Honest struggles on God’s omniscience.

[Derf]

No, I'm not AI.

The ideas come from my own work and study, particularly around grief, identity, suffering, and Christian anthropology. The Fossett Framework is a model I've been developing to explore how relational rupture affects human identity and meaning-making.

That said, I understand why you asked. The internet is full of AI-generated content right now, and highly structured writing can sometimes read that way.

I'm less interested in whether the writing sounds like AI and more interested in whether the argument itself is worth discussing. If you disagree with any part of it, I'd be interested in hearing where.

Ok. The other reason is that I had difficulty seeing how your post was relevant to the thread topic. Maybe you can give a short description of your thoughts on the topic. (It's been awhile since I wrote my question to you, and I don't remember what you were getting at, just my initial impression.)

Iow, what does all that you wrote mean in terms of God's omniscience?

 

[JudgeRightly]

That's not how I understand the Gospel, nor our father Abraham (Romans 4:1, 4:12, 4:16). 1st Peter 1:20 God knew He was going to offer His only begotten Son before creation, this was the POINT of Abraham's test, so that God could preach the Gospel to our father Abraham (Acts 3:25, Galatians 3:8). The content of the Gospel, "a lamb without blemish and without spot" "was foreordained before the foundation of the world". But the preaching of the Gospel was to Abraham, "our father" because of his faith. So Abraham was integral to the Gospel from before the foundation of the World.

You are conflating two different things.

I have no problem with God foreordaining Christ as the Lamb before the foundation of the world. I have no problem with God promising blessing through Abraham’s seed. I have no problem with Genesis 22 preaching the gospel typologically through Isaac, the ram, and the provision of a substitute.

But none of that says God exhaustively foreknew Abraham’s obedience before the test.

1 Peter 1:20 says Christ was foreordained before the foundation of the world. It does not say Abraham’s individual free choice in Genesis 22 was already settled before Abraham made it. Galatians 3:8 says the gospel was preached beforehand to Abraham, saying, “In you all the nations shall be blessed.” It does not say Abraham’s obedience on Moriah was exhaustively foreknown before God tested him.

Abraham was the man God chose and used, and once God made promises to Abraham, God was faithful to those promises. But that does not mean Abraham was metaphysically necessary to the gospel from before creation, nor does it mean God would have been trapped if Abraham had refused or failed. God can judge, redirect, preserve the promised line, raise the dead, or otherwise keep His word without Abraham’s obedience being exhaustively foreknown and fixed before the test.

So yes, Abraham is central to the promises concerning the seed. Yes, Genesis 22 is typological. Yes, God intended to provide the Lamb.

But Genesis 22 still says God tested Abraham, Abraham obeyed, and then God said:

“Now I know that you fear God, since you have not withheld your son, your only son, from Me.”​

And the passage does not stop there. God then says, “By Myself I have sworn... because you have done this thing, and have not withheld your son, your only son,” and again, “In your seed all the nations of the earth shall be blessed, because you have obeyed My voice” (Genesis 22:16–18). That is the language of response, not the language of a merely staged event whose outcome was already exhaustively settled before Abraham obeyed.

The typology does not erase the test. The promise does not erase the contingency. Christ being foreordained does not make Abraham’s obedience a settled future free choice before Abraham obeyed. The certainty of Christ as the Lamb rests on God’s faithfulness and power, not on Abraham’s future obedience being exhaustively foreknown and fixed before the test. God does not need to eternally decree, exhaustively foreknow, or pre-fix every future free choice in order to bring about His plans; He is able to judge, redirect, preserve, provide, raise the dead, and fulfill His word without making human choices illusory.

 

[Douglas Fossett]

Ok. The other reason is that I had difficulty seeing how your post was relevant to the thread topic. Maybe you can give a short description of your thoughts on the topic. (It's been awhile since I wrote my question to you, and I don't remember what you were getting at, just my initial impression.)

Iow, what does all that you wrote mean in terms of God's omniscience?

Fair question.

My point wasn't to challenge God's omniscience. I fully affirm that God knows all things.

What I was trying to address was the idea that if God already knew humanity would sin and suffer, why create humans at all instead of beings who simply obeyed?

My response was that Scripture presents God as creating humans for genuine relationship rather than mere compliance. A robot can obey a command, but it cannot meaningfully love, trust, worship, or enter into relationship. Those things require freedom and the possibility of rejection.

So God's omniscience means He knew the consequences of creating relational beings, including the suffering that would result from humanity's rebellion. Yet Scripture also presents Him as willing to enter that suffering Himself through Christ rather than remain distant from it.

So my point wasn't that God's omniscience is limited. My point was that God appears to value genuine relationship enough to create beings capable of both communion and rebellion, knowing the cost involved.

That's the connection I was trying to make.

 

[Derf]

Fair question.

My point wasn't to challenge God's omniscience. I fully affirm that God knows all things.

What I was trying to address was the idea that if God already knew humanity would sin and suffer, why create humans at all instead of beings who simply obeyed?

My response was that Scripture presents God as creating humans for genuine relationship rather than mere compliance. A robot can obey a command, but it cannot meaningfully love, trust, worship, or enter into relationship. Those things require freedom and the possibility of rejection.

So God's omniscience means He knew the consequences of creating relational beings, including the suffering that would result from humanity's rebellion. Yet Scripture also presents Him as willing to enter that suffering Himself through Christ rather than remain distant from it.

So my point wasn't that God's omniscience is limited. My point was that God appears to value genuine relationship enough to create beings capable of both communion and rebellion, knowing the cost involved.

That's the connection I was trying to make.

The point of the thread topic, afaik, is that exhaustive foreknowledge (the usual definition of omniscience), doesn't allow for anyone to choose to have relationship with God, since all their choices, communion or rebellion, are known before they exist.

 

[Douglas Fossett]

The point of the thread topic, afaik, is that exhaustive foreknowledge (the usual definition of omniscience), doesn't allow for anyone to choose to have relationship with God, since all their choices, communion or rebellion, are known before they exist.

I think that's the heart of the disagreement.

I would distinguish between God's knowledge of a choice and God's causation of that choice.

Knowing an event will occur is not necessarily the same thing as determining that it occurs.

For example, if I somehow knew with certainty what choice a person would make tomorrow, my knowledge would not be the cause of that choice. The person would still be making it.

The Christian tradition has wrestled with exactly how God's exhaustive foreknowledge relates to human freedom, and I don't think all Christians answer it the same way. Some lean toward determinism, others toward libertarian freedom, and still others toward various compatibilist positions.

My point was narrower. If genuine relationship requires the possibility of both communion and rejection, then the biblical narrative seems to assume that human choices have meaningful significance even if God possesses exhaustive knowledge of them.

So the question for me becomes: Does foreknowledge itself eliminate meaningful agency, or does it simply mean that God knows the choices free creatures will make?

That's where I think the real debate lies.

 

[Derf]

I think that's the heart of the disagreement.

I would distinguish between God's knowledge of a choice and God's causation of that choice.

Knowing an event will occur is not necessarily the same thing as determining that it occurs.

I agree, but knowing an event will occur does mean the event is determined. For instance, I know Jesus will return, but I didn't determine His return. If everything future event is known infallibly by God, then all those events are indeed determined. Now, if you agree correct that God did not determine those events, but they are determined, then somebody else must have determined them. You might say that we determine our future events, but we did not exist when you say God already knew what we would do.

So we are left with the idea that someone who is not God determines every future event, and God only knows about it. Who is this person who appears to be greater than God?

For example, if I somehow knew with certainty what choice a person would make tomorrow, my knowledge would not be the cause of that choice. The person would still be making it.

I would suggest that if you knew the choice infallibly, then it's because you know that person and his mindset (will). But let's stretch it out a bit and discuss a person whom you don't know, say the child of your sister who isn't married yet (I'm assuming she won't have children until she's married), nor does she have any marital prospects yet. What college major will that child choose when he is grown to adulthood?

The Christian tradition has wrestled with exactly how God's exhaustive foreknowledge relates to human freedom, and I don't think all Christians answer it the same way. Some lean toward determinism, others toward libertarian freedom, and still others toward various compatibilist positions.

My point was narrower. If genuine relationship requires the possibility of both communion and rejection, then the biblical narrative seems to assume that human choices have meaningful significance even if God possesses exhaustive knowledge of them.

What you've assumed is that the biblical narrative says God has exhaustive knowledge of them. I disagree.

So the question for me becomes: Does foreknowledge itself eliminate meaningful agency, or does it simply mean that God knows the choices free creatures will make?

Go back to my previous assertion. If the choices are known, then it does eliminate free agency, whoever (besides the person) made the determination--and you can't make a determination when you don't exist.

That's where I think the real debate lies.

Check your assumptions, because they may trip you up.

 

[JudgeRightly]

What I was trying to address was the idea that if God already knew humanity would sin and suffer, why create humans at all instead of beings who simply obeyed?

He did not know that as a settled future fact, because man had not been created yet and Adam had not yet chosen.

The future doesn't exist as a settled reality sitting somewhere for God to observe. God cannot know something that does not exist. Before creation, Adam did not exist. His choice did not exist. His choice had not yet been made.

God knew it was a possibility for Adam to disobey, because He created him with the capability of doing so. But until Adam took a bite of the fruit of the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil, his action was not "necessary."

I would distinguish between God's knowledge of a choice and God's causation of that choice.

Knowing an event will occur is not necessarily the same thing as determining that it occurs.

For example, if I somehow knew with certainty what choice a person would make tomorrow, my knowledge would not be the cause of that choice. The person would still be making it.

The Christian tradition has wrestled with exactly how God's exhaustive foreknowledge relates to human freedom, and I don't think all Christians answer it the same way. Some lean toward determinism, others toward libertarian freedom, and still others toward various compatibilist positions.

My point was narrower. If genuine relationship requires the possibility of both communion and rejection, then the biblical narrative seems to assume that human choices have meaningful significance even if God possesses exhaustive knowledge of them.

So the question for me becomes: Does foreknowledge itself eliminate meaningful agency, or does it simply mean that God knows the choices free creatures will make?

The answer is, quite simply, yes, if that foreknowledge is infallible.

There's nothing complicated about this.

Let T stand for some future act, such as “you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 a.m.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy lays out the basic argument this way:

(1) Yesterday God infallibly believed T. [Supposition of infallible foreknowledge] (2) If E occurred in the past, it is now-necessary that E occurred then. [Principle of the Necessity of the Past] (3) It is now-necessary that yesterday God believed T. [1, 2] (4) Necessarily, if yesterday God believed T, then T. [Definition of “infallibility”] (5) If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle] (6) So it is now-necessary that T. [3,4,5] (7) If it is now-necessary that T, then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [Definition of “necessary”] (8) Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [6, 7] (9) If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely. [Principle of Alternate Possibilities] (10) Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, you will not do it freely. [8, 9]

Foreknowledge and Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The problem here is not "causation," but rather "necessity."

I agree that knowledge of an action, by itself, does not itself cause the action.

But if the knowledge of the action is infallible, then that knowledge cannot be wrong (by definition), and so there is no possible alternative, because any alternative would falsify that knowledge.

Thus, if God infallibly knew that Adam would sin before he existed, then Adam's sin could not fail to happen. If Adam could have chosen not to sin, then God's prior knowledge could have been false. But if God's knowledge could not be false, then Adam could not have chosen otherwise.

Either God knew Adam's "choice" in advance, and I put choice in quotes because at that point it isn't one except in name only since Adam could not do otherwise, or Adam did have a real alternative, and God's knowledge of future free choices is not exhaustive and infallible.

If Adam could obey, then Adam’s disobedience was not infallibly settled beforehand. If Adam’s disobedience was infallibly settled beforehand, then Adam could not obey.

Saying “God only knew what Adam would freely choose” does not solve it, because if God infallibly knew Adam would choose sin, then choosing otherwise was impossible. Calling the impossible alternative “free” does not make it meaningful.

A free choice requires that the alternative be genuinely possible. Exhaustive infallible foreknowledge removes that possibility by making the outcome settled before the creature even exists.

 

[Douglas Fossett]

He did not know that as a settled future fact, because man had not been created yet and Adam had not yet chosen.

The future doesn't exist as a settled reality sitting somewhere for God to observe. God cannot know something that does not exist. Before creation, Adam did not exist. His choice did not exist. His choice had not yet been made.

God knew it was a possibility for Adam to disobey, because He created him with the capability of doing so. But until Adam took a bite of the fruit of the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil, his action was not "necessary."



The answer is, quite simply, yes, if that foreknowledge is infallible.

There's nothing complicated about this.

Let T stand for some future act, such as “you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 a.m.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy lays out the basic argument this way:

(1) Yesterday God infallibly believed T. [Supposition of infallible foreknowledge] (2) If E occurred in the past, it is now-necessary that E occurred then. [Principle of the Necessity of the Past] (3) It is now-necessary that yesterday God believed T. [1, 2] (4) Necessarily, if yesterday God believed T, then T. [Definition of “infallibility”] (5) If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle] (6) So it is now-necessary that T. [3,4,5] (7) If it is now-necessary that T, then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [Definition of “necessary”] (8) Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [6, 7] (9) If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely. [Principle of Alternate Possibilities] (10) Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, you will not do it freely. [8, 9]

Foreknowledge and Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The problem here is not "causation," but rather "necessity."

I agree that knowledge of an action, by itself, does not itself cause the action.

But if the knowledge of the action is infallible, then that knowledge cannot be wrong (by definition), and so there is no possible alternative, because any alternative would falsify that knowledge.

Thus, if God infallibly knew that Adam would sin before he existed, then Adam's sin could not fail to happen. If Adam could have chosen not to sin, then God's prior knowledge could have been false. But if God's knowledge could not be false, then Adam could not have chosen otherwise.

Either God knew Adam's "choice" in advance, and I put choice in quotes because at that point it isn't one except in name only since Adam could not do otherwise, or Adam did have a real alternative, and God's knowledge of future free choices is not exhaustive and infallible.

If Adam could obey, then Adam’s disobedience was not infallibly settled beforehand. If Adam’s disobedience was infallibly settled beforehand, then Adam could not obey.

Saying “God only knew what Adam would freely choose” does not solve it, because if God infallibly knew Adam would choose sin, then choosing otherwise was impossible. Calling the impossible alternative “free” does not make it meaningful.

A free choice requires that the alternative be genuinely possible. Exhaustive infallible foreknowledge removes that possibility by making the outcome settled before the creature even exists.

I think we're getting closer to identifying the actual point of disagreement.

My assumption is that God's exhaustive foreknowledge and meaningful human agency are compatible, even if I acknowledge that explaining exactly how they fit together is difficult.

Your assumption appears to be that if a future act is infallibly known, then it is necessarily fixed in a way that eliminates genuine alternatives.

JudgeRightly seems to be making a related but slightly different argument: that future free choices do not yet exist as settled realities and therefore cannot be known as settled facts.

Those are different challenges to the classical view of omniscience.

What I find interesting is that Christians have historically arrived at very different conclusions on this question. Classical theists, Augustinians, Thomists, Molinists, Calvinists, Arminians, and Open Theists all affirm God's omniscience, yet they explain the relationship between divine knowledge and human freedom differently.

Where I would hesitate is moving directly from "God knows a future act" to "therefore someone other than the creature must have determined it." That seems to assume that certainty and causation are the same thing, which is precisely one of the points under debate.

Likewise, I am not convinced that God's knowledge must be limited to what presently exists within time. The classical Christian understanding has generally held that God is not merely another observer moving through history alongside us, but transcends time altogether.

So I agree that the real issue is not causation but necessity. The question is whether God's infallible knowledge makes an act necessary in a way that eliminates meaningful agency, or whether God's knowledge is certain because He perfectly knows what free creatures will choose.

That is where I think the discussion actually turns.