Infallible Foreknowledge vs. Free Will

[Clete]

I've posted the following syllogism a few times in recent weeks and each time I've received no response at all to it. In fact, over the years I've posted this syllogism dozens of times and if I've ever seen anyone attempt to refute it, it's been so long ago that I cannot remember it and so I thought I'd start a thread specifically dedicated to it just to see if there is anyone who wants to offer a substantive response to it.

T = You answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am

1. Yesterday God infallibly believed T. [Supposition of infallible foreknowledge]
2. If E occurred in the past, it is now-necessary that E occurred then. [Principle of the Necessity of the Past]
3. It is now-necessary that yesterday God believed T. [1, 2]
4. Necessarily, if yesterday God believed T, then T. [Definition of “infallibility”]
5. If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle]
6. So it is now-necessary that T. [3,4,5]
7. If it is now-necessary that T, then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [Definition of “necessary”]
8. Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [6, 7]
9. If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely. [Principle of Alternate Possibilities]
10. Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, you will not do it freely. [8, 9]

Source​

The author of that syllogism is a Prof. Linda Zagzebski, the Kingfisher College Chair of the Philosophy of Religion and Ethics at Oklahoma University. She calls this the "Basic Argument for Theological Fatalism" because she happens to be a Catholic and presupposes the truth of God's exhaustive infallible foreknowledge and thus intended it as a proof that people do not have free will. (I've often wondered whether it has ever occurred to her that the same argument applies to God's will and that if He knows everything in advance then He is no more free than we are.) At any rate, the point here is that this is not something that was cooked up to argue in favor of Open Theism. In fact, the syllogism does not argue whether God foreknows everything nor whether we have free will. It simply proves that infallible foreknowledge and free will are mutually exclusive ideas. If you accept one, you are forced to reject the other. Perhaps I'll post something that will actually make the argument for Open Theism but for now, I'll stick with this rather important first step in that direction.

Resting in Him,
Clete

 

[quip]

I've posted the following syllogism a few times in recent weeks and each time I've received no response at all to it. In fact, over the years I've posted this syllogism dozens of times and if I've ever seen anyone attempt to refute it, it's been so long ago that I cannot remember it and so I thought I'd start a thread specifically dedicated to it just to see if there is anyone who wants to offer a substantive response to it.

T = You answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am

1. Yesterday God infallibly believed T. [Supposition of infallible foreknowledge]
2. If E occurred in the past, it is now-necessary that E occurred then. [Principle of the Necessity of the Past]
3. It is now-necessary that yesterday God believed T. [1, 2]
4. Necessarily, if yesterday God believed T, then T. [Definition of “infallibility”]
5. If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle]
6. So it is now-necessary that T. [3,4,5]
7. If it is now-necessary that T, then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [Definition of “necessary”]
8. Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [6, 7]
9. If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely. [Principle of Alternate Possibilities]
10. Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, you will not do it freely. [8, 9]

Source​

This is fun....being devil's advo. here: :devil:

God is purported to transcend the linear progression of time evident by the 'infallibility' of P1, thus god simultaneously knows (not believed, which implies past >> present linearity) any/every possible T, therefore it's plausible that T was freely chosen.

 

[SaulToPaul 2]

7-9 cannot should be will not

 

[nikolai_42]

What does it mean to "infallibly believe" something? That sounds (to me, anyway) like it's packing a presupposition that is going unchecked.

 

[Clete]

7-9 cannot should be will not

No. I read it through again. It's right as written.

 

[Clete]

What does it mean to "infallibly believe" something? That sounds (to me, anyway) like it's packing a presupposition that is going unchecked.

It's not a trick or anything. It means what it seems to mean. The belief is correct and cannot be incorrect.

That's the beauty of syllogisms. The whole purpose of presenting the argument in such a format is to remove the influence of semantics and sophistry. It's just the bare naked ideas expressed in basic terms.

 

[Clete]

This is fun....being devil's advo. here: :devil:

God is purported to transcend the linear progression of time evident by the 'infallibility' of P1, thus god simultaneously knows (not believed, which implies past >> present linearity) any/every possible T, therefore it's plausible that T was freely chosen.

This is only slightly relevant. The argument is about foreKNOWLEDGE and so the point you're making here somewhat semantic. Your point merely speaks to how God knows not whether He does or not.

I do not disagree with you, though! If God knows everything in advance by any means whatsoever, then the argument holds and we do not act freely.

We do act freely (a point I have not establish here - yet). Therefore, God does not "transcend the linear progression of time", as you put it.

Resting in Him,
Clete

 

[Nick M]

That is all fine, but he tells us straight up;

"now I know you will not with hold your son from me"​

eliminating the possibility that he knew that Abraham would or would not withhold his son. They are his words, not mine. Clete should continue to not expect any sort of coherent, non misdirection response.

 

[quip]

This is only slightly relevant. The argument is about foreKNOWLEDGE and so the point you're making here somewhat semantic. Your point merely speaks to how God knows not whether He does or not.

5. If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle]

Wherefore: ...necessarily (p → q)? I ask because there's no inherent contradiction in ~T thus, '(p → q)' may not be designated as being logically necessary...it fails the conditional.

 

[nikolai_42]

It's not a trick or anything. It means what it seems to mean. The belief is correct and cannot be incorrect.

That's the beauty of syllogisms. The whole purpose of presenting the argument in such a format is to remove the influence of semantics and sophistry. It's just the bare naked ideas expressed in basic terms.

Then "infallibly believe" imports (a priori) the assumption that God doesn't know everything but can believe things infallibly. It assumes imperfect knowledge. Otherwise, why not just use the term "know"?

 

[Clete]

Then "infallibly believe" imports (a priori) the assumption that God doesn't know everything but can believe things infallibly. It assumes imperfect knowledge. Otherwise, why not just use the term "know"?

It could use the word "know" but then people would pick nits about what the word "know" means. It means to infallibly believe something.

 

[Clete]

5. If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle]

Wherefore: ...necessarily (p → q)? I ask because there's no inherent contradiction in ~T thus, '(p → q)' may not be designated as being logically necessary...it fails the conditional.

I'm usually very good at this but I've read this four times and I just can't follow it. Point five makes a complete argument. If you are suggesting that "If P then Q" is not necessary (which I'm not at all sure that you are) then you can't simply declare that it isn't necessary, you have to SHOW that it isn't. You are going to have to actually make the argument. Simply stating claims doesn't cut it. Especially when you state them so vaguely that they can hardly be deciphered.

Resting in Him,
Clete

 

[quip]

I'm usually very good at this but I've read this four times and I just can't follow it. Point five makes a complete argument. If you are suggesting that "If P then Q" is not necessary (which I'm not at all sure that you are) then you can't simply declare that it isn't necessary, you have to SHOW that it isn't. You are going to have to actually make the argument. Simply stating claims doesn't cut it. Especially when you state them so vaguely that they can hardly be deciphered.

Resting in Him,
Clete

Well, for T to be considered logically necessary it must be a contradiction to state ~T. I simply don't see any such contradiction in stating such.

Nonetheless, another challenge stands against P1 is that the truth-value of T simply does not exist until "tomorrow at 9am"; god cannot hold (now-necessary) infallible belief of a non-existent truth.

Or perhaps, this remains an exercise in futility by the very attempt at appropriating esoteric terms via mundane methodology.

 

[nikolai_42]

It could use the word "know" but then people would pick nits about what the word "know" means. It means to infallibly believe something.

But knowledge and belief are two distinct things. Belief implies limitation where knowledge does not. It requires restriction of temporality, and/or presence (not to mention omniscience).

 

[Clete]

But knowledge and belief are two distinct things. Belief implies limitation where knowledge does not. It requires restriction of temporality, and/or presence (not to mention omniscience).

Not if you put the word "infallibly" in front of it. Then it becomes synonymous with "know".

And, just as an irrelevant aside, all of human language is restricted by temporality. It is not possible to even discuss 'atemporality' without contradicting yourself. The very concept itself of existence outside of time is inherently contradictory. (That means its false, by the way.)

Resting in Him,
Clete

 

[Clete]

Well, for T to be considered logically necessary it must be a contradiction to state ~T. I simply don't see any such contradiction in stating such.

I don't care and am not interested in hearing about what you don't see. Only what you can make an argument for or against.

T and ~T are in contradiction to eachother, by definition. There is no way to both answer and not answer the phone tomorrow at 9:00.

Nonetheless, another challenge stands against P1 is that the truth-value of T simply does not exist until "tomorrow at 9am"; god cannot hold (now-necessary) infallible belief of a non-existent truth.

Do you even understand what a "premise" is?

Or perhaps, this remains an exercise in futility by the very attempt at appropriating esoteric terms via mundane methodology.

This 'mundane methodology' is the only means by which your mind works. Every single thing you know was learned by the use of reason. Every concept you communicate, very word you read, say or hear, from any source whatsoever - all of it - is understood because of reason and by NO OTHER MEANS. The fact that you aren't practiced at its disciplined and more formal formats of use is not the fault of reason but of your own lack of training and/or desire to learn.

Resting in Him,
Clete

 

[Ktoyou]

What about the chocolate ice-cream choosing grandson, see by his grandfather, were his grandson would have no choice, if the old man saw him choose it viewing a tape from the future?

The was a man Erick Fromm, who saw it this way, although he believed that human freedom was a curse, and so did the existentialist philosophers, Arthur Schopenhauer, the oddest of them all.

 

[nikolai_42]

Not if you put the word "infallibly" in front of it. Then it becomes synonymous with "know".

And, just as an irrelevant aside, all of human language is restricted by temporality. It is not possible to even discuss 'atemporality' without contradicting yourself. The very concept itself of existence outside of time is inherently contradictory. (That means its false, by the way.)

Resting in Him,
Clete

And there (I think) is a big part of the imported presupposition. "Infallible belief" is still belief - not knowledge. If I infallibly believe that there is a car in some garage I pass (and, therefore, am correct) it is NOT the same thing as if I know (probably because I was told or shown it) it is there. One is a certainty of probability. The other is a certainty that doesn't bring probability into consideration. God's knowledge (according to scripture) is beyond our capability of knowing. Most (or all - if some Quantum theorists are believed) of what we understand is simple probability. Man plans his ways, but God directs his steps. So God's a- or supra- temporality (it seems to me) is important in distinguishing between even man's knowledge and God's knowledge.

 

[Clete]

And there (I think) is a big part of the imported presupposition. "Infallible belief" is still belief - not knowledge.

Saying it doesn't make it so, Nik.

If I infallibly believe that there is a car in some garage I pass (and, therefore, am correct) it is NOT the same thing as if I know (probably because I was told or shown it) it is there.

How is it different?

All you're talking about is the 'how', not the 'what'. You can use whatever term you want, the logic in the argument holds. If you think any form of belief is a weaker term then use the strong one! It doesn't help you escape the conclusion that your action is not free.

One is a certainty of probability. The other is a certainty that doesn't bring probability into consideration.

Probabilities are irrelevant. Even if they were, the word "infallible" makes the probability of being wrong, zero!

God's knowledge (according to scripture) is beyond our capability of knowing.

Scripture doesn't say that but it doesn't need to. There is obviously no way for us to know the things God knows.

Most (or all - if some Quantum theorists are believed) of what we understand is simple probability.

Utterly irrelevant.

Man plans his ways, but God directs his steps. So God's a- or supra- temporality (it seems to me) is important in distinguishing between even man's knowledge and God's knowledge.

There is no such thing as supra-temporality. It isn't rational and it isn't biblical either. And even if it were either of those things, again, all you're talking about is how God knows (to use your term), not whether God knows. It is not relevant to the argument. If God knows with certainty what you will do, by whatever means, your action is not free because you cannot do otherwise.

Resting in Him,
Clete

 

[Clete]

What about the chocolate ice-cream choosing grandson, see by his grandfather, were his grandson would have no choice, if the old man saw him choose it viewing a tape from the future?

The future does not exist and so it is not a relevant hypothetical.

But even if you entertain it for a moment, you see almost immediately that it is a logically untenable scenerio. The fact that the grandfather is in the future means that the grandson is in the past and the events of the past are necessary, by definition. [Principle of the Necessity of the Past]

The "Principle of the Necessity of the Past" is simply the notion that the past is unalterable. The events of the past, being unalterable, are therefore logically necessary. If you put it in formal language it goes something like this....

"No one has the power at any moment t, to do anything that would cause what is, at t, a fact about the past to no longer be a fact about the past as a result of doing it." - That's a quote/paraphrase of someone - I don't know who - William Rowe maybe.

The was a man Erick Fromm, who saw it this way, although he believed that human freedom was a curse, and so did the existentialist philosophers, Arthur Schopenhauer, the oddest of them all.

I'll take your word for it.