E occurred in the past, it is now-necessary that E occurred then. [Principle of the Necessity of the Past] (3) It is now-necessary that yesterday God believed T. [1, 2] (4) Necessarily, if yesterday God believed T, then T. [Definition of “infallibility”] (5) If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle] (6) So it is now-necessary that T. [3,4,5] (7) If it is now-necessary that T, then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [Definition of “necessary”] (8) Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [6, 7] (9) If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely. [Principle of Alternate Possibilities] (10) Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, you will not do it freely. [8, 9]

Foreknowledge and Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The problem here is not "causation," but rather "necessity."

I agree that knowledge of an action, by itself, does not itself cause the action.

But if the knowledge of the action is infallible, then that knowledge cannot be wrong (by definition), and so there is no possible alternative, because any alternative would falsify that knowledge.

Thus, if God infallibly knew that Adam would sin before he existed, then Adam's sin could not fail to happen. If Adam could have chosen not to sin, then God's prior knowledge could have been false. But if God's knowledge could not be false, then Adam could not have chosen otherwise.

Either God knew Adam's "choice" in advance, and I put choice in quotes because at that point it isn't one except in name only since Adam could not do otherwise, or Adam did have a real alternative, and God's knowledge of future free choices is not exhaustive and infallible.

If Adam could obey, then Adam’s disobedience was not infallibly settled beforehand. If Adam’s disobedience was infallibly settled beforehand, then Adam could not obey.

Saying “God only knew what Adam would freely choose” does not solve it, because if God infallibly knew Adam would choose sin, then choosing otherwise was impossible. Calling the impossible alternative “free” does not make it meaningful.

A free choice requires that the alternative be genuinely possible. Exhaustive infallible foreknowledge removes that possibility by making the outcome settled before the creature even exists.

 

[Douglas Fossett]

He did not know that as a settled future fact, because man had not been created yet and Adam had not yet chosen.

The future doesn't exist as a settled reality sitting somewhere for God to observe. God cannot know something that does not exist. Before creation, Adam did not exist. His choice did not exist. His choice had not yet been made.

God knew it was a possibility for Adam to disobey, because He created him with the capability of doing so. But until Adam took a bite of the fruit of the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil, his action was not "necessary."



The answer is, quite simply, yes, if that foreknowledge is infallible.

There's nothing complicated about this.

Let T stand for some future act, such as “you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 a.m.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy lays out the basic argument this way:

(1) Yesterday God infallibly believed T. [Supposition of infallible foreknowledge] (2) If E occurred in the past, it is now-necessary that E occurred then. [Principle of the Necessity of the Past] (3) It is now-necessary that yesterday God believed T. [1, 2] (4) Necessarily, if yesterday God believed T, then T. [Definition of “infallibility”] (5) If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle] (6) So it is now-necessary that T. [3,4,5] (7) If it is now-necessary that T, then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [Definition of “necessary”] (8) Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [6, 7] (9) If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely. [Principle of Alternate Possibilities] (10) Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, you will not do it freely. [8, 9]

Foreknowledge and Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The problem here is not "causation," but rather "necessity."

I agree that knowledge of an action, by itself, does not itself cause the action.

But if the knowledge of the action is infallible, then that knowledge cannot be wrong (by definition), and so there is no possible alternative, because any alternative would falsify that knowledge.

Thus, if God infallibly knew that Adam would sin before he existed, then Adam's sin could not fail to happen. If Adam could have chosen not to sin, then God's prior knowledge could have been false. But if God's knowledge could not be false, then Adam could not have chosen otherwise.

Either God knew Adam's "choice" in advance, and I put choice in quotes because at that point it isn't one except in name only since Adam could not do otherwise, or Adam did have a real alternative, and God's knowledge of future free choices is not exhaustive and infallible.

If Adam could obey, then Adam’s disobedience was not infallibly settled beforehand. If Adam’s disobedience was infallibly settled beforehand, then Adam could not obey.

Saying “God only knew what Adam would freely choose” does not solve it, because if God infallibly knew Adam would choose sin, then choosing otherwise was impossible. Calling the impossible alternative “free” does not make it meaningful.

A free choice requires that the alternative be genuinely possible. Exhaustive infallible foreknowledge removes that possibility by making the outcome settled before the creature even exists.

I think we're getting closer to identifying the actual point of disagreement.

My assumption is that God's exhaustive foreknowledge and meaningful human agency are compatible, even if I acknowledge that explaining exactly how they fit together is difficult.

Your assumption appears to be that if a future act is infallibly known, then it is necessarily fixed in a way that eliminates genuine alternatives.

JudgeRightly seems to be making a related but slightly different argument: that future free choices do not yet exist as settled realities and therefore cannot be known as settled facts.

Those are different challenges to the classical view of omniscience.

What I find interesting is that Christians have historically arrived at very different conclusions on this question. Classical theists, Augustinians, Thomists, Molinists, Calvinists, Arminians, and Open Theists all affirm God's omniscience, yet they explain the relationship between divine knowledge and human freedom differently.

Where I would hesitate is moving directly from "God knows a future act" to "therefore someone other than the creature must have determined it." That seems to assume that certainty and causation are the same thing, which is precisely one of the points under debate.

Likewise, I am not convinced that God's knowledge must be limited to what presently exists within time. The classical Christian understanding has generally held that God is not merely another observer moving through history alongside us, but transcends time altogether.

So I agree that the real issue is not causation but necessity. The question is whether God's infallible knowledge makes an act necessary in a way that eliminates meaningful agency, or whether God's knowledge is certain because He perfectly knows what free creatures will choose.

That is where I think the discussion actually turns.

 

[Clete]

I think that he was throwing in some "onimipresent" passages to "pile on" with the "omnis" to make his "argument" appear more persuasive.

A complete failure for sure.

It's interesting that I didn't even bother to read the passages he cited. They don't teach omni-anything, in the classical meaning of the terms.

 

[JudgeRightly]

For the record, I have no problem with someone using AI to help organize a post. What I object to is posting polished filler without owning or editing the argument.

But there is a very clear and obvious difference between a well-structured post and AI-generated fog that sounds careful while avoiding the actual issue.

I think we're getting closer to identifying the actual point of disagreement.

This reads like AI-generated filler, but yes, the point of disagreement is clear enough.

My assumption is that God's exhaustive foreknowledge and meaningful human agency are compatible, even if I acknowledge that explaining exactly how they fit together is difficult.

That's the very point of contention.

You can't just assume what is in dispute. That's not how discussion works. If exhaustive infallible foreknowledge and meaningful human agency are compatible, then you need to show how, not merely say that they are while admitting it is difficult to explain.

And might I add, the difficulty is not accidental. The difficulty is that the claim is contradictory. Truth is not self-contradictory.

Your assumption appears to be that if a future act is infallibly known, then it is necessarily fixed in a way that eliminates genuine alternatives.

No, that's the argument I'm making, not just an assumption. There's a difference.

If God infallibly knows Adam will sin, then Adam’s sin cannot fail to happen. If Adam can refrain from sinning, then God’s prior knowledge can be false. If God’s prior knowledge cannot be false, then Adam cannot refrain from sinning.

Again, the issue is not causation, but necessity.

JudgeRightly seems to be making a related but slightly different argument: that future free choices do not yet exist as settled realities and therefore cannot be known as settled facts.

At least edit what the machine gives you.

The arguments are two sides of the same coin.

If a future free act is not settled, then it cannot be known as settled. If it is already known as settled, then the creature cannot do otherwise.

Those are different challenges to the classical view of omniscience.

They are two sides of the same problem: either the future free act is not settled, in which case it cannot be known as settled, or it is settled, in which case the person genuinely cannot do otherwise.

What I find interesting is that Christians have historically arrived at very different conclusions on this question. Classical theists, Augustinians, Thomists, Molinists, Calvinists, Arminians, and Open Theists all affirm God's omniscience, yet they explain the relationship between divine knowledge and human freedom differently.

Listing the historical options does not tell us which premise of the fatalism argument you reject. It only tells us that different systems have tried to deal with the problem.

Where I would hesitate is moving directly from "God knows a future act" to "therefore someone other than the creature must have determined it." That seems to assume that certainty and causation are the same thing, which is precisely one of the points under debate.

That's Derf's argument, not mine, though I'm not in disagreement with his point.

My argument is narrower: if a future act is infallibly known, then it cannot be otherwise. You can say God did not cause the choice, but that does not restore the possibility of doing otherwise.

Likewise, I am not convinced that God's knowledge must be limited to what presently exists within time.

Whether you are convinced or not is in fact irrelevant.

"What is God supposed to be knowing?"

God can know possibilities. He can know His own intentions. He can know what He will do. He can know all actual facts.

But a future free choice that has not yet been made is not an actual fact. It is a possibility. To know it as a settled fact before it is made is to make it settled before it is made.

The classical Christian understanding has generally held that God is not merely another observer moving through history alongside us, but transcends time altogether.

Addressed here: https://kgov.com/time

Timelessness does not automatically solve the problem. If Adam’s sin is timelessly fixed, then Adam still cannot do otherwise. Removing the word “before” does not restore the alternative.

The question remains: could Adam have refrained from sinning?

If yes, then the supposedly fixed fact could have been otherwise.

If no, then Adam did not have a genuine alternative.

So I agree that the real issue is not causation but necessity.

Another AI-sounding phrase.

Are you, @Douglas Fossett, actually agreeing here, or is the machine just smoothing over the disagreement?

The question is whether God's infallible knowledge makes an act necessary in a way that eliminates meaningful agency, or whether God's knowledge is certain because He perfectly knows what free creatures will choose.

I just demonstrated that it does do just that.

“God perfectly knows what free creatures will choose” is just a restatement of exhaustive foreknowledge. It does not answer the problem.

If God infallibly knows Adam will sin, can Adam refrain from sinning?

If yes, then God’s knowledge is not infallible.

If no, then Adam cannot do otherwise.

That is where I think the discussion actually turns.

More AI filler text.

Answer it directly.

Can Adam do otherwise than what God infallibly knows Adam will do?

If he can, then God’s foreknowledge is not infallible.

If he cannot, then Adam does not have a genuine alternative.

 

[Right Divider]

If a future free act is not settled, then it cannot be known as settled. If it is already known as settled, then the creature cannot do otherwise.

That is PERFECT!

That is the final answer...

If they can refute that... (which they cannot) then they win... They lose.

 

[Derf]

I think we're getting closer to identifying the actual point of disagreement.

My assumption is that God's exhaustive foreknowledge and meaningful human agency are compatible, even if I acknowledge that explaining exactly how they fit together is difficult.

One thing is to try to figure out how God knows things. Is the knowledge inate or acquired? If there are any scriotures about God acquiring knowledge, then it speaks against exhaustive foreknowledge, don't you think?

Here's one:
Jeremiah 17:10 KJV — I the LORD search the heart, I try the reins, even to give every man according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his doings.

Does it make sense to say that the verse means that God already knows what He is searching the heart and trying the reins for? If He already knows the information He is searching for, what is the verse actually saying?

Your assumption appears to be that if a future act is infallibly known, then it is necessarily fixed in a way that eliminates genuine alternatives.

Yes.

JudgeRightly seems to be making a related but slightly different argument: that future free choices do not yet exist as settled realities and therefore cannot be known as settled facts.

His point is that God's omniscience is not harmed by His not knowing something that doesn't have a truth value.

Those are different challenges to the classical view of omniscience.

What I find interesting is that Christians have historically arrived at very different conclusions on this question. Classical theists, Augustinians, Thomists, Molinists, Calvinists, Arminians, and Open Theists all affirm God's omniscience, yet they explain the relationship between divine knowledge and human freedom differently.

And we should diligently seek to find out which one or ones are more scripturally and logically supported.

Where I would hesitate is moving directly from "God knows a future act" to "therefore someone other than the creature must have determined it." That seems to assume that certainty and causation are the same thing, which is precisely one of the points under debate.

You missed a point. If you don't exist, you cant determine anything. But if something is infallibly known, then it has been determined. Therefore, we should look for the real determiner of your choices, which were determibed without your input.

Likewise, I am not convinced that God's knowledge must be limited to what presently exists within time.

No, you've missed something here, too. God can decide things before they happen. (You can too, but your decisions might be overridden.) If God decides something before it happens, and He is powerful enough to bring it to pass, then He certainly can know things before they happen. Therefore God's knowledge is not limited to what presently exists ("within time" is superfluous in your sentence).

The classical Christian understanding has generally held that God is not merely another observer moving through history alongside us, but transcends time altogether.

I don't know how far back such a "classical" understanding goes. I think it is a fairly recent development.

So I agree that the real issue is not causation but necessity.

But causation is the real issue, imo. Something that is necessary could be caused by multiple persons, perhaps.

The question is whether God's infallible knowledge makes an act necessary in a way that eliminates meaningful agency,

No, for most things it does not--but it might change who the agent is.

or whether God's knowledge is certain because He perfectly knows what free creatures will choose.

Which means the choices are determined--it can't be otherwise. If the choices are determined before the agent exists, he's not really the agent, is he?

That is where I think the discussion actually turns.

I think you are missing the true point in the discussion.

 

[way 2 go]

A near perfect definition of an appeal to tradition fallacy.

precedent which has not been overthrown by heterodox open theism

It is not an inference or an implication. We state it outright that God does not know the future in any sense similar to what Classical Christian dogma teaches.

open theism infers not only does God not know the knowable he is not omnipresent

I know until open theism came along everyone got it wrong.

but to your point you mean what the bible teaches ,

(Romans 8:29) For whom he foreknew, he also foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren
(Jeremiah 1:5) Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee, and before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee; I have appointed thee a prophet unto the nations

do open theist have a book of Daniel or do you just tear that one out ?

We do not state that because we pull it out of the clear blue sky but because it is the only biblical and rationally consistent position to take. Neither of which is the final arbiter of truth for the Classical theist.

it's irrational to say God knows all that is knowable then deny it
God knew sodom was evil but didn't know sodom was evil , ah the special pleading

Jeremiah 23:23-24Psalm 139:7-12

Those passages nor any other passage in the whole of scripture teaches that God is omniscient.

'if you ignore all the verses that infer\teach omniscience then there are no verses that infer\teach omniscience '
Neo in the matrix
uh no that was about a spoon ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

but those verses were about omnipresence , as in God didn't need to go to sodom to know if it was evil

The other thing that Open Theists do not do is to read our doctrines into the text. Classical theism, on the other hand, cannot survive at all without doing so. The two passages you cite are as good examples as exist. Neither of them teach omniscience at all.

I won't bore you with a full reply. JudgeRightly's post is excellent and doesn't need any help from me.

¯\(°_o)/¯
Revelation 4:1