The water deepens with yet another Greek word was
prosopon (
πρόσωπον). The original meaning is “face” or “mask.” The Latin
persona, from which we get “person,” had the same meaning. Of course, the heretical Sabellians, who wished to know only of a revealed trinity, eagerly made use of these words in order to gain acceptance for their views. As a consequence, the orthodox avoided these words. The Greeks therefore used the above-mentioned hypostasis for “person,” even where they had earlier used
prosopon.
From history we know the Western Latin church found it difficult at first to find unambiguous terms. There were two Latin words, namely,
substantia and
subsistentia. Sometimes both were used for
substance, and sometimes both for
person, sometimes the one for
substance and the other for
person. From an understanding of church doctrinal history, the solution was as follows:
1. The term
substantia was abolished in relation to God.
Substantia is associated by contrast with
accidentia, “accident,” “chance,” and by calling God “
substance” one did not want to give the impression that in God, too, there is chance.
2. This rejected word—
substantia—was replaced by the more precise term
essential, “being,” “essence,” which corresponds to the Greek
ousia.
3. The nature of God, as inclusive of the attributes of His being, is called
natura in Latin, which agrees with the Greek
physis.
4. The word
subsistentia remained in use in order to indicate the personal mode of existence. Thus, it means what we call
person. In the same sense is
suppositum, a translation of the Greek words
hypostasis and
hypokeimenon (
ὑποκείμενον).
The ancients also spoke of a
perichoresis or
enyparxis (
περιχωρήσις,
ἐνυπάρξις); with the Latin:
circumcessio or
inexistentia mutual, “mutual in-being.” One wished to say that the persons of the Godhead are in each other reciprocally (see John 14:2; 17:21; 1 Cor. 2:10–11). Hence, there is a kind of internal circulation of the Godhead, an eternal movement within the being of God.
The persons of the Trinity are distinguished from each other by their character (
character hypostatius sive personalis (
τρόπος ὑπάρξεως). This personal factor is expressed in the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, which make known the uniqueness of the three persons. This factor is incommunicable, that is, it belongs only to one person. Thus, it serves to distinguish the persons. With the Father, it is the Father begetting the Son (but not in His causing by breathing the procession of the Spirit, for He has that in common with the Son). With the Son, it is the Son being begotten by the Father. With the Holy Spirit, it is the Spirit being breathed out (
spirated) by Father and Son.
Regarding the relation between
persons and
substance, and, in particular, regarding the question how the persons are distinguished from the substance, we know that complete unanimity does not reign among the orthodox. We must avoid two extremes: Sabellianism that admits only one person, who is said to have revealed himself in three
forms, and tritheism that does not comprise the three persons within the unity of substance.
In order to find the proper middle way, some would say that the persons are distinguished from the substance
modaliter, “according to the mode,” that is, as the substance in the abstract and as the substance in a certain mode with certain ways of existence (but not
realiter,
formaliter, or merely
ratione). And others would say that the persons are distinguished from each other
realiter, “actually” (but not
essentialiter or merely
ratione).
Concerning the idea to be with connected the words
hypostasis, subsistentia, suppositum, persona, there is no reigning unanimity. Calvin admits that the word “person” is only an aid but still did not disapprove of its use. The Socinians, Remonstrants, Anabaptists, Cartesians, and also Cocceius have disputed the use of “person”. The likely oldest definition of “person” was: “
Person is the divine being itself distinguished by a certain independent character and by its own manner of existence.” As time passed further descriptions were added. The accepted definition of the older dogmaticians goes back beyond Melanchthon to Boethuis: “
Person is an independent entity, indivisible, rational, incommunicable, not sustained by another nature and not a part of something else.”
More recently, men like G. Vos (to whom I am indebted for what follows), offer up:
- “Person is an independent entity, indivisible, rational, incommunicable, not sustained by another nature but possessing in itself the principle of its operation.”
I am even content with a more modest description, as long as the caveats implied in my above (e.g., heretical modalism) are maintained:
- “Person, with reference to the Trinity, means the divine essence in a specific mode of existence and distinguished by this specific mode of existence from that essence and the other persons.”
We should also be aware of the issues of
ousia and Platonism,
hypostasis and Stoicism. The latter originally means “self-existence” and could therefore be used by theologians for a long time to express the same as
ousia.
Hypostasis took on more the sense of “person.” But not at once and as a result great confusion arose because one could now hear at the same time the assertion that there was one hypostasis and that there were three hypostases in the Godhead.
I realize that
physis and
ousia are not the same.
Ousia is the being of God in the abstract.
Physis is inclusive of the attributes in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, that is, those unique to the divine being. The attributes, however, are inseparably joined to the being (
φύσις).
The activities by which each of the persons of the Trinity exists distinct from each other, is called “internal works” (
opera ad intra). They are personal activities not common to all the persons and are incommunicable. As such they are the begetting and spirating of the Father, for the Son, being begotten and spirating, for the Spirit being spirated. These works, for the reasons mentioned, are called divided works (
opera divisa).
Contrasted to these “internal works” are the “external works” (
opera ad extra). These may not be divided but belong to the whole being (Gen. 1:26; John 5:17, 19). The external works are performed by God’s power, and power as an attribute belongs to the being. In the economy or management of God each person has His unique task. For example, creation is ascribed to the Father, salvation to the Son, etc. Yet here, too, the three persons in a certain sense work together, namely, the Father through the Son and the Spirit, the Son through the Father and Spirit.
Moreover, in the economy within the Godhead in a narrower sense—in the economy of salvation—the persons of the Trinity exist in a judicial fellowship. Nothing can take place in which each one is not involved judicially. The Father, as Judge, represents violated holiness and is wrathful. But at the same time the Father ordains the Son as Mediator and the Holy Spirit as the one who applies salvation. The Son accomplishes the Mediator’s work, but He does so officially for the Father’s sake, and through the Holy Spirit He applies His merits. The Holy Spirit works in the hearts of the elect, but He does so for the sake of the Father and the Son.
This order of working points us back to the order of existence. Just because the Father is the First Person, He occupies that place in the plan of salvation and in the external works in general (
opera ad extra). Just because the Son is the Second Person, He also assumes in both respects the position He assumes. And the same is true for the Holy Spirit.
