Euthyphro Companion Thread for Enyart's Answer

[Ecumenicist]

The question is not whether God can command something that is good, but: What is it that makes something good?

At least in the case of LOVE, this is a direct declaration of who God IS. Does God command
that love is good? No, because God IS Love. Love is not a trait of God, it is the very substance
of God. Does God recognize Love is good? Well, yes, but not in an external sense. God
recognizes God's Self, God's Presence, manifested in Love, within God's Creatures.

Now the question comes up, what does it mean for God (in Christ) to command that we
love one another and even our enemies? In commanding that we Love, Christ is commanding
that we make God's BEING a part of our own BEING, God's SUBSTANCE a part of our own
SUBSTANCE. Is this possible? To make the substance of God a part of our own
substance? Indeed, perhaps this is the very essense of Christ's message to a fallen
world.

For the sake of your other points, lets discuss attributes as well. The bible says everywhere
that God is merciful. It does not state that God is Mercy, but rather that God that is merciful.

But, I would ask, being an attribute of God, is Mercy not also a part of who God IS? I think
so. God is just, but is justice a part of who God is? Again, yes. God is Gracious, but is
Grace a part of who God IS? Again, yes. God is righteous, but is God Righteousness itself,
is Righteousness a part of the very BEING of God? Once again, I would argue yes.

How about something a little darker. God is jealous. Is Jealousy a part of God's make up?
Actually, yes, but not in a way that conflicts with love, mercy, and grace. For as you have
stated, God is consistant.

How about hate? Deuteronomy 16:22 instructs "do not erect a sacred stone, for these the
LORD your God hates." Does that mean God is hate? Again, I would have to suggest that
yes, hate is a part of who God is, but only in a sense that is consistant with love, righteousness,
mercy, etc.

Given this assertion that God's attributes describe who God IS, the same argument applies. Does
God command mercy? Not as an independent attribute, because God IS mercy, it is part of
God's being. But in the sense of humanity making God's BEING a part of our BEING, our
own SUBSTANCE, yes. Does God recognize mercy? Yes, but not as an external attribute, but
as something that is part of God's Self.

FYI, here are a few more explicit declarations about what God IS, as opposed to
descriptions of God's attributes:

Genesis 31:50 - ...God is a witness ...
Deuteronomy 7:9 - ... God is God...
Deuteronomy 4:24 God is a consuming fire
John 4:24 God is spirit
Galatians 3:20 God is one
1 John 1:5 God is light
1 John 4:8 God is love

thanx,

Dave Miller

 

[larryniven]

Nature is not arbitrary. It is what it is. The persons of the triune God recognize and agree that this nature is what it is. They do not disagree about this. Thus, the standard for righteousness is not external, but internal--within the triune God.

Setting the issue of arbitrariness aside for the moment, your explanation tells us nothing about how the persons recognize their own and each others' nature. In other words, the mere fact that these three persons agree implies nothing at all about the moral nature of what they agree on, or how they evaluate the natures of the other members to arrive at this agreement. Like I said before, with each agreement (say, person x of the trinity agrees with person y), you now have two dilemmas to answer:

(1) Does person y's moral nature need outside referents, or not? If so, it is not an internal standard. If not, you have failed to provide a meaningful definition of "good." This, as you probably recognize, simply is the original dilemma. Note especially that your explanation doesn't answer this at all, so it's hard to see why you feel you've defeated the dilemma. Moreover, we now can ask a separate question...
(2) Does person x evaluate person y's beliefs on any facts external to the trinity, or not? If so, again we have established an exterior basis for morality. If not, you have again failed to provide a meaningful definition of "good."

Answering just one of these questions will not suffice (so far, by the way, you've explicitly answered neither) - both answers have to be internal in order for you to maintain your view. Now, then, about arbitrariness: this is perhaps not a problem of ontology so much as epistemology. Christians will want to claim that our moral intuitions are at least moderately accurate, but both the Bible and their history are replete with instances where God either did, commanded, or is said to have commanded things that our moral intuitions tell us are just wrong. Perhaps, therefore, a more accurate statement of the problem of a fully internal morality is that we would have no way of predicting whether any given act would be right or wrong. From our perspectives, then, morality would be arbitrary. But this, of course, doesn't square with the Christian perspective at all. Anyway, until you address the above questions, this latter point is somewhat academic.

 

[Tico]

By the way, welcome to TOL.

Setting the issue of arbitrariness aside for the moment, your explanation tells us nothing about how the persons recognize their own and each others' nature. In other words, the mere fact that these three persons agree implies nothing at all about the moral nature of what they agree on, or how they evaluate the natures of the other members to arrive at this agreement.

Since the persons of the triune God have their own volition and mental attributes, they can recognize the moral (and other) attributes of the other persons of the godhead. They can recognize the nature of the others and they can peer into all that has existed and recognize that there is not nor has there ever been another extant authority superior to their own. Furthermore, since eternity past, each member of the trinity has been exercising and doing that which is good within their relationship. Their nature precludes doing anything but that which is good. They can each witness each other doing the good which is the fruit of their nature. Thus, good is defined.

Perhaps, therefore, a more accurate statement of the problem of a fully internal morality is that we would have no way of predicting whether any given act would be right or wrong. From our perspectives, then, morality would be arbitrary. But this, of course, doesn't square with the Christian perspective at all. Anyway, until you address the above questions, this latter point is somewhat academic.

You're right we would have no way of predicting whether any given act would be right or wrong without a revelation from God to man. Nonetheless, this wouldn't make morality arbitrary, but just unknown.

In order to test the basis of your objections, is it possible to know any fact as true? If so, how?

 

[Nick M]

Yes. Do I believe they are always recognizable or understandable by mere humans? No.

And what sets the standard?

 

[PlastikBuddha]

And what sets the standard?

The limitations of human intelligence and available knowledge.

 

[mythstified]

I'm sure this has been addressed but I figure I'll have a crack at it:

First of all, I'm largely unimpressed with the lengthy sophistry that fuels the original article. It is indeed an interesting point to reveal that Plato is discrediting a corrupt pantheon, but it feels like it's missing the point to say the question doesn't hold because the Christian God is not corrupt. For one thing, it skirts the issue. So what if a three-figure Godhead is being consistent with itself on being good? It certainly doesn't answer the question: from whence is this goodness that these three "people" are holding each other subject to?

Lets modify the question to account for a triune God. Does the Father decree what is Good and therefore the Son and the Mo...er, Holy Spirit have to agree? Or do the others agree because they already know what is good?

Further, did the trinity have a conversation at the "start" of eternity to establish a constitution of which they will hold each other accountable? How does each entity know how to be just as Good as the other? How, and by what standard, can each entity hold the other accountable even if it were possible for the Son to betray the Father?

The dilemma stands. Morality still seems either arbitrary, or above God. For God to be considered Good, we have to posit that Good and Evil exist outside of his being, and he's CHOOSING to be one or the other.. if he has no choice, then what good is his goodness?

Is something good because God recognizes it as good? Yes. Then to clarify:
● Is the standard He judges by anterior or superior to Himself?

where else would they be? if they were within him, then there is an obvious bias. I don't care if this God has M.P.D., all the more reason to think He's crazy!

● Is He Himself the standard that He judges by?

Seems to be the case, according to what I've read in various scriptures. He's going to judge us on the last day by his standard of Good and Evil, apparently. I personally reject this notion, otherwise it's impossible to judge ANY deities lest I commit blasphemy. Who am I to say Zeus is corrupt unless there's a standard outside of Zeus from which I can measure...

● If the standard is Himself, how could God know it is valid?

"By the eternal concurring witnesses of the Trinity." For one thing we have no idea if the trinity gets along lol. My experience is that in living with anyone for a few years, nevermind all of time, arguments happen. Of course, you are merely using the bible to prove the bible, which to me is pathetic reasoning.

:execute:

 

[Frank Ernest]

Yes. Do I believe they are always recognizable or understandable by mere humans? No.

Then it is impossible for mere humans to judge whether an absolute moral standard set by God is right or wrong.

I honestly don't see how.

If one insists that any moral standard be evaluated by an arbiter. then who is going to evaluate the aribter, etc.

Then why compare the agreement of three people to the agreement of the persons of the Trinity to show that it is reliable?

An analogous situation. Best I can do in human terms.

I wouldn't. I'm not asking for similarities but for differences- enough to make it clear that any agreement between them on the topic of what is pious/good/holy is more than just an internal agreement that is no less arbitrary than that a more "singular" deity might pronounce.

If you had the same essential nature as God, I'm sure you would have that kind of knowledge. Failing that, you are left with human standards which are at best arbitrary.
Best I can do here is Isaiah 55:7-11 KJV.

 

[PlastikBuddha]

Then it is impossible for mere humans to judge whether an absolute moral standard set by God is right or wrong.

What's your point? This discussion isn't about whether the standard is absolutely right or wrong but whether it is decided internally by God or in appeal to an external standard. Mankind is only a spectator in this.

If one insists that any moral standard be evaluated by an arbiter. then who is going to evaluate the aribter, etc.

Since "no man is island" that isn't really a problem. Mankind is both simultaneously smilar enough to establish dialogue and different enough to ensure at lease some degree of arbitration when dealing with collective morality. My question is how so with the Trinity?

An analogous situation. Best I can do in human terms.

OK

If you had the same essential nature as God, I'm sure you would have that kind of knowledge. Failing that, you are left with human standards which are at best arbitrary.

But are they any more arbitrary then God's?

Best I can do here is Isaiah 55:7-11 KJV.

Faith solves the dilemma only for those who already believe. That's fine in it's way- just don't expect any atheists, or agnostics like myself, to accept it as a solution to the dilemma.

 

[Frank Ernest]

What's your point? This discussion isn't about whether the standard is absolutely right or wrong but whether it is decided internally by God or in appeal to an external standard. Mankind is only a spectator in this.

What you have said so far leads one to suspect that you expect mankind to be more than a spectator.

Since "no man is island" that isn't really a problem. Mankind is both simultaneously smilar enough to establish dialogue and different enough to ensure at lease some degree of arbitration when dealing with collective morality. My question is how so with the Trinity?

I would expect much in the same way.

But are they any more arbitrary then God's?

How did you rech the conclusion that God's are arbitrary?

Faith solves the dilemma only for those who already believe. That's fine in it's way- just don't expect any atheists, or agnostics like myself, to accept it as a solution to the dilemma.

I have no expectations in that regard. The atheist/agnostic will always regress to the precipitous conclusion that there is no God, ergo, no resolution to the dilemma.

 

[PlastikBuddha]

What you have said so far leads one to suspect that you expect mankind to be more than a spectator.

How so? The important work is being carried out by the Trinity in this dilemma, is it not?

I would expect much in the same way.

Aren't the aspects of the Trinity seen less as seperate and sovereign individuals than aspects of the same being? Christianity is monotheistic, after all.

How did you rech the conclusion that God's are arbitrary?

Can it be demonstrated that they aren't? In order to resolve the dilemma the standards recognized by God must be shown to be both non-external and non-arbitrary.

I have no expectations in that regard. The atheist/agnostic will always regress to the precipitous conclusion that there is no God, ergo, no resolution to the dilemma.

One doesn't need to go as far as rejecting the existence of God to find this solution unsatisfactory.

 

[Frank Ernest]

How so? The important work is being carried out by the Trinity in this dilemma, is it not?

You refer to the issue of whether or not three people can come to a correct conclusion. You say that there should be an external arbiter for God. You also say that three humans can arbitrate successfully and express doubts that God can do the same.

Aren't the aspects of the Trinity seen less as seperate and sovereign individuals than aspects of the same being? Christianity is monotheistic, after all.

No. One cannot have three distinct persons who are the same in every respect.

Can it be demonstrated that they aren't? In order to resolve the dilemma the standards recognized by God must be shown to be both non-external and non-arbitrary.

Pastor Enyart already did that.

One doesn't need to go as far as rejecting the existence of God to find this solution unsatisfactory.

Yes, one does.

 

[Ask Mr. Religion]

One cannot have three distinct persons who are the same in every respect.

(Stopping by in honor of Fellowship week.)

Herein lies the rub, if you will. This entire discussion would make more progress if Bob E. would take the time to clearly lay out his views on what he believes to be the nature of the Trinity and Incarnate Christ. As things stand, persons are talking past one another until a solid foundation is built. Trying to extract what Bob E. holds from his posts is problematic and fraught with possible misinterpretations.

For those interested, the orthodox view (my own) is given here and here. From which several questions are in need of answering by Bob E. if one is to understand the rationale he is using to declare the dilemma solved.

1. Is God a single essence, with three personal subsistences, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit? I hold here that subsistences (not modes as in the sense used by Unitarianism), are often called persons, which do not divide the essence of God. Instead God’s essence is common to the three Persons in God, not communicated from one to another; each subsistence partakes of the essence, and possess it as one undivided nature—‘as all the fullness of the Godhead dwells in Christ’, so in the Holy Spirit; and of the Father.

2. Did the Incarnate Christ consist of fully human (including a human soul) and fully divine natures, the divine nature taking on a human nature, mystically (hypostatically) joined such that they cannot be separated, confused, mixed, or divided? In other words, I believe that we distinguish between the two natures but never separate, confuse, divide, or mix the two natures in our conceptualizations.

Moreso, orthodoxy holds that God the Son, already the Second Person of the Trinity, did not take into Himself a human person in the Incarnation. That would mean two persons occupied the body of Jesus versus one person, with two natures. The Second Person of the Trinity took into Himself a human nature. Nature used when discussing the Incarnation is “a complex of attributes”. Nature never means ‘person’ when discussing the Incarnation. The human nature has its subsistence in His Person, and the human nature has a glory and excellence given it. Yet the human nature gives nothing at all to the nature and person of the divine Word and Son of God.

One can best understand the hypostatic union (together united in one subsistence and in one single person) by examining what it is not, thus from the process of elimination determine what it must be.

The union is not:

1. a denial that Christ was truly God (Ebionites, Elkasites, Arians);
2. a dissimilar or different substance (anomoios) with the Father (semi-Arianism);
3. a denial that Christ had a genuine human soul (Apollinarians);
4. a denial of a distinct person in the Trinity (Dynamic Monarchianism);
5. God acting merely in the forms of the Son and Spirit (Modalistic Monarchianism/Sabellianism/United Pentecostal Church);
6. a mixture or change when the two natures were united (Eutychianism/Monophysitism);
7. two distinct persons (Nestorianism);
8. a denial of the true humanity of Christ (docetism);
9. that God the Son laid aside all or some of His divine attributes (kenoticism);
10. that there was a communication of the attributes between the divine and human natures (Lutheranism, with respect to the Lord's Supper); and
11. that Jesus existed independently as a human before God entered His body (Adoptionism).

3. Did God's essence change as a result of the Incarnation? This would imply that the Trinity is now something different than it was before the Incarnation and undermines Bob's arguments for the constancy of agreement between the three subsistences of the Godhead. Bob cannot have it both ways when he agues elsewhere that the Incarnation represented a changing God, yet herein argues that the Godhead has always been in agreement.

4. During the Incarnation, was God the Son, the second person of the Trinity, confined to the physical body of Christ, or was the second person of the Trinity also present in heaven with the Father and the Holy Spirit?

On these last two points I maintain that when the Word became flesh, it does not mean that the Logos ceased to be what He was beforehand. In John 1:14, the verb egeneto does not mean the Logos changed into flesh, thereby changing His essential nature, only that He took on that particular character, that He acquired an additional form, without in any way changing His original nature.

Bob's explicit answers to these questions are sorely needed to come to grips with the arguments being presented.

 

[PlastikBuddha]

You refer to the issue of whether or not three people can come to a correct conclusion. You say that there should be an external arbiter for God. You also say that three humans can arbitrate successfully and express doubts that God can do the same.

I believe you are misunderstanding me. Three people CAN come to a correct conclusion. So can one. Or five. There is nothing in a gathering of three persons that means that their conclusions are guaranteed to be correct, however. I am NOT saying there should be an external arbiter for God's conclusions on right and wrong- that is one of the horns of the dilemma. Either the standard for righteousness is seperate from God or it is internal.

No. One cannot have three distinct persons who are the same in every respect.

Are the members of the Trinity distinct persons? How does Christianity then escape polytheism?

Pastor Enyart already did that.

I am saying that he didn't- at least not to the satisfaction of non-Christians (which was part of his claim, that even atheists would have to admit that the dilemma was not a problem for Christians). If faith must be invoked (the nature of the trinity is singular in that it can arrive at one standard and yet contains distinct personalities such that they can "witness" and confirm this standard) then the dilemma isn't a dilemma for any religion. Muslims could just change the players from the Trinity to Allah and his angels or djinn, for example. So long as they have "faith", the dilemma is answered (for them at least).

Yes, one does.

As I've pointed out all one needs to doubt is the nature of the Trinity not its existence.

 

[Frank Ernest]

I believe you are misunderstanding me. Three people CAN come to a correct conclusion. So can one. Or five. There is nothing in a gathering of three persons that means that their conclusions are guaranteed to be correct, however. I am NOT saying there should be an external arbiter for God's conclusions on right and wrong- that is one of the horns of the dilemma. Either the standard for righteousness is seperate from God or it is internal.

If the standard is external, then God becomes dependent on an arbiter above God. If God is unitary, then the standard is internal and arbitrary.

Are the members of the Trinity distinct persons? How does Christianity then escape polytheism?

God is.
The Father is God.
The Son is God.
The Holy Spirit is God.
The Father is not the Son nor the Holy Spirit.
The Son is not the Father nor the Holy Spirit.
The Holy Spirit is not the Father nor the Son.

I am saying that he didn't- at least not to the satisfaction of non-Christians (which was part of his claim, that even atheists would have to admit that the dilemma was not a problem for Christians). If faith must be invoked (the nature of the trinity is singular in that it can arrive at one standard and yet contains distinct personalities such that they can "witness" and confirm this standard) then the dilemma isn't a dilemma for any religion. Muslims could just change the players from the Trinity to Allah and his angels or djinn, for example. So long as they have "faith", the dilemma is answered (for them at least).

No, one cannot play mix-and-match from a unitary deity to a triune one or appeal to polytheism and make it come out just fine as in all these are one and the same.

As I've pointed out all one needs to doubt is the nature of the Trinity not its existence.

One can doubt anything, but simple doubt is insufficient to negate an argument. Reasonable doubt may call a question, but is still not sufficient to negate an argument.

 

[Town Heretic]

If the standard is external, then God becomes dependent on an arbiter above God. If God is unitary, then the standard is internal and arbitrary.

Just a small quibble to toss into the pond. God can be unitary without being arbitrary if His nature is perfect. That is, God acts as He does and righteousness is accounted not by some capricious whim but because God cannot be other than Good and Just and beyond reproach...God is then both restrained and compelled by His own nature and while a free agent in terms of which moral path or which Just act to apply cannot act unjustly and cannot act immorally. He is defined by Himself in perfection. He can no more make an arbitrary decision than I can think myself to a differing height or eye color.

 

[PlastikBuddha]

If the standard is external, then God becomes dependent on an arbiter above God. If God is unitary, then the standard is internal and arbitrary.

Thanks for restating the dilemma.

God is.
The Father is God.
The Son is God.
The Holy Spirit is God.
The Father is not the Son nor the Holy Spirit.
The Son is not the Father nor the Holy Spirit.
The Holy Spirit is not the Father nor the Son.

Doctrines of faith that may convince those who need no convincing in the first place. As it is I don't how that see how simple assertion answers anything.

No, one cannot play mix-and-match from a unitary deity to a triune one or appeal to polytheism and make it come out just fine as in all these are one and the same.

:squint:

One can doubt anything, but simple doubt is insufficient to negate an argument. Reasonable doubt may call a question, but is still not sufficient to negate an argument.

What's your point?

 

[Frank Ernest]

Just a small quibble to toss into the pond. God can be unitary without being arbitrary if His nature is perfect. That is, God acts as He does and righteousness is accounted not by some capricious whim but because God cannot be other than Good and Just and beyond reproach...God is then both restrained and compelled by His own nature and while a free agent in terms of which moral path or which Just act to apply cannot act unjustly and cannot act immorally. He is defined by Himself in perfection. He can no more make an arbitrary decision than I can think myself to a differing height or eye color.

The Quran describes Allah as being perfect in nature, yet arbitrary. Certain actions were allowed to the Prophet Muhammad that were not allowed for his followers. The idea that Allah can (and will) destroy anybody or anything that displeases him for whatever reason is difficult to deal with in less than arbitrary terms. Yet, Allah is described as perfect, but not restrained by anything.

Therein lies a problem with a unitary god.

 

[Frank Ernest]

Thanks for restating the dilemma.

You're welcome.

Doctrines of faith that may convince those who need no convincing in the first place. As it is I don't how that see how simple assertion answers anything.

I answered your question. You don't like the answer.

:squint:

:chuckle:

What's your point?

My point was quite clear.

 

[Town Heretic]

The Quran describes Allah as being perfect in nature, yet arbitrary. Certain actions were allowed to the Prophet Muhammad that were not allowed for his followers. The idea that Allah can (and will) destroy anybody or anything that displeases him for whatever reason is difficult to deal with in less than arbitrary terms. Yet, Allah is described as perfect, but not restrained by anything.

Therein lies a problem with a unitary god.

Interesting Frank, still I'd say there lies the problem with a poorly reasoned understanding of perfect will, goodness, and justice on the part of Islam and their unitary idea as defined if it works to that conclusion...but my point is as readily made with either or any expression of God. That is, in the end, to be meaningful He must be the standard from which even the idea of standards is derived and so perfect in any meaningful understanding of the word and (following) perfect in both being and expression.

 

[PlastikBuddha]

I answered your question. You don't like the answer.

Because it only "answers" the question if you already believe. I've already said that personal faith can get around the dilemma in other ways than Enyart's proposed solution, but you can't have it both ways. Either it relies on faith, in which case it isn't a problem for anyone with faith anyways, or you use reason and the solution fails.

:chuckle:

My point was quite clear.

I wasn't trying to "negate" the argument, just point out that it requires something more than logic to make it work- faith.