ARCHIVE: Open Theism part 2

[themuzicman]

I opposed it. Articles opposed it.

No, they try to use modal logical to try to explain EDF and LFW. They don't address my proof at all.

There is no element in our experience that explains an eternal nonbeginning well.

But it isn't logically contradictory with some other doctrine.

I'm totally able and 'did' interact with it. It is a repeat and just repeating it is asserting. I'm not into readdressing a mistaken concept more than twice.

Not in a valid way.

I introduced 'y' and you actually proved my point by saying 'y' has nothing to do with 'x.' That was the proof of the whole thing and a sizable concession.
Of course I believe I'm right and you are wrong. The scriptures point to this truth and yet, because you cannot grasp it logically are dismissing it out of hand with a commitment to OV.

1) You never defined 'Y'.
2) 'Y' was not a part of my proof. Your insertion changes the proof, which means you're arguing against a strawman. My argument stands without needing 'Y'.

Despite what a Stanford paper and two other collegiate works would say.

All they are doing is explaining the ways various people have tried to get around Aristotle's proof that EDF and LFW are incompatible.

Explain the difference, please. I'm not tracking with you here.

That God exists eternally doesn't conflict doctrinally with anything else. We can't explain it exactly, but there is nothing to contradict it.

EDF and LFW are directly contradictory, logically speaking. They butt heads.

Because I see your logical objection and object to it.

Then you've abandoned free will. There is simply no possible way to claim that an almanac that travels back a year in time will be 100% accurate.

Are you eliminating freewill every time you actualize a decision then?

Yes. Once I actualize a decision, I cannot make that decision anymore. My free will over that decision is gone.

Further, does this mean you never had freewill?

No, it means that I no longer have free will over decisions I've already made.

Your logical conclusions are confusing to me and I expect it is because they are committing logical fallacies.

Yet you haven't pointed any out.

OV is caught in this trap because it seeks to grasp an atemporal anomaly with temporally constrained parameters of logic.

God describes Himself as temporal. One only needs read Genesis to find that. (Gen 6, God regrets creating mankind, for instance.)

Let me ask, according to the Almanac presentation, is freewill lost?
In my estimation, the answer is 'no.' That is, we are talking about something we can't intellectualize well because it goes beyond our reason. The qualifier that disables our ability to assess is the fact that somehow the Almanac came back a year earlier before it was written. This doesn't gel with temporal logic because we are trying to take something that escapes our temporal parameters and trying to understand it temporally. OV assumptions are the problem here, not the logistics of the problem. When John meets and speaks with an elder in heaven, you assume the elder is a fabrication. I assume that God is able to transcend temporal restraints. I believe my position takes the scripture at face value and interprets it correctly.

I never said that the elder was a fabrication. I said that Revelation is of such a genre as to make highly symbolic and stylized language and images. If you'd do a proper exegesis of Revelation, beginning with understanding the genre that John informs us that it is, you'd grasp that concept, and you'd be able to read Revelation as John intended for us to read it, rather than as you want us to read it.

Muz

 

[Lon]

You basically start doing this asserting when you I have to repeat myself.

No, they try to use modal logical to try to explain EDF and LFW. They don't address my proof at all.

At first I believed you had a handle on modal logic.

Here it is briefly: <> Possibility
[] Necessarily

<>Bob wore a red shirt (possible)
[] Bob did not wear any other color
[] Bob wore a shirt

It doesn't prove that Bob wore a red shirt but it eliminates the 'objections.'
We know that Bob wore a shirt and that it wasn't any other color.
We don't know 100% that he wore a red shirt, but we know the objections are untenuable. The links I gave show that the OV argument is likewise untenuable
<> Foreknowledge doesn't eliminate choices
[] We have choices
[] We cannot build logical objection once duration is eliminated which is the proposition (either by a literal definition of prognosis or by an almanac somehow coming back in time)

But it isn't logically contradictory with some other doctrine.

Foreknowledge isn't logically contradictory either. It is applying 'duration' logical to atemporal proposition that creates the logical fallacy. Your mind is going unidirectional logically when we are talking about multidirectional capacity according to the literal definition of foreknowledge (knows beforehand).
You and I must wade through duration to know if a preconception is proved true or not (the very definition of knowledge is only actualized by us 'after' the fact).

Not in a valid way.

I'll attempt it again below. I pray the key that will explain this logically and comprehensively will come to mind, but at this point, I'd guess OV has seen most of these arguments.

1) You never defined 'Y'.
2) 'Y' was not a part of my proof. Your insertion changes the proof, which means you're arguing against a strawman. My argument stands without needing 'Y'.

Fair enough, and maybe I'll need you to really break this down.

In my mind x=choice. I mention y=foreknowledge because the thing you are arguing requires it. They are two different things and you are trying to show that there is a logical problem with y (at least as I see it).

All they are doing is explaining the ways various people have tried to get around Aristotle's proof that EDF and LFW are incompatible.

I believe 1) they have shown that logical argument against it is presumptuous
2) that they have given good reasons for compatibility that satisfy logical demands

That God exists eternally doesn't conflict doctrinally with anything else. We can't explain it exactly, but there is nothing to contradict it.

If you can't explain it, then you cannot contradict it. That's all I'm saying about choice and foreknowledge as well.

EDF and LFW are directly contradictory, logically speaking. They butt heads.

I think there are contradictions to finite being's logic (not really contradictions, but limitations on our ability to comprehend and/or acquiesce). The question "How can God have never had a beginning?" usually starts pointing in that direction.

Then you've abandoned free will. There is simply no possible way to claim that an almanac that travels back a year in time will be 100% accurate.

If it records accurately what 'happened' then those things necessarily will happen, not because the Almanac 'predicts' it, but because it accurately records it. It already assessed what man's greatest choice inclinations were. Because man is the determinitive factor, man will have already chosen.

Yes. Once I actualize a decision, I cannot make that decision anymore. My free will over that decision is gone.

No, it means that I no longer have free will over decisions I've already made.

I'm going to try to equate here and feel free to correct me because I really want to try and understand your objection:
If you no longer have freewill over the past, did you really have it to begin with?
I'm trying to understand the difference in your mind between an inescapable past and your objection to an inexcapable future. In my thinking, I don't think we have free choice in the future either. It is only the 'now' where we can actually make a choice and it is for the briefest of duration. Because foreknowledge deals with 'future' I see these logical problems similarly and need much clarification from OVer's about the specific differences. I'm not tracking on your wave-length for disagreement.

Yet you haven't pointed any out.

Not for lack of trying

God describes Himself as temporal. One only needs read Genesis to find that. (Gen 6, God regrets creating mankind, for instance.)

And we can go off on proof-texting from our perspective advantages, but as I said, if it is logically impossible in your mind, the only option is to explain away the verses (like you also believe we do, so it is important to get from impossible to possible or vise versa). If OV could prove the point, I'd become a convert but I really believe we are discussing something that no 8 year old would readily grasp.

I never said that the elder was a fabrication. I said that Revelation is of such a genre as to make highly symbolic and stylized language and images. If you'd do a proper exegesis of Revelation, beginning with understanding the genre that John informs us that it is, you'd grasp that concept, and you'd be able to read Revelation as John intended for us to read it, rather than as you want us to read it.

Muz

I agree with this assessment, but not for the whole book. There are figurative and literal explications. When John says he spoke with the elder, it seems properly literal to me. I don't see 'elder' as a symbolic figure.

 

[themuzicman]

At first I believed you had a handle on modal logic.

I do.

Here it is briefly: <> Possibility
[] Necessarily

<>Bob wore a red shirt (possible)
[] Bob did not wear any other color
[] Bob wore a shirt

It doesn't prove that Bob wore a red shirt but it eliminates the 'objections.'

Again, this assumes that it was possible that Bob wore another color. If Bob is a robot who is perfectly constructed and programmed to wear a red shirt which is in his possession, then, for Bob, wearing the red shirt is necessary, because he cannot do otherwise. He MUST wear the red shirt.

You see, something that is "possible" must have a possible "not" contingent.

Apparently you are the one who needs the lesson in modal logic.

We know that Bob wore a shirt and that it wasn't any other color.
We don't know 100% that he wore a red shirt, but we know the objections are untenuable.

But you've assumed that it is possible for Bob to do something other than wear the red shirt. You actually need to establish contingent for Bob's wearing of a red shirt.

The links I gave show that the OV argument is likewise untenuable

Except that you segregate these items from the remainder of the argument, leaving the question of necessity or possibility in question.

<> Foreknowledge doesn't eliminate choices
[] We have choices
[] We cannot build logical objection once duration is eliminated which is the proposition (either by a literal definition of prognosis or by an almanac somehow coming back in time)

This simply doesn't follow from anything you've said. You've left far too many holes in your argument for it to stand, whereas the necessity of God and His attributes are clear and unopposed.

Well, let's test this:

If foreknowledge is eternal, at what point could it have been otherwise?

In fact, given that God is both necessary and eternal and His foreknowledge is eternal, the logical conclusion is that foreknowledge MUST be necessary, as I've demonstrated before.

[]If God foreknows X then X
If God necessarily foreknows X then X, necessarily
God is necessary.
God's eternal foreknowledge is necessary (it cannot be otherwise.)
Therefore, X is necessary.

It's not complicated.

Foreknowledge isn't logically contradictory either. It is applying 'duration' logical to atemporal proposition that creates the logical fallacy. Your mind is going unidirectional logically when we are talking about multidirectional capacity according to the literal definition of foreknowledge (knows beforehand).
You and I must wade through duration to know if a preconception is proved true or not (the very definition of knowledge is only actualized by us 'after' the fact).

No. Foreknowledge is logically contradictory to free will. God's eternal existence doesn't run into a logical contradiction with some other doctrine.

Fair enough, and maybe I'll need you to really break this down.

In my mind x=choice. I mention y=foreknowledge because the thing you are arguing requires it. They are two different things and you are trying to show that there is a logical problem with y (at least as I see it).

X can be anything. Doesn't matter what it is.

And there is no 'Y'. I mention foreknowledge directly in the proof, and demonstrate its necessity. Why change it?

I believe 1) they have shown that logical argument against it is presumptuous
2) that they have given good reasons for compatibility that satisfy logical demands

The Aristotelian solution:

One response to the dilemma of infallible foreknowledge and free will is to deny that the proposition T has a truth value, nor does any proposition about the contingent future or its negation have a truth value.​

Eliminates Foreknowledge

The Boethian solution:

The way Boethius describes God's cognitive grasp of temporal reality, all temporal events are before the mind of God at once.​

Which seems to be your tack.

This requires another argument.

the Ockhamist solution

Adams argues that God's existence in the past and God's past beliefs about the future are not strictly past because they are facts that are in part about the future.

Adams's argument was unsuccessful since, among other things, her criterion for being a hard fact had the consequence that no fact is a hard fact (Fischer 1989, introduction), but it led to a series of attempts to bolster it by giving more refined definitions of a “hard fact” and the type of necessity such facts are said to have — what Ockham called “accidental necessity” (necessity per accidens).​

The Molinist solution​

Discussed at length, here. The issue here is that God chooses which choices we make when He actualizes.

The Frankfurtian/Augustinian solution

Black, an evil neurosurgeon, wishes to see White dead but is unwilling to do the deed himself. Knowing that Mary Jones also despises White and will have a single good opportunity to kill him, Black inserts a mechanism into Jones's brain that enables Black to monitor and to control Jones's neurological activity. If the activity in Jones's brain suggests that she is on the verge of deciding not to kill White when the opportunity arises, Black's mechanism will intervene and cause Jones to decide to commit the murder. On the other hand, if Jones decides to murder White on her own, the mechanism will not intervene. It will merely monitor but will not affect her neurological function. Now suppose that when the occasion arises, Jones decides to kill White without any “help” from Black's mechanism. In the judgment of Frankfurt and most others, Jones is morally responsible for her act. Nonetheless, it appears that she is unable to do otherwise since if she had attempted to do so, she would have been thwarted by Black's device.​

The problems, here, are evident, albeit convoluted. In the end, if the neurological device kicks in because Jones chose not to kill, then free will no longer exists.

If you can't explain it, then you cannot contradict it. That's all I'm saying about choice and foreknowledge as well.

False dichotomy. I said that we cannot explain it exactly. There are elements that we DO understand, and we can deal with those.

I think there are contradictions to finite being's logic (not really contradictions, but limitations on our ability to comprehend and/or acquiesce). The question "How can God have never had a beginning?" usually starts pointing in that direction.

Yes, but that falls under unexplainable, not under contradicts other doctrine.

If it records accurately what 'happened' then those things necessarily will happen, not because the Almanac 'predicts' it, but because it accurately records it. It already assessed what man's greatest choice inclinations were. Because man is the determinitive factor, man will have already chosen.

But in going back in time, those same individuals will have an opportunity to make a free choice again. Even if everything remains identical, if free will is true, it is almost certain that things will not happen exactly the same way.

If your almanac were 100% accurate, then free will does not exist.

I'm going to try to equate here and feel free to correct me because I really want to try and understand your objection:
If you no longer have freewill over the past, did you really have it to begin with?
I'm trying to understand the difference in your mind between an inescapable past and your objection to an inexcapable future. In my thinking, I don't think we have free choice in the future either. It is only the 'now' where we can actually make a choice and it is for the briefest of duration. Because foreknowledge deals with 'future' I see these logical problems similarly and need much clarification from OVer's about the specific differences. I'm not tracking on your wave-length for disagreement.

Well, I cannot remake a decision from the past right now, and I cannot make a decision that I don't know I'll have to make in the future, can I? I can only make decisions that I have in front of me right now.

Now, future decisions (without foreknowledge) are still contingent, and I will freely make them. Past decisions are now-necessary, since they cannot be otherwise. That's the difference between the past and the future.

And we can go off on proof-texting from our perspective advantages, but as I said, if it is logically impossible in your mind, the only option is to explain away the verses (like you also believe we do, so it is important to get from impossible to possible or vise versa). If OV could prove the point, I'd become a convert but I really believe we are discussing something that no 8 year old would readily grasp.

I wouldn't expect an 8 year old to grasp it. These are complex theological and philosophical issues.

And there is no "explaining away" of anything.

I agree with this assessment, but not for the whole book. There are figurative and literal explications. When John says he spoke with the elder, it seems properly literal to me. I don't see 'elder' as a symbolic figure.

Then you don't really understand the apocalyptic genre.

Muz

 

[godrulz]

Revelation can be taken in a normative literal fashion with recognition of figures of speech and apocalyptic genre (Pentecost; Walvoord).

Free will/foreknowledge/predestination discussions can get very technical. I think OT stands the test of these technical arguments (Hasker, etc.) with counter arguments to the determinists.

On another level, if we keep things simple, OT should resonate with reality and biblical principles without convoluted proofs and arguments few can grasp. I am always delighted when teens, atheists, new Christians, or unindoctrinated believers quickly grasp Open Theism (in contrast to Ware, Geisler, etc. who misrepresent and misunderstand it, despite their normal brilliance).

In the end, even settled theists live as if the future is partially open. Prayer arguments, for e.g., in a settled view or strained at best.

 

[Lon]

Back to the Almanac

Back to the Almanac

I do.
Again, this assumes that it was possible that Bob wore another color. If Bob is a robot who is perfectly constructed and programmed to wear a red shirt which is in his possession, then, for Bob, wearing the red shirt is necessary, because he cannot do otherwise. He MUST wear the red shirt.

You see, something that is "possible" must have a possible "not" contingent.

Apparently you are the one who needs the lesson in modal logic.

Okay, that was a cheapshot but not consciously done. My apologies.

If Bob doesn't wear another color, did he have choice? I still don't think the alternative rationally leads to choice elimination. I do admit it naturally leads to this in durative rationale, but we cannot answer the question that way. It confuses our rational ability to do so as with the almanac. I'll work through that again momentarily.

But you've assumed that it is possible for Bob to do something other than wear the red shirt. You actually need to establish contingent for Bob's wearing of a red shirt.

Except that you segregate these items from the remainder of the argument, leaving the question of necessity or possibility in question.



This simply doesn't follow from anything you've said. You've left far too many holes in your argument for it to stand, whereas the necessity of God and His attributes are clear and unopposed.

Well, let's test this:

If foreknowledge is eternal, at what point could it have been otherwise?

In fact, given that God is both necessary and eternal and His foreknowledge is eternal, the logical conclusion is that foreknowledge MUST be necessary, as I've demonstrated before.

[]If God foreknows X then X
If God necessarily foreknows X then X, necessarily
God is necessary.
God's eternal foreknowledge is necessary (it cannot be otherwise.)
Therefore, X is necessary.

It's not complicated.

It is too, once we start going back and forth through time, much of our rationale is barred from making the trip. As soon as you look at it from forward-backwards, the duration argument becomes untenuable. You and I cannot answer the question: If it is foreknown, can it be free? It just isn't possible because we have no capacity to reasonably work through multidirectional time considerations effectively. The only thing that makes sense to us is unidirectional rationale because we do not possess this ability nor have any experience of it to hook into.

No. Foreknowledge is logically contradictory to free will. God's eternal existence doesn't run into a logical contradiction with some other doctrine.

X can be anything. Doesn't matter what it is.

And there is no 'Y'. I mention foreknowledge directly in the proof, and demonstrate its necessity. Why change it?

The Aristotelian solution:

One response to the dilemma of infallible foreknowledge and free will is to deny that the proposition T has a truth value, nor does any proposition about the contingent future or its negation have a truth value.​

Eliminates Foreknowledge

The Boethian solution:

The way Boethius describes God's cognitive grasp of temporal reality, all temporal events are before the mind of God at once.​

Which seems to be your tack.

This requires another argument.

the Ockhamist solution

Adams argues that God's existence in the past and God's past beliefs about the future are not strictly past because they are facts that are in part about the future.

Adams's argument was unsuccessful since, among other things, her criterion for being a hard fact had the consequence that no fact is a hard fact (Fischer 1989, introduction), but it led to a series of attempts to bolster it by giving more refined definitions of a “hard fact” and the type of necessity such facts are said to have — what Ockham called “accidental necessity” (necessity per accidens).​

The Molinist solution​

Discussed at length, here. The issue here is that God chooses which choices we make when He actualizes.

The Frankfurtian/Augustinian solution

Black, an evil neurosurgeon, wishes to see White dead but is unwilling to do the deed himself. Knowing that Mary Jones also despises White and will have a single good opportunity to kill him, Black inserts a mechanism into Jones's brain that enables Black to monitor and to control Jones's neurological activity. If the activity in Jones's brain suggests that she is on the verge of deciding not to kill White when the opportunity arises, Black's mechanism will intervene and cause Jones to decide to commit the murder. On the other hand, if Jones decides to murder White on her own, the mechanism will not intervene. It will merely monitor but will not affect her neurological function. Now suppose that when the occasion arises, Jones decides to kill White without any “help” from Black's mechanism. In the judgment of Frankfurt and most others, Jones is morally responsible for her act. Nonetheless, it appears that she is unable to do otherwise since if she had attempted to do so, she would have been thwarted by Black's device.​

The problems, here, are evident, albeit convoluted. In the end, if the neurological device kicks in because Jones chose not to kill, then free will no longer exists.

I'm saying, as brilliant as these men were and your astute presentation (again, forgive the former slight, please, as unintentional consciously) the question about multidirectional considerations isn't addressed.

False dichotomy. I said that we cannot explain it exactly. There are elements that we DO understand, and we can deal with those.



Yes, but that falls under unexplainable, not under contradicts other doctrine.



But in going back in time, those same individuals will have an opportunity to make a free choice again. Even if everything remains identical, if free will is true, it is almost certain that things will not happen exactly the same way.

If your almanac were 100% accurate, then free will does not exist.

I diverge here. The almanac does not determine those outcomes, it records them.
Simply going forward or backward in time does nothing. The almanac (and my reason for bringing in 'y' for foreknowledge so I could use it) has nothing to do with events occuring. It is completely unrelated to x other than recording x. That's it. There is no loss of choice simply because it records choice. If it comes back, the events happen exactly as recorded because nothing changes. Choice wasn't lost, it is the way your mind is going unidirectionally that determines this and I believe this is in fact the logical hole missing. You and I cannot make this determination and are completely without the ability to rationalize through a multidirectional time parameter to say that it eliminates or preserves it. This is compatiblism, it is recognizing human limitation to either deny or varify the claim that freewill is lost. How in the world, other than taking something out of multidirectional context and trying to force it into a unidirectional one, could we say something is illogical? The whole premise of the objection is wrong.

Well, I cannot remake a decision from the past right now, and I cannot make a decision that I don't know I'll have to make in the future, can I? I can only make decisions that I have in front of me right now.

Now, future decisions (without foreknowledge) are still contingent, and I will freely make them. Past decisions are now-necessary, since they cannot be otherwise. That's the difference between the past and the future.

I wouldn't expect an 8 year old to grasp it. These are complex theological and philosophical issues.

And there is no "explaining away" of anything.

Then you don't really understand the apocalyptic genre.

Muz

I believe the unidirectional function to be 1) a condition describing man's limitation that does not apply to God 2) that this logic certainly does affect our views of what is possible and impossible when examining scripture.

I believe I understand apocalyptic genre against your assertation and hope your's was also unpurposefully maligning.

 

[themuzicman]

Okay, that was a cheapshot but not consciously done. My apologies.

If Bob doesn't wear another color, did he have choice? I still don't think the alternative rationally leads to choice elimination. I do admit it naturally leads to this in durative rationale, but we cannot answer the question that way. It confuses our rational ability to do so as with the almanac. I'll work through that again momentarily.

OK

It is too, once we start going back and forth through time, much of our rationale is barred from making the trip. As soon as you look at it from forward-backwards, the duration argument becomes untenuable. You and I cannot answer the question: If it is foreknown, can it be free? It just isn't possible because we have no capacity to reasonably work through multidirectional time considerations effectively. The only thing that makes sense to us is unidirectional rationale because we do not possess this ability nor have any experience of it to hook into.

I don't see why we can't work through them. We've been discussing it in your almanac example.

I'm saying, as brilliant as these men were and your astute presentation (again, forgive the former slight, please, as unintentional consciously) the question about multidirectional considerations isn't addressed.

Given what free will is, there doesn't seem to be a problem. If it is foreknown, it will be the same decision every time. Period. It cannot be otherwise.

However, free will requires a new decision every time a circumstance is reached, and the possibility that another choice will be taken.

I diverge here. The almanac does not determine those outcomes, it records them.

I agree. I never said that the almanac determined them. I said that of the almanac were 100% correct, then free will could not exist. It's a correlation, not a causation. The cause is unimportant and, without further assumptions about this scenario, unknown

Simply going forward or backward in time does nothing. The almanac (and my reason for bringing in 'y' for foreknowledge so I could use it) has nothing to do with events occuring. It is completely unrelated to x other than recording x. That's it. There is no loss of choice simply because it records choice. If it comes back, the events happen exactly as recorded because nothing changes. Choice wasn't lost, it is the way your mind is going unidirectionally that determines this and I believe this is in fact the logical hole missing. You and I cannot make this determination and are completely without the ability to rationalize through a multidirectional time parameter to say that it eliminates or preserves it. This is compatiblism, it is recognizing human limitation to either deny or varify the claim that freewill is lost. How in the world, other than taking something out of multidirectional context and trying to force it into a unidirectional one, could we say something is illogical? The whole premise of the objection is wrong.

Given your false assumption about what I said, this isn't relevant.

The point is that if free will exists, then each time agent A comes to time T and circumstance C, both choices X and ~X must be able to be chosen. In your almanac example, when agent A comes to time T in circumstance C the second time, choice ~X is not possible, and thus A does not have free will. Since having free will is a constant state for a conscious being, we must conclude that he never had it.

I believe the unidirectional function to be 1) a condition describing man's limitation that does not apply to God 2) that this logic certainly does affect our views of what is possible and impossible when examining scripture.

I believe that it really doesn't matter if you're referring to uni- or multidirectional time, if free will exists, each pass through a given period of time will result in some decisions being different than the time before, because each decision is made without external causation.

I believe I understand apocalyptic genre against your assertation and hope your's was also unpurposefully maligning.

I apologize for being blunt and making an overreaching assertion.

However, there is no basis for saying that when these events come to pass (if they have not already come to pass), that we would be able to observe John speaking with the elder at that time.

I would be more inclined to think either that this elder is a symbol of something in heaven, which is represented by him, or, if this elder exists, that John is interacting with him in John's time, and not the future.

Either way, John jumping years or a millennia into the future aren't necessary, given the genre in which he writes.

Muz

 

[Lon]

I don't see why we can't work through them. We've been discussing it in your almanac example.

We can to a point. I'm saying that going backwards or forwards in time in our logic and the logical problems it creates, are difficult to assess, especially since our logic is mostly constrained to unidirectional thinking.

Given what free will is, there doesn't seem to be a problem. If it is foreknown, it will be the same decision every time. Period. It cannot be otherwise.

Again, this is constrained unidirectional thinking.

Time is a measurement like distance

3 race cars going the distance

We are in the middle car.

Wherever on the track we are, the last car sees it in the pas (where we just were).

The first car, sees us from the front before we actually get there. Even if we change lane position, he can adjust and block us, etc.

We are free to choose where we drive to a point (on the track, position between the cars).

The car in front knows where we are going, the car behind knows where we've been.

No logical contradictions but if we we start changing around between cars it will start to become confusing, like "Does the guy in the back see his future?"
He certainly sees future possibility for himself, but the guys in front have already been there.

However, free will requires a new decision every time a circumstance is reached, and the possibility that another choice will be taken.

I disagree, all that is required are the exact same possibilities again.

I agree. I never said that the almanac determined them. I said that of the almanac were 100% correct, then free will could not exist. It's a correlation, not a causation. The cause is unimportant and, without further assumptions about this scenario, unknown

This needs to be examined from every angle. Again, from the Almanac origin, it recorded what was chosen. It is only because we are stuck in the linear consideration that we'd assess no choice. It doesn't rationalize this all the way as it should. Looking back from the future, we know that the Almanac just recorded the facts, not determined them. Freewill obviously existed.

Given your false assumption about what I said, this isn't relevant.

The point is that if free will exists, then each time agent A comes to time T and circumstance C, both choices X and ~X must be able to be chosen. In your almanac example, when agent A comes to time T in circumstance C the second time, choice ~X is not possible, and thus A does not have free will. Since having free will is a constant state for a conscious being, we must conclude that he never had it.

I'll take the correction, but I don't see why it was false. Perhaps I got confused (remember I'm trying to think outside of a unidirectional box and that is a conundrum all by itself).

I believe that it really doesn't matter if you're referring to uni- or multidirectional time, if free will exists, each pass through a given period of time will result in some decisions being different than the time before, because each decision is made without external causation.

As noted above, I don't agree with this for the reasons given.

I apologize for being blunt and making an overreaching assertion.

Thank you sir (from one guilty).

However, there is no basis for saying that when these events come to pass (if they have not already come to pass), that we would be able to observe John speaking with the elder at that time.

I would be more inclined to think either that this elder is a symbol of something in heaven, which is represented by him, or, if this elder exists, that John is interacting with him in John's time, and not the future.

Either way, John jumping years or a millennia into the future aren't necessary, given the genre in which he writes.

Muz

Rev 4:1 After these things I looked, and there was a door standing open in heaven! And the first voice I had heard speaking to me like a trumpet said: "Come up here so that I can show you what must happen after these things."

Rev 5:1 Then I saw in the right hand of the one who was seated on the throne a scroll written on the front and back and sealed with seven seals.
Rev 5:2 And I saw a powerful angel proclaiming in a loud voice: "Who is worthy to open the scroll and to break its seals?"

Rev 22:6 Then the angel said to me, "These words are reliable and true. The Lord, the God of the spirits of the prophets, has sent his angel to show his servants what must happen soon."

There is definitely a tension in trying to convey what will happen, John having seen (past), and recording those things.

 

[themuzicman]

Again, this is constrained unidirectional thinking.

Time is a measurement like distance

3 race cars going the distance

We are in the middle car.

Wherever on the track we are, the last car sees it in the pas (where we just were).

The first car, sees us from the front before we actually get there. Even if we change lane position, he can adjust and block us, etc.

We are free to choose where we drive to a point (on the track, position between the cars).

The car in front knows where we are going, the car behind knows where we've been.

No logical contradictions but if we we start changing around between cars it will start to become confusing, like "Does the guy in the back see his future?"
He certainly sees future possibility for himself, but the guys in front have already been there.

Who is it exactly that is in a different point in time in this creation than we are?

I disagree, all that is required are the exact same possibilities again.

Well, if the first time around I chose A, and the 2nd time around, I chose ~A, and that changed the possible options for you then the possibilities wouldn't be exactly the same.

However, if you're saying that the same "possibilities" must exist, but then turn around and claim that each agent MUST choose the same as they did the first time around, then you've contradicted yourself, since the unchosen "possibilities" aren't possible, and you've lost free will.

This needs to be examined from every angle. Again, from the Almanac origin, it recorded what was chosen. It is only because we are stuck in the linear consideration that we'd assess no choice. It doesn't rationalize this all the way as it should. Looking back from the future, we know that the Almanac just recorded the facts, not determined them. Freewill obviously existed.

Obviously? How can you say that it obviously existed? Because we're assuming that it does?

The element in question is whether it exists, if the recorded events must happen the same way every time.

I'll take the correction, but I don't see why it was false. Perhaps I got confused (remember I'm trying to think outside of a unidirectional box and that is a conundrum all by itself).

OK, think of it this way:

The Almanac records events has they happen along time line T₁, between A an B. Between A and B, I chose to eat Vanilla Ice cream, and the Almanac recorded it. Also, because I ate Vanilla Ice Cream, there was none left, and you could not eat from the same box.

Rewind time from B to A, and begin again. Call this time line T₂.

If I have free will, then the choice to eat or not eat the Vanilla Ice Cream is before me again, and if all the possible choices exist, I may choose not to eat it.

If I choose not to eat Vanilla, now T₂ is different than T₁, and the Almanac is inaccurate.

The only way that T₁ can be exactly the same as T₂ is if there is some kind of determining factor which renders only one possible choice for each decision between A and B.

This doesn't mean that every choice must be different, but given sufficient time and decisions (which wouldn't require many), some decisions will be different.

Time isn't a video tape that can be recorded and then played over and over again.

As noted above, I don't agree with this for the reasons given.

Hopefully I've addressed this.

There is definitely a tension in trying to convey what will happen, John having seen (past), and recording those things.

Well, God only says that he'll see things that are to come. We don't really know whether he actually went forward in time, and given the genre, quite possible that John only saw representations of things to come.

Muz

 

[Lon]

Who is it exactly that is in a different point in time in this are?

The guy behind us is 'presently' behind us. In the near 'future' he will be where we have been.
We are 'presently' in the middle but will shortly be where the first guy has been.
The guy in front of us 'has been' where we presently are, it is his past.

We are all presently in our respective positions and perspectives, past, present, future.

(It is by no means EDF, looks something like-but not foreknowledge)

Well, if the first time around I chose A, and the 2nd time around, I chose ~A, and that changed the possible options for you then the possibilities wouldn't be exactly the same.

However, if you're saying that the same "possibilities" must exist, but then turn around and claim that each agent MUST choose the same as they did the first time around, then you've contradicted yourself, since the unchosen "possibilities" aren't possible, and you've lost free will.

Maybe we are getting somewhere finally here. Not 'must' but 'will' without deviance.

Obviously? How can you say that it obviously existed? Because we're assuming that it does?

The element in question is whether it exists, if the recorded events must happen the same way every time.

Obvious as in gratuitive, intuitive, self-evident. I choose to be typing at the moment. Doing a thing and having it exponentially known (OV-"God is very smart") or Exhaustively isn't that far apart in my thinking. OV is seeking to preserve the same thing, but again I believe the conundrum exists merely from unidirectional thinking. You look at it one way and see no choice but the one chosen, going forward (one direction consideration only). As with the Almanac, moving beyond the time consideration barriers presents a whole new stipulation for considering EDF and freewill that must be examined differently.
My answer is that it isn't contradictory once it is looked at from all angles. A bit beyond our capacity, yes, but not contradictory.

OK, think of it this way:

The Almanac records events has they happen along time line T₁, between A an B. Between A and B, I chose to eat Vanilla Ice cream, and the Almanac recorded it. Also, because I ate Vanilla Ice Cream, there was none left, and you could not eat from the same box.

Rewind time from B to A, and begin again. Call this time line T₂.

If I have free will, then the choice to eat or not eat the Vanilla Ice Cream is before me again, and if all the possible choices exist, I may choose not to eat it.

If I choose not to eat Vanilla, now T₂ is different than T₁, and the Almanac is inaccurate.

The only way that T₁ can be exactly the same as T₂ is if there is some kind of determining factor which renders only one possible choice for each decision between A and B.

This doesn't mean that every choice must be different, but given sufficient time and decisions (which wouldn't require many), some decisions will be different.

Time isn't a video tape that can be recorded and then played over and over again.
Hopefully I've addressed this.

Okay, I think I'm tracking with you but your assumption in the argument is what must exist for freewill to occur. I don't disagree with this, but see that it could be a wrong assumption (that we must be able to choose differently for it to be freewill). With this, as I said, I don't disagree, but I'm not convinced our idea is 100% accurate to make any strong defense. Again, I believe when we start thinking through time in which we are constrained, it isn't necessarily accurate if, as I believe, our logic is constrained in time considerations and God's isn't.

Well, God only says that he'll see things that are to come. We don't really know whether he actually went forward in time, and given the genre, quite possible that John only saw representations of things to come.

Muz

I do see your point, and also agree with you about postulation here with the 'if's' 'possible' etc. I was reading some from my Presbyterian Systematic Theology by Buswell last night on this issue, and he explains much of these things. It was written before Sanders and Boyd and he even gives examples from as early as 600AD of this debate. OV ideas have been around a long time. Even if we continue to disagree on things, I'm hopeful that when we are careful and looking at our presuppositions, we'll still find we are on the same page on most things even if we diverge on assumptions. I believe John talked with an elder in the future vision and that this has implications for our time considerations and freewill.

 

[themuzicman]

The guy behind us is 'presently' behind us. In the near 'future' he will be where we have been.
We are 'presently' in the middle but will shortly be where the first guy has been.
The guy in front of us 'has been' where we presently are, it is his past.

We are all presently in our respective positions and perspectives, past, present, future.

(It is by no means EDF, looks something like-but not foreknowledge)

I guess the only thing would change is to note that if we're seeing time slices in front of us, then, looking forward, you wouldn't see just someone at a point in front of you, but a blur of that existence in every point between them, as well. Furthermore, since each car can affect the other in the time which it exists, the actions of the one in back may change the course in front of him.

Which kinda brings us to the almanac problem.

Maybe we are getting somewhere finally here. Not 'must' but 'will' without deviance.

"Will" without deviance is must, because it is not contingent.

Obvious as in gratuitive, intuitive, self-evident.

Except that it isn't. Only if you assume that only one timeline is possible does it become obvious.

I choose to be typing at the moment. Doing a thing and having it exponentially known (OV-"God is very smart") or Exhaustively isn't that far apart in my thinking. OV is seeking to preserve the same thing, but again I believe the conundrum exists merely from unidirectional thinking. You look at it one way and see no choice but the one chosen, going forward (one direction consideration only).

On the contrary. I've said that each pass through would almost certainly result in some different decisions being made, creating a different thread.

As with the Almanac, moving beyond the time consideration barriers presents a whole new stipulation for considering EDF and freewill that must be examined differently.
My answer is that it isn't contradictory once it is looked at from all angles. A bit beyond our capacity, yes, but not contradictory.

The contradiction remains, since we can see that, even if we make a hundred passes though a given period of time, that consistency is not guaranteed.

Okay, I think I'm tracking with you but your assumption in the argument is what must exist for freewill to occur. I don't disagree with this, but see that it could be a wrong assumption (that we must be able to choose differently for it to be freewill).

That's the definition of Free Will. Agent A must be able to choose X AND must be able to choose ~X, but not both. How can you have free will without this?

With this, as I said, I don't disagree, but I'm not convinced our idea is 100% accurate to make any strong defense. Again, I believe when we start thinking through time in which we are constrained, it isn't necessarily accurate if, as I believe, our logic is constrained in time considerations and God's isn't.

God seems to be constrained in some kind of temporal restriction in Scripture. One only needs read the first book of Genesis to see that. It's not that God is restrained by OUR time, but God is certainly temporal.

I do see your point, and also agree with you about postulation here with the 'if's' 'possible' etc. I was reading some from my Presbyterian Systematic Theology by Buswell last night on this issue, and he explains much of these things. It was written before Sanders and Boyd and he even gives examples from as early as 600AD of this debate. OV ideas have been around a long time. Even if we continue to disagree on things, I'm hopeful that when we are careful and looking at our presuppositions, we'll still find we are on the same page on most things even if we diverge on assumptions. I believe John talked with an elder in the future vision and that this has implications for our time considerations and freewill.

Well, one feature of apocalyptic genre is that it is overly deterministic, as though the events are set in stone, even if they do not occur in that exact manner. Daniel 11 is a good example, where it's very difficult (if not impossible) to line up the exact prophecy with the actual events, unless you take a more symbolic and genre based look at what was written.

Muz

 

[themuzicman]

So, I guess OVT wins? lol

Muz

 

[Lon]

I guess the only thing would change is to note that if we're seeing time slices in front of us, then, looking forward, you wouldn't see just someone at a point in front of you, but a blur of that existence in every point between them, as well. Furthermore, since each car can affect the other in the time which it exists, the actions of the one in back may change the course in front of him.
Which kinda brings us to the almanac problem.

"Will" without deviance is must, because it is not contingent.

I kinda feel like we are starting to go around and coming back to the same worn discussions.

OV uses 'self-evident' truth to refute foreknowledge (as 'I' understand it) but the self-evident is not my perspective or understanding. I'll run a dialogue at the end here, but as I said, I think we've turned the bend again.

All that having been said, I truly appreciate you going around it again with me. We are at a point of disagreement but you've been a wonderful debate partner/counterpoint and I appreciate that here very much.

Except that it isn't. Only if you assume that only one timeline is possible does it become obvious.



On the contrary. I've said that each pass through would almost certainly result in some different decisions being made, creating a different thread.



The contradiction remains, since we can see that, even if we make a hundred passes though a given period of time, that consistency is not guaranteed.



That's the definition of Free Will. Agent A must be able to choose X AND must be able to choose ~X, but not both. How can you have free will without this?



God seems to be constrained in some kind of temporal restriction in Scripture. One only needs read the first book of Genesis to see that. It's not that God is restrained by OUR time, but God is certainly temporal.



Well, one feature of apocalyptic genre is that it is overly deterministic, as though the events are set in stone, even if they do not occur in that exact manner. Daniel 11 is a good example, where it's very difficult (if not impossible) to line up the exact prophecy with the actual events, unless you take a more symbolic and genre based look at what was written.

Muz

On this particular you are insisting that your own inclination and choice must be variable but as I look at it from another perspective, what you are saying actually denies your own freewill choice in the first place. If you can choose something else, your own choice is negated in hindsight. Again, when we are trying to analyze, truth here, it just isn't possible to be definitive. Here is that promised dialogue to give thought. I'm not sure we've convinced each other but I truly want to leave food for thought:

"If my action is known, it cannot be free. I'd have no choice."
"The Almanac records the choice you chose."

"The past cannot be changed, we've established that."

"Yeah, but you are making the same mistake in assuming foreknowledge does this too. It's constrained to a linear thought process. Once we start looking at time in a multidirectional consideration, there are all kinds of problems in trying to figure it out."

"If the decision is contingent, then another choice could be made."

"You are assuming that forward movement is the best way to grasp this dilemma and it is not. Once you are in any way able to go backward in time, the argument fails because it is totally built upon one directional thinking. We cannot say what an Almanac traveling back in time does nor that any other decision would have been made. Besides, if another decision is possible, the Almanac would automatically have changed because it recorded past events accurately. See what I mean? We just aren't built well to investigate whether Foreknowledge denies freewill and it is a precarious position built on a fault of one-directional thinking."

In my estimation, we've exposed our assumptions and problems with either position here adequately. I'm more than open to continuing but don't seem to see anything we can further add to this particular conversation.

Thanks again for wading through it with me.

 

[themuzicman]

And I thank you for the opportunity to have a civil conversation.

Muz

 

[Lon]

Hi Knight,

might be a good time for part 3 as there has been nothing really since Muz's August 8 entry.

It just seems like a good place to start again for bandwidth considerations and timing.

 

[Nathon Detroit]

Hi Knight,

might be a good time for part 3 as there has been nothing really since Muz's August 8 entry.

It just seems like a good place to start again for bandwidth considerations and timing.

Yeah... I have been thinking about that as well.

I will try to set that up today.

 

[Nathon Detroit]

Open Theism part 3.

 

[Nathon Detroit]

Open Theism part 3.