It indeed needs a fresh airing, as it got no response
here, a few years ago.
I hope no one misses the irony in Pastor Enyart's response above and in the OP. On the one hand he raises the "Greeks!" "Philosophy!" canard, yet on the other appeals to Aristotle's views about the truth values of future propositions. Since the future does not exist, well, a temporal God cannot know anything about the future. This is just one of the many "having your cake and eating it, too" tactics of open theism.
In order to somehow relieve God of the problem of evil, open theists deny God knows the future actions of his creatures. To the open theists, free human actions cannot be known by anyone, including an "omniscient" God--after all, this does not mean God is not "omniscient"--for He knows only what there is to know. In other words the free actions of creatures cannot be the object of knowledge for anyone, including God. God cannot know the future because there is nothing for him to know.
Where does the logical conclusion of such a view lead us?
If propositions about the future are neither true nor false, it is logically impossible for God to predict (not guess, but state with absolute certainty) the future.
The belief that God does predict the future presumes that God knows what he is talking about. Yet, if, per open theism, God does not know what cannot be known, it follows that God cannot predict the future.
The best the open theist can hope for is that God might be able to do, on Aristotle’s view, is make a good guess--quite the epistemological liability when compared with the historic Christian view about God’s knowledge.
Well, some openists will try to skirt the issue by saying that God knows some things about the future with absolute certainty failing to grasp that, per their view of God's limits of knowledge,
God cannot even know what He is going to do in the future when His own actions in response to the unknown free actions of His creatures are not even known to him.
The facts are simple: God can have no knowledge of future human contingents because any alleged proposition about the free choices of humans contains no truth value--it can be neither true nor false. Remember, openists claim God cannot know these things because there is nothing to know. So when the openist starts to make statements that the constraints on God's knowledge are not as severe as I have stated per their own claims, we need to hold them accountable to their own dogma. Either God knows future contingents or He does not. If God knows even as few as even one future contingent, then He can know all.
AMR