Combined reply to Yorzhik and 1Way,
Yorzhik,
Re: "Solving the game of chess." I don't understand what you mean by it. Perhaps I can better understand and answer the question if I knew what chess problem needs to be solved. If you said "Jones solved the glitch in the software," that would make sense. If you said "I solved the leak in the toilet tank," I would understand. Those are problems that need a solution. But if someone says to me, "I solved the game of 'Go Fish,'" I need to know what the problem was in the first place.
To 1Way,
Here's an illustration to communicate distinctions between cause and decree, choosing in terms of ability and choosing in terms of will. It is not intended to communicate anything about God Himself. No component of this analogy is intended to represent or correspond to God or any of His attributes or characteristics.
For the sake of argument, let's say that my genetics alone were the determining factor for what kinds of vegetables I like or hate to eat. In this case I hate peas and I like beans.
A choice is set before me. Eat peas or eat beans.
Am I able to choose peas? In terms of ability, yes, I can choose peas. But in terms of my will, I am not able to choose peas over beans. Is it possible, in terms of ability, to choose peas, of course. Is it possible, in terms of my will, to choose peas, of course not, unless I can go against my own will.
"Why don't you choose the peas?" someone might ask. "Are you too weak to choose the peas?" The answer is no, of course. I have the ability to choose them if I wanted to. But I don't want to. "What's so hard?" Someone might ask. What's so hard is going against my own will. That makes it not possible, in terms of my will.
If someone were to ask, "Why doesn't that guy choose to eat peas." The answer is, he doesn't want to (a function of the will). "Is he able to?" In terms of ability, yes. In terms of what the will is (a function of genetics), no.
So what is the cause of my choosing peas? My will. What role do my genetics play? The genetics decree the will. The genetic decree the sole determining factor of my vegetable preference. If you want to say my genetics (decree) are the reason for my will being such as it is, that's fine. But genetics (the decree) did not cause me to choose beans. My will did. You might say that the genetic decree accounts for why my will is what it is, but genetics did not cause me to choose beans. That is to say, the "because" is not the same as the "cause."
Can the answer be, "His genetics caused him to choose beans?" If you want to loosely define "cause" and say both genetics and my will are somehow causes, then I'm going use your concession against you.
If there's any part of that you don't understand, I will happily explain further.
Yorzhik,
Re: "Solving the game of chess." I don't understand what you mean by it. Perhaps I can better understand and answer the question if I knew what chess problem needs to be solved. If you said "Jones solved the glitch in the software," that would make sense. If you said "I solved the leak in the toilet tank," I would understand. Those are problems that need a solution. But if someone says to me, "I solved the game of 'Go Fish,'" I need to know what the problem was in the first place.
To 1Way,
Here's an illustration to communicate distinctions between cause and decree, choosing in terms of ability and choosing in terms of will. It is not intended to communicate anything about God Himself. No component of this analogy is intended to represent or correspond to God or any of His attributes or characteristics.
For the sake of argument, let's say that my genetics alone were the determining factor for what kinds of vegetables I like or hate to eat. In this case I hate peas and I like beans.
A choice is set before me. Eat peas or eat beans.
Am I able to choose peas? In terms of ability, yes, I can choose peas. But in terms of my will, I am not able to choose peas over beans. Is it possible, in terms of ability, to choose peas, of course. Is it possible, in terms of my will, to choose peas, of course not, unless I can go against my own will.
"Why don't you choose the peas?" someone might ask. "Are you too weak to choose the peas?" The answer is no, of course. I have the ability to choose them if I wanted to. But I don't want to. "What's so hard?" Someone might ask. What's so hard is going against my own will. That makes it not possible, in terms of my will.
If someone were to ask, "Why doesn't that guy choose to eat peas." The answer is, he doesn't want to (a function of the will). "Is he able to?" In terms of ability, yes. In terms of what the will is (a function of genetics), no.
So what is the cause of my choosing peas? My will. What role do my genetics play? The genetics decree the will. The genetic decree the sole determining factor of my vegetable preference. If you want to say my genetics (decree) are the reason for my will being such as it is, that's fine. But genetics (the decree) did not cause me to choose beans. My will did. You might say that the genetic decree accounts for why my will is what it is, but genetics did not cause me to choose beans. That is to say, the "because" is not the same as the "cause."
Can the answer be, "His genetics caused him to choose beans?" If you want to loosely define "cause" and say both genetics and my will are somehow causes, then I'm going use your concession against you.
If there's any part of that you don't understand, I will happily explain further.
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