It's interesting that nobody's really noticed all the errors of logic riddling Enyart's material.
Yes, Bob does redefine words, but that's not good. It's like saying "transubstantiation" in a debate on Catholicism should be redefined as y, not x like it has been for centuries, and I will furthermore address it as y, not x and argue against in from my definition. One shouldn't have to redefine terms. He ends up arguing against a straw man. His miscitation of Reymond is a prime example.
How exactly some attributes of God are more biblically sound than others seems to beg the question. Such an assertion is true only insofar as it is true that some attributes of God ascend over others, which He did not establish in his posts. His use of the false dilemma in his chart on the attributes of God understood by the two views is a case in point. It's designed to give the reader a warm fuzzy. Words like "warm" with relation to one group and "cold" with relation to others are nothing but emotive terms, which, having read them here in some reviews, seem to confer my suspicion that Bob is relying not on exegesis for this piece of his argument, but on false antithesis and appeal to emotion.
Enyart no doubt knows that his view is only true insofar as the other is false (that's probably why he's addressing Calvinism in particular), and since one of the biggest issues is libertarianism vs. compatibalism, I'm disappointed he did not lay out any articulation of how libertarian free will is taught in Scripture. If libertarianism is an invalid mechanism, then his view crumbles into dust. He has redefined "libertarian free will" already:
Finally, the triply redundant common term libertarian free will (LFW) has effectively the same definition as mine—that will is the ability to decide other than you do decide
.
In reality, there are three positions:
a) Hard determinism: We are not free to do otherwise even if we wanted to do otherwise.
b) Soft determinism: We are free to do otherwise if we want to do otherwise—although we are not free to want to do otherwise.
c) Indeterminism: We are free to want to do otherwise.
Is Enyart creating a diversion?
The definition of LFW is more properly stated as "freedom to want to do otherwise,
not the ability to choose. His position is indeterminism. He simply assumes libertarianism, sometimes known as contra-causal freedom.
He has not successfully defined the will any differently than his opponent, but it is known that his position is different than his opponent on this issue, and he says it is different. How it is different is the issue, but he does not tell us.
I know already that he holds to (c) above not (b) above. Dr. L. holds to (b). Notice in both views we are free to do otherwise, and his definition is "the ability to to decide other than you you do decide," "eg. freedom to do otherwise." The issue is whether we are free to want to do otherwise or not, not whether or not we are free to do otherwise. So,
he didn't answer Lamerson's question. Lamerson asked him to define "free will." Enyart only defined "will." This diverts the issue away from the real issue...LFW or CFW (compatibalist free will).
Notice he cites no Scripture to actually support a libertarian view itself, nor does he even attempt to deal with the compatibalist view. Instead, he makes an emotive appeal and infers Calvinism makes God the author of sin. Notice also that the definition he holds as an Open Theist, if he's consistent with his compatriots, is not one driven by Scripture, but is one that is, itself, derived from Greek philosophy. It is the libertarian, not the compatibalist, that draws such a definition from Greek philosophy, so Enyart's argument against Calvinism on those grounds becomes subject to criticism for using a double standard. In short, if the Calvinist is influenced by extra-biblical philosophy regarding God's will, so is Enyart on his own views about man's will.
Rather than deal with what compatibalists say, he simply throws up a few Scriptures and says, "these define the will in such a way that it means this." However, do they do so in libertarian or compatibalist terms? We aren't told.
There are philosophical, and, more importantly exegetical considerations surrounding his position that he simply has not dealt with in a meaningful manner. He mentions what Calvinists say about free will, but, most importantly, he simply does not deal with the reasons that Calvinists believe in compatibalism. In short, he has made a weak case for his position on this issue, which really doesn't surprise me since libertarians acknowledge that they derive their views on this particular subject from extra-biblical thought (See Walls and Dongell and each and every major apologist for Greek Orthodoxy, for example), and, having made that charge to Dr. L, it would expose him to easy criticism.
So far, then, he's simply assumed libertarianism without any interaction with the exegesis from the passages the other side of the aisle uses. He mentions the number of times the NKJV uses the word "will." This is irrelvant. (A) The issue is the underlying text; (B) there are texts where "will" as word in English is
not used from which Calvinists draw their ideas about compatibalism, texts he does not engage. He also seems here confuse "dogmatic" usage (as in a theology text or creedal formula) and "literary" usage, as in the biblical text. Sometimes they overlap; sometimes they don't.
I find this rather ironic:
For the Christians who have not been heavily influenced by pagan Greek thought, such a statement is repulsive and recognized immediately as contrary to the goodness and love of God
Then he goes on to quote Paul from two letters written to people steeped in Greek thought, letters which can be construed to teach the very doctrines he labels contrary to the goodness and love of God. Enyart seems to want to have his cake and eat it too. He says that he's not influenced by Greek thought, but uses a view of the will with its roots exactly there, and he chides Augustine, Calvin, etc. for being so influenced.
Thus, I must conclude his whole interlude into pagan philosophy is way off the mark and just a huge red herring.
A. The issue is what the exegesis of the text of Scripture has to say. The issue isn't Greek philosophy, it is the text by its own grammar and setting. If there was one text saying "Men are robots, but God is love." He would have to conclude both were true, not reject them based the emotive value of those terms.
B. "Logos" is a Philonic term, so we already have Hellenistic philosophy in Scripture itself. I don't see him denying the Incarnation on that basis, so pointing out Greek influences doesn't bolster his argument. They are already in the text.
He's also overstating Calvinism on a few things.
He writes,
To make it crystal clear how far this goes for the reader who is unfamiliar with common, thoroughgoing Calvinism, you believe that our “choice” is secondary, for each decision occurs because it is completely dependent upon God’s foreordination of that specific choice.
That's true, insofar as Calvinism draws a distinction between the power of contrary choice (between good and evil) and the power of alternative choice (between alternative goods and alternative evils). God does not directly decree every detail actively. (potentia absoluta) His decree includes the permission given to secondary causes (potentia ordinata). (C.Hodge Sys. Theo. V.1) Permission is still a decree, thus, even His permission is deemed “effectual.” His decretive will grounds both. The way that will is executed is the issue. E.g. the means are decreed as well as the ends. Those means for the Calvinist, include the free, compatibalistic choices of men. An agent’s nature does not determine his
specific choice . Rather, it determines the
general class of choices. A sinner can only sin, but he can sin in different ways. God can only do good, but there are a variety of goods from which to choose. For his opponent, His grounding decree grounds the existence of all things, including those specific choices, but it does not mean that God directly causes by His direct action those choices. Since He is the one who began the decree, He knows everything that exists on it.
Enyart is making an emotive plea to allege that Calvinists make God the author of sin since God is responsible for the existence of everything. Since God is the ground of all being, He has that pay-grade. The issue is what constitutes "blame" and "responsibility" and whether or not one always entails the other. He is making a huge blunder here.
First, To say that God is responsible for whatever happens is not to say that God is solely responsible for whatever happens. God is not the only agent in the world. God is the primary agent, but he has made secondary agents as well. Responsibility is a necessary condition for blame, but it is insufficient to entail blame. There are reasons the Calvinist believes this, there is a vast apologetic literature on this subject from all sides in this debate, and he never deals with them. See C, subhead b below.
Also, if LFW is true, then it gives man a type of freedom God does not have, since Enyart seems to believe God is only able to do good. God is not free unless He can do evil or illogically. Note too that if God can act in an illogical manner and the universe not fly apart when He does so, then the law on non-contradicition and all logical absolutes are, in fact, relative and mutable. . Theology proper has generally articulated a compatibalistic will for God that flows from His character attributes and His incommunicable attributes. His omniscience is related to His independence. Enyart has also mentioned a handful of attributes of God. However, it strikes me that, since God is in some measure dependent on man for His knowledge, his position needs to address the independence of God as articulated by the past 1900 or so years of orthodox theology. He has not done this, and the opposing position routinely accuses his of attacking this doctrine.
A. Not everything is foreordained by God's direct action. Some things are rendered by His inaction.
B. Some things are freely left to secondary causes based on the above distinctions if God's decree is one of permission and not direct action.
C. Based on (a) His knowledge of the nature of each person which He has created, He can accurately know what they will do in any given situation, and
(b) He can inferfere as He pleases to ensure a particular person makes a particular decision at a particular time and place if He so chooses, while the motives of that persons actions belong to Him alone. The motive for x action is the determinant of moral responsibilty, not the freedom to do otherwise. In fact, if was Dr. Ll, I would argue that LFW, because chance is a real possibility, destroys moral responsibility. God raised up nations to judge Israel, but he judged those nations for sinning in the process. They did God's bidding, but they did it while hating God and His people, not while loving God and His people. Thus, they are morally blameworthy for their evil, their evil was not in destroying Israel, for example, it was in hating the Israelites doing what they did for selfish reasons, etc. If they had done so loving God and worshipping Him only, that would be a different story, for that is precisely what God did with Israel when Joshua led them to conquer Canaan. God judged the pagan nations w/Israel and commended Israel, while he judged the pagan nations for what they did to Israel, even though He says He raised them up to do to Israel what Israel did to Canaan.
c) as such His foreknowledge is perfect, because His foreordination decrees it so, see D;
(d) God's direct action still need not make Him to blame for everything, because moral responsibility can be proven from hard determinism via Frankfurt-cases. A Frankfurt-case is a thought-experiment in which the subject, unbeknownst to himself, has a failsafe device implanted in his brain which would prevent him from making a certain choice. Frankfurt-cases are generally deployed to show that LFW is not a necessary condition of moral responsibility. Both the exegetical basis and the absolute necessity of LFW are essential to his position. He has neither interacted with his opponent on these issues, nor has he offered anythiing of substance that contravenes the apologetic material (including non-Christian views supporting compatibalism), nor has he established the presence or necessity of LFW in Scripture or that LFW is even philosophically valid.
D. Divine foreknowledge is grounded in His own foreordained responses to His own decree, and this is something Enyart has simply not dealt with in his posts, since he has seen fit to redefine terms. Enyart has assumed that God is relating to men themselves, but the contrary position is that God is reacting to His own decree. He is, in a broad sense, reacting to Himself when He reacts to man.
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