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From The Collected Writings of James Henley Thornwell, Volume I - Theological, Lecture X - Man
Freedom of the Will
This is one of the most difficult questions in the whole compass of Metaphysical Philosophy or Christian Theology. Its inherent difficulties have been aggravated by the ambiguities of language. All the terms which are introduced into the discussion have been so abusively employed that it is hard to fix clearly and precisely the points at issue, or to determine the exact ground which we or others actually maintain. We impose upon ourselves, as well as upon others, by the looseness of our terminology. Liberty, necessity, contingency, possibility, are all used in various senses, are applied in different relations, and without the utmost caution we are likely to embarrass ourselves by a latent confusion of these different significations.
Necessity is used metaphysically to express that the opposite of which involves a contradiction; naturally, to express the connection betwixt an effect and a cause, an antecedent and a consequent; and morally, in the twofold sense of obligation or duty, and the connection betwixt motive and volition. Liberty is used in relation to the absence of hindrance and restraint in the execution of our plans and purposes, and refers exclusively to the power of acting; or, to denote mere spontaneity—the mere activities and energies of our inner being according to their essential constitution; or, to the exclusion of a cause apart from itself in determining the decisions of the will. Contingency is used in the sense of the undesigned or accidental ; and, in the sense that another reality was at the same time producible by the same cause. The possible, again, is the metaphysical nonexistence of contradiction, or the contingent in the sense last explained.
These instances of ambiguity of language are sufficient to illustrate the nature of the difficulties upon this point.
The will is indispensable to moral agency. A being without a will cannot be the subject of rewards and punishments. Where there is no will there is no responsibility. In investigating, therefore, the freedom of the will, the conditions which a just exposition must fulfil are these:
1. Freedom as a confirmed state of holiness—an inward necessity of holiness, in which the perfection of every moral being consists, must be grounded and explained. Any account of the will which leaves the permanent states of heart of holy beings without moral significance; which deprives character and rooted habits of moral value; which attaches importance only to individual acts, and acts considered apart from their expression of inward and controlling principles, is radically defective.
2. Any account of the will which does not ground our sense of guilt, our convictions of ill-desert, and which does not show that these convictions are no lie, but the truth, is also defective. I must show that my sin is mine—that it finds its root and principle in me.
3. Hence, a just account of the will must show that God is not the author of sin. To say that He is its author is to destroy its character— it ceases to be sin altogether.
4. A just account of the will must also solve the problem of the inability, and yet of the responsibility, of the sinner—that he cannot, and yet he ought, and justly dies for not doing what he confessedly cannot do.
The fulfilling of these conditions is indispensable to a broad-sided, adequate exposition of the will. To leave out any of them is to take partial and one-sided views.
1. Tried by this standard, the theory of Arminians and Pelagians is seen to be essentially defective. Two forms of the theory—indifference and equilibrium.
(1.) These theories contradict an established holiness, and deny any moral character to the decisions of the will—they are mere caprice.
(2.) They do not account for character at all—they put morality in single acts.
(3.) They deny the sinner's helplessness and even sinfulness—the sinner is as free as the saint, the devil as the angel.
2. The theory of Edwards breaks down.
(1.) It does not explain guilt; it does not rid God of being the author of sin.
(2.) It does not explain the moral value attached to character.
(3.) This theory explains self-expression, but not self-determination. Now, a just view must show how we first determine and then habitually express ourselves. In these determinations is found the moral significance of these expressions. Otherwise my nature would be no more than the nature of a plant. Will supposes conscience and intelligence—these minister to it; the moral law—this is its standard.
3. There are two states in which man is found—a servant and a son.
The peculiarity of the servant is that his holiness is not confirmed. It exists rather as impulse than habit, and the law speaks rather with authority—sense of duty. Now, the province of the will was to determine—that is, to root and ground these principles as a fixed nature. There was power to do so. When so determined, a holy necessity would have risen as the perfection of our being.
There was also the possibility of determining otherwise—a power of perverting our {AMR Note: Adam was our Federal Representative} nature, of determining it in another direction. {AMR Note: After Adam's sin, the possibility of determining otherwise was erased as a consequence of the perverting of our nature.} The power, therefore, of determining itself in one or the other direction is the freedom of a servant preparing to become a son, and the whole of moral culture lies in the transition.
This theory explains all the phenomena, and has the additional advantage of setting in a clear light the grace of regeneration. In the moral sphere, and especially in relation to single acts, this freedom is now seen in man. It is neither necessity nor a contempt of the principle of law.
In Lecture XII, The Covenant of Works, (here) Thornwell offers more insights related to the essence of Adam's sin:
The First Sin
There are three points to be considered—
I. What was the formal nature of the sin?
II. How it was possible that a holy being could sin.
III. The consequences of this sin.
I. What was the formal nature of the sin?—that is, what was the root of it? Was it pride? Was it unbelief?
1. It was a complicated sin; it included in it the spirit of disobedience to the whole law.
2. It was aggravated—(1) by the person; (2) by his relations to God; (3) by the nature of the act; (4) by its consequences.
3. The germ of it was estrangement from God, which is radically unbelief. It was an apostasy, which in falling away from God set up the creature as the good.
II. How could a holy being sin?
1. We must not lower the account so as to remove difficulties. Many make it the growth of an infant to maturity, having its powers quickened by errors and mistakes.
2. Others make it allegorical, representing the conflict of sense and reason. This is contradicted by the narrative. Intellect is prominent in the cause of sin. Eve desired wisdom.
3. Others make it an apologue intended to illustrate the change from primitive simplicity.
4. Others, as Knapp, make the thing venial, but degrade the meaning to physical phenomena.
5. We must regard it as the natural history of sin—the manner in which it was introduced into our world.
6. It is not enough to say that man was mutable; that explains the possibility, but not the immediate cause of sin.
III. Consequences—immediate and remote.
1. Shame and remorse.
2. Loss of the image of God. This a penal visitation. Not the mere force of habit.
Freedom of the Will
This is one of the most difficult questions in the whole compass of Metaphysical Philosophy or Christian Theology. Its inherent difficulties have been aggravated by the ambiguities of language. All the terms which are introduced into the discussion have been so abusively employed that it is hard to fix clearly and precisely the points at issue, or to determine the exact ground which we or others actually maintain. We impose upon ourselves, as well as upon others, by the looseness of our terminology. Liberty, necessity, contingency, possibility, are all used in various senses, are applied in different relations, and without the utmost caution we are likely to embarrass ourselves by a latent confusion of these different significations.
Necessity is used metaphysically to express that the opposite of which involves a contradiction; naturally, to express the connection betwixt an effect and a cause, an antecedent and a consequent; and morally, in the twofold sense of obligation or duty, and the connection betwixt motive and volition. Liberty is used in relation to the absence of hindrance and restraint in the execution of our plans and purposes, and refers exclusively to the power of acting; or, to denote mere spontaneity—the mere activities and energies of our inner being according to their essential constitution; or, to the exclusion of a cause apart from itself in determining the decisions of the will. Contingency is used in the sense of the undesigned or accidental ; and, in the sense that another reality was at the same time producible by the same cause. The possible, again, is the metaphysical nonexistence of contradiction, or the contingent in the sense last explained.
These instances of ambiguity of language are sufficient to illustrate the nature of the difficulties upon this point.
The will is indispensable to moral agency. A being without a will cannot be the subject of rewards and punishments. Where there is no will there is no responsibility. In investigating, therefore, the freedom of the will, the conditions which a just exposition must fulfil are these:
1. Freedom as a confirmed state of holiness—an inward necessity of holiness, in which the perfection of every moral being consists, must be grounded and explained. Any account of the will which leaves the permanent states of heart of holy beings without moral significance; which deprives character and rooted habits of moral value; which attaches importance only to individual acts, and acts considered apart from their expression of inward and controlling principles, is radically defective.
2. Any account of the will which does not ground our sense of guilt, our convictions of ill-desert, and which does not show that these convictions are no lie, but the truth, is also defective. I must show that my sin is mine—that it finds its root and principle in me.
3. Hence, a just account of the will must show that God is not the author of sin. To say that He is its author is to destroy its character— it ceases to be sin altogether.
4. A just account of the will must also solve the problem of the inability, and yet of the responsibility, of the sinner—that he cannot, and yet he ought, and justly dies for not doing what he confessedly cannot do.
The fulfilling of these conditions is indispensable to a broad-sided, adequate exposition of the will. To leave out any of them is to take partial and one-sided views.
1. Tried by this standard, the theory of Arminians and Pelagians is seen to be essentially defective. Two forms of the theory—indifference and equilibrium.
(1.) These theories contradict an established holiness, and deny any moral character to the decisions of the will—they are mere caprice.
(2.) They do not account for character at all—they put morality in single acts.
(3.) They deny the sinner's helplessness and even sinfulness—the sinner is as free as the saint, the devil as the angel.
2. The theory of Edwards breaks down.
(1.) It does not explain guilt; it does not rid God of being the author of sin.
(2.) It does not explain the moral value attached to character.
(3.) This theory explains self-expression, but not self-determination. Now, a just view must show how we first determine and then habitually express ourselves. In these determinations is found the moral significance of these expressions. Otherwise my nature would be no more than the nature of a plant. Will supposes conscience and intelligence—these minister to it; the moral law—this is its standard.
3. There are two states in which man is found—a servant and a son.
The peculiarity of the servant is that his holiness is not confirmed. It exists rather as impulse than habit, and the law speaks rather with authority—sense of duty. Now, the province of the will was to determine—that is, to root and ground these principles as a fixed nature. There was power to do so. When so determined, a holy necessity would have risen as the perfection of our being.
There was also the possibility of determining otherwise—a power of perverting our {AMR Note: Adam was our Federal Representative} nature, of determining it in another direction. {AMR Note: After Adam's sin, the possibility of determining otherwise was erased as a consequence of the perverting of our nature.} The power, therefore, of determining itself in one or the other direction is the freedom of a servant preparing to become a son, and the whole of moral culture lies in the transition.
This theory explains all the phenomena, and has the additional advantage of setting in a clear light the grace of regeneration. In the moral sphere, and especially in relation to single acts, this freedom is now seen in man. It is neither necessity nor a contempt of the principle of law.
In Lecture XII, The Covenant of Works, (here) Thornwell offers more insights related to the essence of Adam's sin:
The First Sin
There are three points to be considered—
I. What was the formal nature of the sin?
II. How it was possible that a holy being could sin.
III. The consequences of this sin.
I. What was the formal nature of the sin?—that is, what was the root of it? Was it pride? Was it unbelief?
1. It was a complicated sin; it included in it the spirit of disobedience to the whole law.
2. It was aggravated—(1) by the person; (2) by his relations to God; (3) by the nature of the act; (4) by its consequences.
3. The germ of it was estrangement from God, which is radically unbelief. It was an apostasy, which in falling away from God set up the creature as the good.
II. How could a holy being sin?
1. We must not lower the account so as to remove difficulties. Many make it the growth of an infant to maturity, having its powers quickened by errors and mistakes.
2. Others make it allegorical, representing the conflict of sense and reason. This is contradicted by the narrative. Intellect is prominent in the cause of sin. Eve desired wisdom.
3. Others make it an apologue intended to illustrate the change from primitive simplicity.
4. Others, as Knapp, make the thing venial, but degrade the meaning to physical phenomena.
5. We must regard it as the natural history of sin—the manner in which it was introduced into our world.
6. It is not enough to say that man was mutable; that explains the possibility, but not the immediate cause of sin.
(1.) It was owing to temptation. Here explain the nature of temptation.
(2.) Desires might be excited, in themselves innocent, accidentally wrong.
(3.) The general principle of virtue—Watch. Here was the first slip. Desires produced inattention to the circumstances under which they might be indulged; here was a renunciation of the supreme authority of God. Want of thought, want of reflection.
(4.) These desires, by dwelling upon the objects, engross the mind and become inflamed. They become the good of the soul. Here was the renunciation of God as the good. They prevail upon the will and the act is consummated.
(2.) Desires might be excited, in themselves innocent, accidentally wrong.
(3.) The general principle of virtue—Watch. Here was the first slip. Desires produced inattention to the circumstances under which they might be indulged; here was a renunciation of the supreme authority of God. Want of thought, want of reflection.
(4.) These desires, by dwelling upon the objects, engross the mind and become inflamed. They become the good of the soul. Here was the renunciation of God as the good. They prevail upon the will and the act is consummated.
III. Consequences—immediate and remote.
1. Shame and remorse.
2. Loss of the image of God. This a penal visitation. Not the mere force of habit.