Constitutional Monarchy

[JudgeRightly]

I'm pretty sure if Clete and JR would agree to some sort of constitutional element which explains what constitutes voluntary abdication on the part of the monarch, that the apparent chasm between them would be bridged, and easily.

In Catholicism, for comparison, if a pope teaches manifest heresy, not under duress, then he is claiming he's not the pope anymore. He quit. So therefore he's not the pope, so therefore the seat is vacant, so therefore the succession process proceeds according to the constitution, and this man is expelled from the pope's quarters.

If something that was like, manifest heresy, except in the civil realm, then this could be included in Enyart's proposal. The upshot is that the monarch can either explicitly quit, retire, abdicate, vacate; or, he can also implicitly do it. The implication just has to be foolproof. Any idiot, not just a high ranking judge or lawyer or lawmaker, can make the evaluation, assessment, and call, in the ideal case. The ideal case might not exist. Again going back to the Catholicism comparison, what is "manifest heresy"? Is that something any idiot can identify? Unfortunately not. It does actually take an expert or a team or college of them, to reliably identify manifest heresy. So Catholicism isn't the ideal system, in the sense that, it takes more than an idiot to decide authoritatively that a monarch has implicitly quit.

Perhaps in the civil realm there's something that even an idiot could see, means the monarch has quit (by implication).

I understand the angle, but abdication is not really the point under dispute.

If the king voluntarily abdicates, explicitly or by some unmistakable public act, then the throne is vacant and the succession process begins. That is not especially controversial.

But Clete’s proposal, as I understand it, is not merely about recognizing a vacancy. It is about creating a domestic legal mechanism by which a sitting king can be judged and removed.

Those are different categories.

Abdication means the king has vacated the office.

Removal means someone else has authority to declare that he may no longer occupy it.

So defining abdication may be useful, but it does not bridge the actual gap unless the alleged “implicit abdication” is truly unmistakable and not just judicial removal under another name.

If the king says, “I abdicate,” fine.

If the king publicly renounces the Constitution and says he no longer rules under it, fine, maybe that can be treated as vacancy by his own act.

But if judges, lawyers, experts, or a council must decide against the king’s denial that he has “implicitly abdicated,” then we are right back to the same jurisdiction problem:

Who has final earthly authority to make that determination?

If the answer is some court or process beneath the king, then that court or process is above him at the decisive point.

 

[Clete]

@JudgeRightly,

Yet another new direction from which to make the same essential point....



Civil disobedience is explicitly sanctioned by the proposed constitution...

"Any amendment or command issued by the King in defiance of this Constitution including one that increases taxes, gives all subjects the responsibility to engage in non-violent civil disobedience, including by withholding taxes, against such offense..."​

​

To use your logic...

Who determines that the king has violated the Constitution? (rhetorical question)



The Constitution already permits ordinary citizens to decide that a king's command is unconstitutional and to withhold obedience from him. Therefore, the Constitution already recognizes that the king's judgment is not the final earthly judgment in every matter. The people themselves are expected to evaluate his actions against the Constitution.

If citizens may determine that the king has violated the Constitution and may lawfully resist him through civil disobedience, why is it inconceivable that some constitutional process could determine the same thing and impose a constitutional consequence?


Also, have you ever thought through what such "non-violent civil disobedience" would actually look like and how it would be carried out? How far is this civil disobedience permitted to go?

What happens when the king orders the military to collect it anyway?
What happens when he arrests those who are withholding taxes?
What happens when he appoints judges who support him?

The Constitution appears to assume that widespread civil disobedience will either

• Convince the king to back down,
• Convince subordinate officials not to cooperate,
• Convince the military/police not to enforce the order,
• Create sufficient social pressure to stop the violation.

In other words, the remedy is largely political and moral rather than judicial.
But, if the Constitution already contemplates a situation where...

• citizens judge the king's actions unconstitutional,
• citizens refuse obedience,
• citizens refuse taxes,
• officials may refuse cooperation,

...then the Constitution is already relying on human beings to make constitutional judgments against the king.

The real difference between Bob's approach and mine isn't whether men may oppose an unlawful king. Indeed, Bob explicitly says they may. The difference is that Bob stops at civil disobedience, while I am arguing that there should also be a lawful mechanism to deal with a king who persists in violating the Constitution. In short a more orderly and official form of civil disobedience. Let the people resist, but give them a constitutional mechanism that has some realistic chance of prevailing against a king who no longer cares what the Constitution says.

 

[JudgeRightly]

@JudgeRightly,

Yet another new direction from which to make the same essential point....

Exactly. My position is internally consistent, which is why your objections keep running into the same distinction. If that same distinction answers you through judges, venue, civil disobedience, “rule of law,” legal recompense, and constitutional enforcement, then maybe it is not a dodge or rationalization. Maybe it is the actual issue.

Civil disobedience is explicitly sanctioned by the proposed constitution...

"Any amendment or command issued by the King in defiance of this Constitution including one that increases taxes, gives all subjects the responsibility to engage in non-violent civil disobedience, including by withholding taxes, against such offense..."​

​

To use your logic...

Who determines that the king has violated the Constitution? (rhetorical question)

That may be rhetorical, but the answer exposes the flaw in your reasoning. The subject determines it for himself, for purposes of his own obedience. That does not give him jurisdiction over the king. Every man is responsible before God to determine whether he may obey without sinning. If the king commands wickedness, imposes an unconstitutional tax, or orders a judge to enforce an unlawful decree, the subject, taxpayer, soldier, or judge may refuse.

But judging whether one may obey is not the same thing as sitting in judgment over the king with authority to punish or remove him. A subject may judge a command unlawful without becoming the king’s judge. A soldier may judge an order unlawful without becoming commander-in-chief. A judge may refuse to enforce an unconstitutional command without acquiring jurisdiction over the throne. Men beneath the king may judge his acts in the moral and constitutional sense necessary for obedience; what they lack is judicial jurisdiction to punish and remove him.

The Constitution already permits ordinary citizens to decide that a king's command is unconstitutional and to withhold obedience from him.

Correct, but that is categorically different from your position. The citizen judges the command for purposes of his own obedience; he is not judging the king from above with authority to punish or remove him. Civil disobedience says, “I cannot lawfully obey this.” Your removal mechanism says, “We have authority to judge you and remove you from office.” One is subordinate refusal to participate in wickedness; the other is superior authority imposing judgment on the king.

Therefore, the Constitution already recognizes that the king's judgment is not the final earthly judgment in every matter. The people themselves are expected to evaluate his actions against the Constitution.

Correct, for purposes of their own obedience. The king’s judgment is not final over another man’s conscience; every man remains responsible before God to determine whether he may obey. But judging whether I may obey is not the same thing as having jurisdiction to punish or remove the king. The people may evaluate, condemn, refuse, resist, and withhold unlawful obedience; they may not convert that moral judgment into judicial authority over the throne. That is the leap you are making, and it does not follow.

If citizens may determine that the king has violated the Constitution and may lawfully resist him through civil disobedience, why is it inconceivable that some constitutional process could determine the same thing and impose a constitutional consequence?

Because that is a category error. You are equivocating on what it means to “determine” or “judge.” A subject may judge the king’s command for purposes of his own obedience; that does not mean some process may judge the king for purposes of punishing or removing him. Civil disobedience says, “I cannot lawfully obey this.” Your proposed process says, “We have authority to impose judgment on the king.” The first is subordinate refusal; the second is superior jurisdiction. That leap does not follow.

Also, have you ever thought through what such "non-violent civil disobedience" would actually look like and how it would be carried out?

I know it wouldn't be pretty. But that's assuming they do.

I refer you back to Christian Heiens's video I posted earlier. Watch it if you haven't already. Again if you have.

How far is this civil disobedience permitted to go?

As far as obedience to God requires.

It goes as far as refusing to participate in wickedness, refusing unlawful commands, refusing unlawful taxes, and refusing to cooperate with unconstitutional acts.

It does not thereby become jurisdiction to remove the king.

What happens when the king arrests those who are withholding taxes?

(I rearranged the questions here to make more sense.)

Then further civil disobedience is required.

What happens when he orders the military to collect it anyway?

Then the military has to decide whether it will obey God or man. None of this happens in a vacuum. You are talking as though the king can simply say “collect the unlawful tax” and reality magically obeys him, but that order has to pass through commanders, officers, soldiers, families, communities, churches, towns, and armed citizens who also have moral agency.

And yes, this is America. There are lots of guns, and armed citizens deter unlawful force against the innocent. If a wicked king ordered the military to enforce an unconstitutional tax against a heavily armed population, that would not be a clean administrative act. It risks national catastrophe. The military might win such a fight, but even if it did, the cost would be enormous: dead citizens, dead soldiers, ruined families, shattered legitimacy, and a nation pushed toward civil war. Those soldiers would not be acting against faceless abstractions; they would be acting against their own countrymen, and in many cases against the people and places they are supposed to defend.

So your framing is too clean. You talk as though the king commands, the military enforces, and therefore civil disobedience is meaningless unless some superior court can remove the king. No. Civil disobedience works precisely because unlawful commands still have to be carried out by men who remain accountable before God, before their neighbors, and before the nation. That may be ugly. It may be costly. It may fail. But difficulty does not create jurisdiction.

What happens when he appoints judges who support him?

Then those judges have to decide whether they are judges under God’s law or servants of the king’s will. A judge’s commission does not make him righteous, does not make his rulings lawful, and does not relieve him of responsibility before God. If he supports the king in wickedness, then he has joined the king in wickedness.

But that still does not create jurisdiction above the king. It only means the nation has a wicked king and wicked judges, which is a moral and civil disaster, but not proof that some higher domestic court must exist. Your question assumes that if wicked men can corrupt the offices beneath the king, the solution is to create another office above the king.

But why would that office be immune? If the king can corrupt judges by appointment, influence, fear, loyalty, or ambition, then ambitious men can corrupt a removal mechanism by influence, fear, loyalty, ambition, accusation, and procedure. So the issue remains the same: where does final earthly authority terminate, and why should I believe your added mechanism will not become the very thing corrupt men fight to control?

The Constitution appears to assume that widespread civil disobedience will either

• Convince the king to back down,
• Convince subordinate officials not to cooperate,
• Convince the military/police not to enforce the order,
• Create sufficient social pressure to stop the violation.

In other words, the remedy is largely political and moral rather than judicial.

Right.

That's the point.

The remedy is moral, social, political, and religious resistance beneath the king, not judicial authority above the king.

That's exactly the distinction I have been making.

But, if the Constitution already contemplates a situation where...

• citizens judge the king's actions unconstitutional,
• citizens refuse obedience,
• citizens refuse taxes,
• officials may refuse cooperation,

...then the Constitution is already relying on human beings to make constitutional judgments against the king.

Supra.

The real difference between Bob's approach and mine isn't whether men may oppose an unlawful king. Indeed, Bob explicitly says they may. The difference is that Bob stops at civil disobedience, while I am arguing that there should also be a lawful mechanism to deal with a king who persists in violating the Constitution.

Yes.

And that “lawful mechanism” is the problem.

If the mechanism can judge and remove the king, then the men administering it are above the king at the point of judgment.

Calling it “lawful” does not change that. It only means the Constitution has placed final earthly authority somewhere other than the king.

In short a more orderly and official form of civil disobedience.

But that is not what civil disobedience is. Civil disobedience is refusal to obey an unlawful command. A state-authorized process that removes the king is not civil disobedience; it is an exercise of superior civil authority. You are trying to describe judicial supremacy as though it were merely organized resistance. It is not.

Let the people resist, but give them a constitutional mechanism that has some realistic chance of prevailing against a king who no longer cares what the Constitution says.

And there it is. For that mechanism to have “some realistic chance of prevailing,” someone must have authority to enforce it against the king. Otherwise, as you said, he is simply not going to care. Who should have that authority: judges, soldiers, officers, a council, the people? Whoever can make that process prevail against the king is above the king at the decisive point.

That is my argument. Your proposal does not avoid final earthly authority; it relocates it, and it does not reckon with the consequences of that relocation. Ideas have consequences. If you create a constitutional mechanism above the king with power to remove him, ambitious men will seek control of that mechanism. It becomes another prize to capture, another lever to pull, and another lawful-looking road to power.

The biblical picture supports my distinction. David knew Saul was wicked, resisted him, fled from him, refused to participate in his evil, and twice had opportunity to kill him (1 Samuel 24, 26). But David would not take it upon himself to remove the Lord’s anointed. Recognizing wickedness is not the same thing as possessing jurisdiction to depose the ruler. That is the distinction between civil disobedience and removal.

 

[Clete]

Exactly. My position is internally consistent, which is why your objections keep running into the same distinction. If that same distinction answers you through judges, venue, civil disobedience, “rule of law,” legal recompense, and constitutional enforcement, then maybe it is not a dodge or rationalization. Maybe it is the actual issue.

It's clearly a rationalization. I've never said it was a dodge.

That may be rhetorical, but the answer exposes the flaw in your reasoning. The subject determines it for himself, for purposes of his own obedience. That does not give him jurisdiction over the king. Every man is responsible before God to determine whether he may obey without sinning. If the king commands wickedness, imposes an unconstitutional tax, or orders a judge to enforce an unlawful decree, the subject, taxpayer, soldier, or judge may refuse.

See what I mean? Rationalization!

But judging whether one may obey is not the same thing as sitting in judgment over the king with authority to punish or remove him. A subject may judge a command unlawful without becoming the king’s judge.

No, he cannot. Commands do not make themselves. It's the king's command that is being judged. Indeed, it is specifically whether the actions of the king are legal that is being judge - by men - legally - and without somehow becoming the de-facto king nor making him into some sort of puppet where the tax rebel has become the king by proxy or any of the other things you insist are true when a judge does the exact same thing.

A soldier may judge an order unlawful without becoming commander-in-chief.

Precisely!

A judge may refuse to enforce an unconstitutional command without acquiring jurisdiction over the throne.

Precisely!

Men beneath the king may judge his acts in the moral and constitutional sense necessary for obedience; what they lack is judicial jurisdiction to punish and remove him.

For no objective reason! The only reasons you've given are contradictions of what you just conceded. Soldiers do not become the commanding general for defying and unlawful order and judges do not become sovereign by virtue of following the law in defiance of an unlawful order.

Correct, but that is categorically different from your position. The citizen judges the command for purposes of his own obedience; he is not judging the king from above with authority to punish or remove him.

Who said anything about "above"? That's your framing, not mine. I've repeatedly stated that the only thing above the king is the law itself. The law that gives ordinary citizens the legal duty to refuse an unlawful king's order.

Civil disobedience says, “I cannot lawfully obey this.” Your removal mechanism says, “We have authority to judge you and remove you from office.” One is subordinate refusal to participate in wickedness; the other is superior authority imposing judgment on the king.

My mechanism does not place anyone above the king. It simply applies the law to the king via an orderly and clearly defined legal process.

Go ahead and repeat it..."Laws don't enforce themselves."

Okay, that's enough for now. I'm not going to subject you to a multi-thousand word response to each point.


It is clear that you are quite fully entrenched on this issue and I'm bored of trying to find new directions from which to come at it. You simply are not going to agree. I can't really even tell if you are even seeing the point, but it doesn't matter.

Bob Enyart has been my primary teacher on all things biblical since the 1990s. I agree with 99.999% of everything he's ever taught. I am literally in the habit of agreeing with Bob's teaching. I do it intuitively and by default. This issue and Bob's teaching about the age of accountability are the only two issues, that I am aware of, that I have ever disagreed with him about. When I started this thread, I went in believing that someone would be able to demonstrate how I've missed something important and that I'd leave with one less issue that I disagree with him about. Indeed, that is what I wanted to happen!

The opposite is what has actually happened.

I see nothing in the proposed system that would prevent almost instantaneous tyranny. Indeed, it installs a de-facto tyrant - by definition! The only thing that prevents it is the king's own character and his selection as king as NOTHING AT ALL to do with whether he is or is not a man of good moral character. When Israel had a similar system, they had God who not only specifically selected the king, but who would send His prophets to tell the king to straighten up or lose your throne (i.e. your life). Without that, the proposed constitution places a randomly selected human being in charge of an entire nation on the honor system. It would not work.

 

[Idolater]

It appears that Enyart's proposal allows for subjects to disobey the monarch based on conscience. Additionally if the monarch clearly abdicates there is a succession process. The details of what an implicit abdication might look like can be hammered out. But so long as the right of his subjects to ignore immoral, unconstitutional orders and edicts that he might make is respected, then even if you wound up with the worst monarch possible, a second coming and combination of Hitler and Lenin and Stalin and Mao; he'd be basically powerless since no one would have to obey him. His realm would just wait him out. He's got to die sometime.

 

[JudgeRightly]

But so long as the right of his subjects to ignore immoral, unconstitutional orders and edicts that he might make, then even if you wound up with the worst monarch possible, a second coming and combination of Hitler and Lenin and Stalin and Mao; he'd be basically powerless since no one would have to obey him. His realm would just wait him out. He's got to die sometime.

Which is my point exactly!

Clete has it in his head that a wicked king is not only possible, but guaranteed within a short period of time, and not only that, but that his wickedness (which his heir will apparently also follow in his footsteps) will destroy the nation within a generation or two, and that the only way to prevent such a thing from happening is to have a way of removing the wicked king!

Of course a wicked king is bad for everyone. But while his worries are founded in reality, he's blown them WAY out of proportion!

And as a result, he's not considering what happens as the consequence of his proposal.

On the other hand, my position does not allow for his mechanism BECAUSE of what it entails beyond the removal of one king. And as you have so simply pointed out, all the people beneath him have to do is wait out an evil king. If he's smart at all, he'll recognize this, and very quickly reign himself in. And even if he's dumb as a box of rocks, his subordinates need only manage the country in his name until he dies and is succeeded by his heir or a new king is chosen via lottery.

 

[JudgeRightly]

It's clearly a rationalization. I've never said it was a dodge.


See what I mean? Rationalization!


No, he cannot. Commands do not make themselves. It's the king's command that is being judged. Indeed, it is specifically whether the actions of the king are legal that is being judge - by men - legally - and without somehow becoming the de-facto king nor making him into some sort of puppet where the tax rebel has become the king by proxy or any of the other things you insist are true when a judge does the exact same thing.


Precisely!


Precisely!


For no objective reason! The only reasons you've given are contradictions of what you just conceded. Soldiers do not become the commanding general for defying and unlawful order and judges do not become sovereign by virtue of following the law in defiance of an unlawful order.


Who said anything about "above"? That's your framing, not mine. I've repeatedly stated that the only thing above the king is the law itself. The law that gives ordinary citizens the legal duty to refuse an unlawful king's order.


My mechanism does not place anyone above the king. It simply applies the law to the king via an orderly and clearly defined legal process.

Go ahead and repeat it..."Laws don't enforce themselves."

Okay, that's enough for now. I'm not going to subject you to a multi-thousand word response to each point.


It is clear that you are quite fully entrenched on this issue and I'm bored of trying to find new directions from which to come at it. You simply are not going to agree. I can't really even tell if you are even seeing the point, but it doesn't matter.

Bob Enyart has been my primary teacher on all things biblical since the 1990s. I agree with 99.999% of everything he's ever taught. I am literally in the habit of agreeing with Bob's teaching. I do it intuitively and by default. This issue and Bob's teaching about the age of accountability are the only two issues, that I am aware of, that I have ever disagreed with him about.

And the HPT.

When I started this thread, I went in believing that someone would be able to demonstrate how I've missed something important and that I'd leave with one less issue that I disagree with him about. Indeed, that is what I wanted to happen!

The opposite is what has actually happened.

I see nothing in the proposed system that would prevent almost instantaneous tyranny. Indeed, it installs a de-facto tyrant - by definition! The only thing that prevents it is the king's own character and his selection as king as NOTHING AT ALL to do with whether he is or is not a man of good moral character. When Israel had a similar system, they had God who not only specifically selected the king, but who would send His prophets to tell the king to straighten up or lose your throne (i.e. your life). Without that, the proposed constitution places a randomly selected human being in charge of an entire nation on the honor system. It would not work.

Let me take a different approach here.

As itchy as I am to respond to the many things you said in your post here, I'm going to refrain.

Let's say I grant you your position.

Let’s say the king needs a lawful removal mechanism.

Let’s say civil disobedience is not enough.

Let’s say “the law itself” can be above the king in the way you mean, and that men can administer that process without themselves becoming superior to the king in the relevant sense.

Fine.

Now what?

You still have to actually build the mechanism.

Who initiates the charge?

Who decides whether the charge is valid?

Who judges the evidence?

Who determines whether the evidence is real or fabricated?

Who decides whether the king’s resistance to the proceeding is obstruction or lawful defense of the throne?

Who decides whether the accusers are prosecutors or seditionists?

Who commands enforcement if the king refuses to submit?

Who punishes those who abuse the process?

Who removes the judges or officials if they corrupt the mechanism?

And who decides whether they have corrupted it?

You keep speaking as though saying “there should be a lawful mechanism” solves the problem. It does not. It merely names the place where the next problem begins.

Even if I grant, for argument’s sake, that such a mechanism could exist in principle, you still have not shown what it is, how it works, who controls it, who restrains it, who enforces it, or why it would not become the very thing ambitious men fight to capture.

At most, you have shown that you want a constitutional failsafe.

Fine.

Then write the failsafe.

Because until the actual mechanism exists on paper, with its jurisdiction, procedure, limits, enforcement, evidentiary standards, penalties for abuse, and final point of appeal clearly defined, you have not offered a working improvement to Bob’s proposal.

You have offered a slogan:

“Put the king under the law.”

But the entire dispute is over which men apply that law to the king, by what authority, with what enforcement, and with what safeguards against abuse.

So even granting your premise, the question remains:

What exactly are you proposing?

 

[Clete]

Which is my point exactly!

Clete has it in his head that a wicked king is not only possible, but guaranteed within a short period of time, and not only that, but that his wickedness (which his heir will apparently also follow in his footsteps) will destroy the nation within a generation or two, and that the only way to prevent such a thing from happening is to have a way of removing the wicked king!

Of course a wicked king is bad for everyone. But while his worries are founded in reality, he's blown them WAY out of proportion!

And as a result, he's not considering what happens as the consequence of his proposal.

On the other hand, my position does not allow for his mechanism BECAUSE of what it entails beyond the removal of one king. And as you have so simply pointed out, all the people beneath him have to do is wait out an evil king. If he's smart at all, he'll recognize this, and very quickly reign himself in. And even if he's dumb as a box of rocks, his subordinates need only manage the country in his name until he dies and is succeeded by his heir or a new king is chosen via lottery.

Because history is replete with nations that "waited out" a wicked king to be replaced with his heir who turned out to be wonderfully righteous in spite of having been raised and trained by the wicked king.

 

[Clete]

And the HPT.

That's only partially true. The HPT isn't Bob's work and it is only portions of it that I disagree with. I find it's basic premise quite plausible.

Let me take a different approach here.

As itchy as I am to respond to the many things you said in your post here, I'm going to refrain.

Let's say I grant you your position.

Let’s say the king needs a lawful removal mechanism.

Let’s say civil disobedience is not enough.

Let’s say “the law itself” can be above the king in the way you mean, and that men can administer that process without themselves becoming superior to the king in the relevant sense.

Fine.

Now what?

You still have to actually build the mechanism.

Who initiates the charge?

Who decides whether the charge is valid?

Who judges the evidence?

Who determines whether the evidence is real or fabricated?

Who decides whether the king’s resistance to the proceeding is obstruction or lawful defense of the throne?

Who decides whether the accusers are prosecutors or seditionists?

Who commands enforcement if the king refuses to submit?

Who punishes those who abuse the process?

Who removes the judges or officials if they corrupt the mechanism?

And who decides whether they have corrupted it?

You keep speaking as though saying “there should be a lawful mechanism” solves the problem. It does not. It merely names the place where the next problem begins.

Even if I grant, for argument’s sake, that such a mechanism could exist in principle, you still have not shown what it is, how it works, who controls it, who restrains it, who enforces it, or why it would not become the very thing ambitious men fight to capture.

At most, you have shown that you want a constitutional failsafe.

Fine.

Then write the failsafe.

Because until the actual mechanism exists on paper, with its jurisdiction, procedure, limits, enforcement, evidentiary standards, penalties for abuse, and final point of appeal clearly defined, you have not offered a working improvement to Bob’s proposal.

You have offered a slogan:

“Put the king under the law.”

But the entire dispute is over which men apply that law to the king, by what authority, with what enforcement, and with what safeguards against abuse.

So even granting your premise, the question remains:

What exactly are you proposing?

This is a much more productive direction!

If my criticism of Bob’s proposal is correct, then the next step would be to write the failsafe. I have not pretended that merely saying “the king should be under the law” is the same thing as drafting the mechanism. My point has been more basic than that. I have been arguing that such questions are valid and must be answered, whereas you have been arguing that the very existence of such a mechanism would be usurpatory by definition.

So yes, the questions you listed are valid questions. Who initiates the charge? Who judges the evidence? Who determines whether the proceeding is lawful or seditious? Who enforces the result? Who punishes abuse? Those are all the very questions that must be answered in drafting the provision.

My position is not that I have already written a perfect failsafe. Indeed, I have mostly avoided doing so because I wanted to focus on the principle rather than getting bogged down in the details. My position is that Bob’s Constitution, as written, leaves the nation with no orderly legal remedy against a king who openly violates the Constitution, and that this is a serious defect in any modern nation lacking Israel’s covenantal situation. The civil disobedience provision already admits that the king can act unlawfully and that the people are able to recognize and resist such unlawful action. I am simply arguing that such resistance should have an orderly constitutional path rather than being left entirely to informal tax resistance and whatever social pressure the people can muster against a king who is already ignoring the Constitution.

So, fair enough. The mechanism would need to be drafted. The exact details, I can't say at this point, but broadly speaking, it would need the following...

• narrow jurisdiction
• a high evidentiary standard
• severe penalties for false accusation or conspiracy
• a limited list of removable offenses
• a defined triggering process
• a defined enforcement process
• an immediate return to the ordinary succession process upon removal

It would also need to be difficult enough that it could not be used for political disagreement, but real enough that it could actually restrain a king who has abandoned the Constitution.

I understand that this would be a pretty tall bill to fill, but the proposed constitution is incomplete without it.

 

[JudgeRightly]

Because history is replete with nations that "waited out" a wicked king to be replaced with his heir who turned out to be wonderfully righteous in spite of having been raised and trained by the wicked king.

Sure, history is replete with wicked kings, wicked heirs, and corrupt dynasties.

But history is not replete with nations governed by anything like this proposed Constitution.

Most historical monarchies were pagan kingdoms, Catholic kingdoms, divine-right absolutist systems, hereditary power structures, parliamentary compromises, priest-ridden monarchies, or dynastic regimes operating under traditions very different from what Bob proposed.

And to be clear, I think, and Bob seemed to think as well, judging by how the constitution is structured, we should return to the good core of the "divine right of kings" mindset: authority descends from God. Civil authority does not originate in the people, democracy, parliament, bureaucrats, judges, or removal committees.

But that does not mean the king’s will is law. It does not mean subjects must obey wicked commands. It does not mean the king is above God’s law. It means the king’s office is not subject to domestic overthrow by inferior earthly authorities.

And your historical point proves far less than you think it proves.

Yes, wicked kings have often had wicked sons. But wicked kings have also been followed by better sons. Wicked kings have repented. Wicked kings have been restrained by circumstances beneath them. And many kings throughout history were removed by formal, semi-formal, or practical mechanisms only for those mechanisms to become tools of faction, ambition, instability, or replacement tyranny.

So “history has wicked kings and wicked heirs” does not prove that this Constitution would produce almost instantaneous tyranny. Nor does it prove that your proposed removal mechanism solves the problem.

It only proves that wicked men exist, something no one here denies.

The question is whether this proposed Constitution, with its civil disobedience provision, judicial hierarchy, tax structure, criminal code, rejection of legislatures and democracy, and theory of authority flowing downward under God’s law, necessarily fails in the way you claim.

And the second question is whether your proposed cure avoids the same corruption problem, or merely creates another power center for ambitious men to capture.

Also, “waiting out” a wicked king does not mean doing nothing. It means refusing unlawful obedience, denying cooperation with wickedness, preserving lawful order beneath him where possible, rebuking him, resisting him morally and politically, and leaving final judgment to God rather than creating a superior domestic authority over the throne.

A wicked king may repent. His heir is not guaranteed to follow all of his father's ways, especially when faced with resistance.

And even if the king does not repent, his son is not automatically guilty of his father’s sins. If the son is wicked, deal with him as wicked when he becomes wicked. But if removal of the father also destroys the son’s future claim of succession, then your mechanism may punish more than the guilty king.

That may be answerable depending on how the mechanism is written, but it is another consequence your proposal has to reckon with.

So while I don't deny that history contains many wicked kings and wicked heirs, this does not prove what you need it to prove.

 

[JudgeRightly]

Who initiates the charge? Who judges the evidence? Who determines whether the proceeding is lawful or seditious? Who enforces the result? Who punishes abuse? Those are all the very questions that must be answered in drafting the provision.

. . .

So, fair enough. The mechanism would need to be drafted. The exact details, I can't say at this point, but broadly speaking, it would need the following...

• narrow jurisdiction
• a high evidentiary standard
• severe penalties for false accusation or conspiracy
• a limited list of removable offenses
• a defined triggering process
• a defined enforcement process
• an immediate return to the ordinary succession process upon removal

It would also need to be difficult enough that it could not be used for political disagreement, but real enough that it could actually restrain a king who has abandoned the Constitution.

I understand that this would be a pretty tall bill to fill, but the proposed constitution is incomplete without it.

My contention is that once you specify the mechanism, it will either be too weak to restrain the king or strong enough to become the real final earthly authority. “Narrow jurisdiction,” “high evidentiary standard,” “limited removable offenses,” “defined triggering process,” and “defined enforcement process” all sound good, but each one raises the same question: who defines, judges, interprets, triggers, enforces, and declares the result lawful?

That is the whole problem. You say Bob’s Constitution is incomplete without a removal mechanism, but the mechanism you say is necessary has not yet been written. So far, you have not shown that your proposal solves the problem. You have only shown that you want a failsafe.

Fine. But a failsafe has to be more than an aspiration. It must be strong enough to restrain a wicked king without becoming the real final earthly authority itself. Until then, “there should be a lawful mechanism” is not an answer to Bob’s proposal. It is the beginning of a new proposal that you need to write, defend, and show that it does not become the very danger it is supposed to prevent.

I can't make that argument for you. You are positing that it is necessary, workable, and preferable to Bob’s proposal, so show it.

Write the mechanism. Define the jurisdiction. Define the offenses. Define the triggering process. Define the evidentiary standard. Define who judges. Define who enforces. Define who punishes abuse. Define who decides whether the process itself has become corrupt.

Until then, the debate is not between Bob’s Constitution and your improved Constitution. It is between Bob’s Constitution and an unwritten failsafe that you believe should exist.

 

[Clete]

My contention is that once you specify the mechanism, it will either be too weak to restrain the king or strong enough to become the real final earthly authority. “Narrow jurisdiction,” “high evidentiary standard,” “limited removable offenses,” “defined triggering process,” and “defined enforcement process” all sound good, but each one raises the same question: who defines, judges, interprets, triggers, enforces, and declares the result lawful?

That is the whole problem. You say Bob’s Constitution is incomplete without a removal mechanism, but the mechanism you say is necessary has not yet been written. So far, you have not shown that your proposal solves the problem. You have only shown that you want a failsafe.

Fine. But a failsafe has to be more than an aspiration. It must be strong enough to restrain a wicked king without becoming the real final earthly authority itself. Until then, “there should be a lawful mechanism” is not an answer to Bob’s proposal. It is the beginning of a new proposal that you need to write, defend, and show that it does not become the very danger it is supposed to prevent.

I can't make that argument for you. You are positing that it is necessary, workable, and preferable to Bob’s proposal, so show it.

Write the mechanism. Define the jurisdiction. Define the offenses. Define the triggering process. Define the evidentiary standard. Define who judges. Define who enforces. Define who punishes abuse. Define who decides whether the process itself has become corrupt.

Until then, the debate is not between Bob’s Constitution and your improved Constitution. It is between Bob’s Constitution and an unwritten failsafe that you believe should exist.

It's hard to understand how it can be that you don't see your own contradictory statements. You make it quite clear that you believe that there can be no such mechanism; that any mechanism strong enough to be effective would be usurpative by definition and then in the next breath you want to me write the mechanism as though no such bias exists on your part.
Your unwillingness to even entertain that such a mechanism can exist in the first place is precisely the reason I've avoided most all discussion having to do with any specifics about how such a mechanism might work. It would be as fruitless as discussing the details of Paul's dispensation of grace with a Buddhist.

Let me ask you this...

Suppose Bob's Constitution were modified to include a carefully designed, but not perfect, removal mechanism with reasonable safeguards against abuse. Would you then consider it superior to every other form of government except the original Constitution itself? Or do you believe that the mere existence of such a mechanism would break it completely to the point of making it inferior to other forms of government as well?

 

[JudgeRightly]

It's hard to understand how it can be that you don't see your own contradictory statements.

There is nothing contradictory about saying, “I think your proposal falls into a dilemma,” and then asking you to specify the proposal so that the dilemma can be tested.

You make it quite clear that you believe that there can be no such mechanism; that any mechanism strong enough to be effective would be usurpative by definition and then in the next breath you want to me write the mechanism as though no such bias exists on your part.

Correct. I am skeptical of your position. The onus probandi is on you to convince me otherwise.

"Onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit, non ei qui negat."

"The burden of proof lies on the one who asserts, not on the one who denies."

You are the one asserting that Bob’s Constitution is incomplete without this mechanism. You are the one asserting that such a mechanism is necessary, workable, and preferable. Therefore you need to demonstrate it.

I'm not going to create a straw-man to beat up just so you can say "but that's not what I'm proposing!"

Your unwillingness to even entertain that such a mechanism can exist in the first place is precisely the reason I've avoided most all discussion having to do with any specifics about how such a mechanism might work.

Oh come on, Clete, at least pay attention to what I write.

I quite literally said, “Let’s say I grant you your position.”

That was the whole point of my last approach. I granted, for the sake of argument, that civil disobedience is not enough, that some lawful removal mechanism is needed, and that such a mechanism could exist in principle. Then I asked: now what is it?

I'm asking you to move from assertion to construction. That's literally me entertaining the possibility.

I could flip your accusation around on you and say you are seemingly unwilling to entertain the possibility that the mechanism cannot be written without becoming either too weak to matter or strong enough to become the real final earthly authority.

But I am not asking you to concede that.

I am asking you to show otherwise.

Write the mechanism. Define the authority. Define the jurisdiction. Define the enforcement. Define the safeguards. Then we can test whether it actually avoids the dilemma I keep raising.

Until then, blaming my skepticism for your refusal to provide specifics gets the burden exactly backwards.

Present your case! You have my attention.

It would be as fruitless as discussing the details of Paul's dispensation of grace with a Buddhist.

I mean, if a misunderstanding there is all that is keeping him from converting, not entirely fruitless. But I digress...

Let me ask you this...

Suppose Bob's Constitution were modified to include a carefully designed, but not perfect, removal mechanism with reasonable safeguards against abuse. Would you then consider it superior to every other form of government except the original Constitution itself?

If you could demonstrate that such a mechanism is workable, not self-defeating, and actually improves the proposal without destroying its central advantage, then yes, I could consider that modified Constitution superior to other forms of government.

But that would not mean I consider it superior to Bob’s original proposal.

Second place may still be better than democracy, republicanism, parliamentarianism, oligarchy, or bureaucracy, but second place is still second place. If the original proposal is better because it keeps final earthly authority visible, personal, and mortal under God, then adding a removal mechanism may still be a downgrade even if the resulting system remains better than the alternatives.

So yes, I can grant that a modified version might still be better than other forms of government without granting that the modification is an improvement.

Or do you believe that the mere existence of such a mechanism would break it completely to the point of making it inferior to other forms of government as well?

No, I am not saying sight unseen that the mere existence of any removal mechanism would automatically make the system inferior to every other form of government.

It could still be better than democracy, republicanism, parliamentary government, oligarchy, bureaucracy, or any number of other systems in many respects.

But yes, I do think a domestic removal mechanism over the king would likely damage one of the central strengths of Bob’s proposal: final earthly authority terminating in a visible, personal, mortal ruler under God, rather than in a hidden ruling class operating through procedures.

That is why the mechanism matters.

Its details determine whether it is a narrow emergency provision or whether it becomes the real constitutional apex.

I am open to being shown wrong.

But you do not get to fault me for being unconvinced by a mechanism that has not yet been written.

 

[Idolater]

There is nothing contradictory about saying, “I think your proposal falls into a dilemma,” and then asking you to specify the proposal so that the dilemma can be tested.



Correct. I am skeptical of your position. The onus probandi is on you to convince me otherwise.

"Onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit, non ei qui negat."

"The burden of proof lies on the one who asserts, not on the one who denies."

You are the one asserting that Bob’s Constitution is incomplete without this mechanism. You are the one asserting that such a mechanism is necessary, workable, and preferable. Therefore you need to demonstrate it.

I'm not sure I agree because Enyart's proposal is the assertion in this case—@Clete is pointing out a defeater, which, if it obtains, does defeat Enyart's proposal. I think that you and he have been at loggerheads over whether his proposed defeater obtains—you've been trying to defeat his defeater—and he's been denying that you're successful at it.

I'm not going to create a straw-man to beat up just so you can say "but that's not what I'm proposing!"



Oh come on, Clete, at least pay attention to what I write.

I quite literally said, “Let’s say I grant you your position.”

That was the whole point of my last approach. I granted, for the sake of argument, that civil disobedience is not enough, that some lawful removal mechanism is needed, and that such a mechanism could exist in principle. Then I asked: now what is it?

I'm asking you to move from assertion to construction.

That's clarifying.

That's literally me entertaining the possibility.

I could flip your accusation around on you and say you are seemingly unwilling to entertain the possibility that the mechanism cannot be written without becoming either too weak to matter or strong enough to become the real final earthly authority.

The real final Earthly authority under Enyart's system, as far as I understand it from your defense of it, is the subjects. Because their freedom of conscience is recognized absolutely under Enyart's proposal (according to what I hear you saying), then therefore THEY are actually individually the real final Earthly authority.

Sure, ofc this is a little hyperbolic and also a little analogical, since ofc, the monarch will be the head of state. In no sense are the subjects in this proposed realm making the highest decisions, and meeting with other heads of state, and ordering the military into action, and judging cases involving the supreme judges of the realm (if they are charged with a crime or sued). The subjects aren't doing any of those things, but those things are just the monarch's grunt work anyway. That's the work nobody else CAN do, it HAS to be him. It doesn't make any sense for anybody else to do those tasks and have those responsibilities, just him, the monarch. And there's no glamor in it either, it's hard work, thankless work, long work. None of it's fun. It's work. And somebody has to do it. And skubalon flows downhill, and that's where he is. He's at the bottom of the hill when it comes to responsibilities and duties, as the monarch.

Honoring the freedom of conscience, such that each subject must agree with any royal decree, in the sense that they agree it is a MORAL and constitutional decree, vests great power in the hands of the individual subjects. It imposes a bar, over which any royal decree must get. Not a very high bar, so long as you're a moral man. A very low bar. It leaves open almost every possible decree as live options to the monarch, except for those that are gravely immoral and unconstitutional.

It might be a high bar for an IMMORAL monarch to get over though. And that is the other side of the coin of the enshrinement of the freedom of conscience, it checks the monarch's power. He is not autocratic or an absolute monarch, but a constitutional monarch—again, this is all assuming I'm understanding what you're saying Enyart's proposal entails.

But I am not asking you to concede that.

I am asking you to show otherwise.

Write the mechanism. Define the authority. Define the jurisdiction. Define the enforcement. Define the safeguards. Then we can test whether it actually avoids the dilemma I keep raising.

Until then, blaming my skepticism for your refusal to provide specifics gets the burden exactly backwards.

Present your case! You have my attention.



I mean, if a misunderstanding there is all that is keeping him from converting, not entirely fruitless. But I digress...



If you could demonstrate that such a mechanism is workable, not self-defeating, and actually improves the proposal without destroying its central advantage, then yes, I could consider that modified Constitution superior to other forms of government.

But that would not mean I consider it superior to Bob’s original proposal.

Second place may still be better than democracy, republicanism, parliamentarianism, oligarchy, or bureaucracy, but second place is still second place. If the original proposal is better because it keeps final earthly authority visible, personal, and mortal under God, then adding a removal mechanism may still be a downgrade even if the resulting system remains better than the alternatives.

So yes, I can grant that a modified version might still be better than other forms of government without granting that the modification is an improvement.



No, I am not saying sight unseen that the mere existence of any removal mechanism would automatically make the system inferior to every other form of government.

It could still be better than democracy, republicanism, parliamentary government, oligarchy, bureaucracy, or any number of other systems in many respects.

But yes, I do think a domestic removal mechanism over the king would likely damage one of the central strengths of Bob’s proposal: final earthly authority terminating in a visible, personal, mortal ruler under God, rather than in a hidden ruling class operating through procedures.

That is why the mechanism matters.

Its details determine whether it is a narrow emergency provision or whether it becomes the real constitutional apex.

I am open to being shown wrong.

But you do not get to fault me for being unconvinced by a mechanism that has not yet been written.

It might be possible to argue that our own Constitution ought to have the power of impeachment and removal of a sitting president struck (by Constitutional amendment), just because the process has already been abused at least one time 100% for sure, and probably (I'm going to get shot for saying 'probably' here in some corners) even twice—and that, within a single president's single four-year term. That was a horrific abuse of power on the part of Congress. That should chill every American. If we can't trust our own Constitution as just, then we really need to consider amending it. We don't want that to happen again, and as you've been pointing out (I think; again; not to be repetitive, but this is all supposing I'm understanding what Enyart's proposal is, according to what I'm hearing you say about it), with our freedom of conscience already protected, that already imposes an automatic strong obstacle to tyranny.

 

[Clete]

There is nothing contradictory about saying, “I think your proposal falls into a dilemma,” and then asking you to specify the proposal so that the dilemma can be tested.



Correct. I am skeptical of your position. The onus probandi is on you to convince me otherwise.

"Onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit, non ei qui negat."

"The burden of proof lies on the one who asserts, not on the one who denies."

You are the one asserting that Bob’s Constitution is incomplete without this mechanism. You are the one asserting that such a mechanism is necessary, workable, and preferable. Therefore you need to demonstrate it.

I'm not going to create a straw-man to beat up just so you can say "but that's not what I'm proposing!"



Oh come on, Clete, at least pay attention to what I write.

I quite literally said, “Let’s say I grant you your position.”

That was the whole point of my last approach. I granted, for the sake of argument, that civil disobedience is not enough, that some lawful removal mechanism is needed, and that such a mechanism could exist in principle. Then I asked: now what is it?

I'm asking you to move from assertion to construction. That's literally me entertaining the possibility.

I could flip your accusation around on you and say you are seemingly unwilling to entertain the possibility that the mechanism cannot be written without becoming either too weak to matter or strong enough to become the real final earthly authority.

But I am not asking you to concede that.

I am asking you to show otherwise.

Write the mechanism. Define the authority. Define the jurisdiction. Define the enforcement. Define the safeguards. Then we can test whether it actually avoids the dilemma I keep raising.

Until then, blaming my skepticism for your refusal to provide specifics gets the burden exactly backwards.

Present your case! You have my attention.



I mean, if a misunderstanding there is all that is keeping him from converting, not entirely fruitless. But I digress...



If you could demonstrate that such a mechanism is workable, not self-defeating, and actually improves the proposal without destroying its central advantage, then yes, I could consider that modified Constitution superior to other forms of government.

But that would not mean I consider it superior to Bob’s original proposal.

Second place may still be better than democracy, republicanism, parliamentarianism, oligarchy, or bureaucracy, but second place is still second place. If the original proposal is better because it keeps final earthly authority visible, personal, and mortal under God, then adding a removal mechanism may still be a downgrade even if the resulting system remains better than the alternatives.

So yes, I can grant that a modified version might still be better than other forms of government without granting that the modification is an improvement.



No, I am not saying sight unseen that the mere existence of any removal mechanism would automatically make the system inferior to every other form of government.

It could still be better than democracy, republicanism, parliamentary government, oligarchy, bureaucracy, or any number of other systems in many respects.

But yes, I do think a domestic removal mechanism over the king would likely damage one of the central strengths of Bob’s proposal: final earthly authority terminating in a visible, personal, mortal ruler under God, rather than in a hidden ruling class operating through procedures.

That is why the mechanism matters.

Its details determine whether it is a narrow emergency provision or whether it becomes the real constitutional apex.

I am open to being shown wrong.

But you do not get to fault me for being unconvinced by a mechanism that has not yet been written.

This is not the answer I expected. Every other statement you've made indicated to me that you believed that the mere existence of any such mechanism would break the entire structure by introducing an internal contradiction that would be systemically fatal.

Indeed, based on the whole of this exchange, I suspect that you do actually believe that any ACTUAL mechanism would indeed be systemically fatal and that you are only here conceding that the concept itself of a removal mechanism doesn't logically imply any such fatal flaw.

This goes to my comments about the self-contradictory nature of your previous post and of your actual position. Premises that have ruled your comments throughout this discussing, like "laws do not enforce themselves" and the like, would be used to defeat any proposed mechanism, no matter how well thought out. You very clearly believe that there can be no such thing as self-consistent system where there isn't a single man who's power is granted to him on the honor system and where there are no legal road block between him and despotism; where what stands between a king being righteous and a king being evil is the king's own will to power (or lack thereof), and any Earthly thing intended to curb it is usurpative by definition. If your underlying premise is that any earthly restraint on the king necessarily usurps his authority, then every proposal will simply be reduced to that premise, regardless of its design or safeguards. The details cease to matter because the conclusion has already been reached before the discussion begins. Thus, I remain skeptical that a discussion of any specific mechanism could be fruitful.

This concession of yours is important though and I think it is likely a bigger deal that you might see at the moment. There can be no doubt at all that the mere existence a removal mechanism is not fatal to the proposed system. Israel never had to rely on the honor system to prevent the king from going nuts. When Saul went rogue, God removed him. When David sinned, God confronted him through Nathan. When Ahab rebelled, God judged him through Elijah. When kings persisted in wickedness, God eventually removed dynasties, raised foreign powers, or otherwise intervened. Israel was not asked to simply trust the king, Israel trusted God to deal with the king.

In other words, Israel had a removal mechanism. It was diving rather than constitutional, but it existed. Therefore, a removal system, as such, is not inherently contradictory to a constitutional monarchy.

Bob's Constitution does not have any such mechanism and is therefore incomplete. A constitutional monarchy without a lawful means of removing a rogue king is not analogous to Israel's monarchy. It is a fundamentally different system because it attempts to exist without God's corrective role.

The question then becomes which is superior...

​

1. A constitutional monarchy modeled after Israel's system that has something in place to mitigate the absence of God's role in that system.​

2. A constitutional monarchy modeled after Israel's system that has nothing at all in place to mitigate the absence of God's role in that system.​

My position has been that Israel's system worked because God was an active participant in the government, and that any attempt to imitate Israel has to grapple with the absence of God's direct participation. We obviously cannot reproduce God's role, but the question is whether a constitution should acknowledge that missing safeguard and provide the best earthly substitute it can, or should it simply leave the vacuum unaddressed. That, it seems to me, is the real issue dividing our positions. I am saying that this car is missing a wheel. We obviously cannot restore the original wheel, but we should at least attempt to fabricate a substitute that is as round as we can make it. You seem to be arguing that because no substitute can equal the original, we should simply drive on three wheels.

 

[JudgeRightly]

This is not the answer I expected. Every other statement you've made indicated to me that you believed that the mere existence of any such mechanism would break the entire structure by introducing an internal contradiction that would be systemically fatal.

I still think that, because you have not convinced me otherwise. That is exactly why I am asking you, yet again, to demonstrate that I am wrong. There is nothing contradictory about saying, “I think your proposal fails on principle,” and then asking you to specify the proposal so that the failure can be tested. If your mechanism actually avoids the dilemma I have described, then show it. But refusing to demonstrate your position while accusing me of not being open to it is counterproductive.

Indeed, based on the whole of this exchange, I suspect that you do actually believe that any ACTUAL mechanism would indeed be systemically fatal and that you are only here conceding that the concept itself of a removal mechanism doesn't logically imply any such fatal flaw.

I do think an actual mechanism will likely be systemically fatal for the reasons I have given. But I was granting your premise for the sake of argument so that your proposal could be tested. I said, in effect, “Let’s assume the mechanism does not violate the proper flow of authority. Let’s assume it can exist in principle. Now show me what it is.” That is how argument works. If we cannot even test your proposal on its own terms, then what is the point of continuing the discussion?

This goes to my comments about the self-contradictory nature of your previous post and of your actual position. Premises that have ruled your comments throughout this discussing, like "laws do not enforce themselves" and the like, would be used to defeat any proposed mechanism, no matter how well thought out.

Again, there is nothing self-contradictory about what I said. If “laws do not enforce themselves” defeats your proposed mechanism, then the mechanism deserves to be defeated. You cannot simply assume my argument is wrong, refuse to provide the mechanism, and then claim that any argument I would use against it proves I am just being stubborn. That is not how this works.

You very clearly believe that there can be no such thing as self-consistent system where there isn't a single man who's power is granted to him on the honor system and where there are no legal road block between him and despotism; where what stands between a king being righteous and a king being evil is the king's own will to power (or lack thereof), and any Earthly thing intended to curb it is usurpative by definition.

That is why I am asking you to demonstrate that there can be. If you can show a mechanism that restrains a wicked king without becoming the real final earthly authority, then show it. If you cannot do that, or if you refuse to do it, what else am I supposed to believe? I am giving you the opportunity to prove me wrong, and I am willing to listen. I genuinely do not understand why you are not jumping at the chance to present the mechanism if it is as necessary, workable, and non-usurpative as you say.

If your underlying premise is that any earthly restraint on the king necessarily usurps his authority, then every proposal will simply be reduced to that premise, regardless of its design or safeguards. The details cease to matter because the conclusion has already been reached before the discussion begins. Thus, I remain skeptical that a discussion of any specific mechanism could be fruitful.

Then let’s resolve that. You claim a removal mechanism can restrain the king without becoming the real final earthly authority; I do not think that can be done. If your mechanism avoids that dilemma, then show it. But you cannot prove that by refusing to describe it. Write the mechanism and show me where I am wrong.

This concession of yours is important though and I think it is likely a bigger deal that you might see at the moment.

You seem to have misread what I said. Again. I did not concede that a removal mechanism can be added without damaging the structure; I granted your premise for the sake of argument so that your mechanism could be tested. That is not a concession of the point in dispute.

There can be no doubt at all that the mere existence a removal mechanism is not fatal to the proposed system.

Saying it doesn't make it so. That's what's in dispute, Clete. I did not concede that point; I granted it hypothetically so that your proposed mechanism could be tested.

Israel never had to rely on the honor system to prevent the king from going nuts. When Saul went rogue, God removed him. When David sinned, God confronted him through Nathan. When Ahab rebelled, God judged him through Elijah. When kings persisted in wickedness, God eventually removed dynasties, raised foreign powers, or otherwise intervened. Israel was not asked to simply trust the king, Israel trusted God to deal with the king.

In other words, Israel had a removal mechanism. It was diving rather than constitutional, but it existed. Therefore, a removal system, as such, is not inherently contradictory to a constitutional monarchy.

That misses my argument. I have not argued that a removal system is inherently contradictory to constitutional monarchy as such. My argument is that a domestic removal mechanism over the king must necessarily be above the king at the decisive point, or else it has no teeth.

And your Israel example does not answer that. God judging Israel’s kings is not a domestic constitutional removal mechanism. God is above the king. Subordinate judges, officers, councils, and citizens are not. So yes, God could remove Saul, confront David through Nathan, judge Ahab through Elijah, remove dynasties, and raise foreign powers. But that proves my point, not yours.

The correction came from above the king, not from beneath him. Nathan rebuked David; he did not depose him. Elijah pronounced judgment against Ahab; he did not become a constitutional tribunal over him. David knew Saul was wicked and had opportunity to kill him, but refused to remove the Lord’s anointed. So Israel’s “mechanism,” if you want to call it that, was divine judgment, not domestic judicial removal.

Bob's Constitution does not have any such mechanism and is therefore incomplete. A constitutional monarchy without a lawful means of removing a rogue king is not analogous to Israel's monarchy. It is a fundamentally different system because it attempts to exist without God's corrective role.

Bob’s Constitution is not identical to Israel’s monarchy. I have never claimed otherwise. We do not have Israel’s covenantal arrangement, prophets with direct national authority speaking God’s word to the king, or God appointing and removing kings in the same public manner He did with Israel. But that does not prove Bob’s Constitution is incomplete. It proves only that Bob’s Constitution is not ancient Israel.

The question is not whether we can reproduce Israel’s divine corrective role. We obviously cannot. The question is whether we are authorized to fabricate a human substitute for that role, and whether that substitute avoids becoming a superior domestic authority over the king. God’s authority over Israel’s kings came from above the king; your proposed mechanism would operate from within the nation, through men beneath the king, unless you can show otherwise. So the question remains unanswered: what is the mechanism, who exercises it, who enforces it, and how does it avoid becoming the very authority above the king that you deny it would be?

The question then becomes which is superior...

​

1. A constitutional monarchy modeled after Israel's system that has something in place to mitigate the absence of God's role in that system.​

2. A constitutional monarchy modeled after Israel's system that has nothing at all in place to mitigate the absence of God's role in that system.​

That framing assumes the very point in dispute. The real comparison is not between “something” and “nothing,” but between Bob’s written proposal, with its existing restraints, and your still-undefined substitute for God’s corrective role. A bad substitute is not better than no substitute; a false safeguard can be worse than an admitted limitation. A mechanism designed to restrain a wicked king can become the lawful-looking path by which ambitious men remove a righteous one. So before we can compare the two, you still have to tell us what your option actually is: what is the mechanism, who controls it, who enforces it, who judges abuse of it, and how does it avoid becoming the real final earthly authority?

My position has been that Israel's system worked because God was an active participant in the government, and that any attempt to imitate Israel has to grapple with the absence of God's direct participation. We obviously cannot reproduce God's role, but the question is whether a constitution should acknowledge that missing safeguard and provide the best earthly substitute it can, or should it simply leave the vacuum unaddressed. That, it seems to me, is the real issue dividing our positions.

I agree that any attempt to learn from Israel’s government has to grapple with the fact that we do not have God’s direct covenantal participation in the same way Israel did, but acknowledging that absence does not prove that your proposed substitute is legitimate, workable, or preferable. The question is not whether God’s direct role is absent; the question is whether we are authorized to replace that role with a domestic human mechanism, and whether that mechanism avoids becoming the real authority over the king. You keep calling it a “safeguard,” but that assumes the conclusion. It may be a safeguard, or it may be a new power center that ambitious men use to lawfully remove a righteous king. “There is a vacuum” does not automatically mean “fill it with this.” You still have to define the substitute and show that it does not create a worse problem than the one it is meant to solve.

I am saying that this car is missing a wheel. We obviously cannot restore the original wheel, but we should at least attempt to fabricate a substitute that is as round as we can make it. You seem to be arguing that because no substitute can equal the original, we should simply drive on three wheels.

No, I am saying the substitute wheel has to actually function as a wheel. If your replacement is straight tubing welded into a square and bolted to the rim, it is not a solution merely because it occupies the place where a wheel should be. It may move the car for a while, but every corner slamming into the ground will send shock through the whole vehicle until it shakes itself apart. That is my concern with your proposed mechanism. You are saying, “The car needs a wheel.” Fine. I am asking whether the thing you want to bolt onto the system is actually a wheel, or a malformed substitute that introduces a new structural failure. Until you define the mechanism, we cannot know which it is.

So do that. Please!

 

[Clete]

I still think that, because you have not convinced me otherwise. That is exactly why I am asking you, yet again, to demonstrate that I am wrong. There is nothing contradictory about saying, “I think your proposal fails on principle,” and then asking you to specify the proposal so that the failure can be tested. If your mechanism actually avoids the dilemma I have described, then show it. But refusing to demonstrate your position while accusing me of not being open to it is counterproductive.



I do think an actual mechanism will likely be systemically fatal for the reasons I have given. But I was granting your premise for the sake of argument so that your proposal could be tested. I said, in effect, “Let’s assume the mechanism does not violate the proper flow of authority. Let’s assume it can exist in principle. Now show me what it is.” That is how argument works. If we cannot even test your proposal on its own terms, then what is the point of continuing the discussion?



Again, there is nothing self-contradictory about what I said. If “laws do not enforce themselves” defeats your proposed mechanism, then the mechanism deserves to be defeated. You cannot simply assume my argument is wrong, refuse to provide the mechanism, and then claim that any argument I would use against it proves I am just being stubborn. That is not how this works.



That is why I am asking you to demonstrate that there can be. If you can show a mechanism that restrains a wicked king without becoming the real final earthly authority, then show it. If you cannot do that, or if you refuse to do it, what else am I supposed to believe? I am giving you the opportunity to prove me wrong, and I am willing to listen. I genuinely do not understand why you are not jumping at the chance to present the mechanism if it is as necessary, workable, and non-usurpative as you say.



Then let’s resolve that. You claim a removal mechanism can restrain the king without becoming the real final earthly authority; I do not think that can be done. If your mechanism avoids that dilemma, then show it. But you cannot prove that by refusing to describe it. Write the mechanism and show me where I am wrong.

Everything before the bolded comment above was wasted time. Both for you to type and for me to read and even that either missed or ignored the point that had been made. You are asking to prove something that your premises will not allow before it has ever been presented. You've taken away the every hue of blue and asked me to prove to you that the sky is Cyan. It's contradictory whether you choose to acknowledge it or not.

You seem to have misread what I said. Again. I did not concede that a removal mechanism can be added without damaging the structure;

I did not say that you had said that. What you very clearly do believe and have just stated again is the any such mechanism would be fatal to the system (i.e. not damaging, not less than perfect, but destructive - deadly - unworkable - contradictory - impossible - by definition.)

I granted your premise for the sake of argument so that your mechanism could be tested. That is not a concession of the point in dispute.

Which demonstrates the validity of my last two posts.

Saying it doesn't make it so.

I've warned you about this before. This will be the last time. If you ever say that to me again, I'll put you on ignore and forget you exist.

I spent over an hour this morning writing a post that makes a very clear argument in favor of the supposition. I strongly recommend that you stop responding to my posts one sentence at a time as if each sentence exists on its own without any sort of context or support.

That's what's in dispute, Clete. I did not concede that point; I granted it hypothetically so that your proposed mechanism could be tested.

Then, once again, my last two posts have hit the nail on the head.

That misses my argument. I have not argued that a removal system is inherently contradictory to constitutional monarchy as such.

You just got through doing that! I feel like I'm on Candid Camera!

My argument is that a domestic removal mechanism over the king must necessarily be above the king at the decisive point, or else it has no teeth.

Above the king, as in the rule of law. Your contention that people performing duties prescribed by the law means that they are somehow themselves above the king who himself is (ideally) only there fulfilling a duty prescribed by the same law.

And your Israel example does not answer that. God judging Israel’s kings is not a domestic constitutional removal mechanism. God is above the king. Subordinate judges, officers, councils, and citizens are not. So yes, God could remove Saul, confront David through Nathan, judge Ahab through Elijah, remove dynasties, and raise foreign powers. But that proves my point, not yours.

The correction came from above the king, not from beneath him. Nathan rebuked David; he did not depose him. Elijah pronounced judgment against Ahab; he did not become a constitutional tribunal over him. David knew Saul was wicked and had opportunity to kill him, but refused to remove the Lord’s anointed. So Israel’s “mechanism,” if you want to call it that, was divine judgment, not domestic judicial removal.

All of this response was anticipated and dealt with later in the same post. Once again, this was a waste of time to both write and for me to read.

Bob’s Constitution is not identical to Israel’s monarchy. I have never claimed otherwise.

Who said anything about "identical"? It is very obviously modeled after Israel's system. The whole point is that the Old Testament (and parts of the New) describe a complete criminal justice system, which Bob explicitly emulates as much as makes sense to do for a nation that is not Israel (i.e. no sacrificial or other ceremonial statutes, etc).

We do not have Israel’s covenantal arrangement, prophets with direct national authority speaking God’s word to the king, or God appointing and removing kings in the same public manner He did with Israel. But that does not prove Bob’s Constitution is incomplete. It proves only that Bob’s Constitution is not ancient Israel.

You stating that it doesn't make it incomplete does nothing to refute the argument that I made that it does make it incomplete.

The question is not whether we can reproduce Israel’s divine corrective role. We obviously cannot.

I already said that.

The question is whether we are authorized to fabricate a human substitute for that role, and whether that substitute avoids becoming a superior domestic authority over the king.

We would be as authorized to form any form of government as any other people have formed their respective forms of government. God does not demand that any particular people must form a constitutional monarchy. He demands justice but that can be achieved without the need for a king.

God’s authority over Israel’s kings came from above the king; your proposed mechanism would operate from within the nation, through men beneath the king, unless you can show otherwise. So the question remains unanswered: what is the mechanism, who exercises it, who enforces it, and how does it avoid becoming the very authority above the king that you deny it would be?

You already know and I have repeatedly stated that of course any such mechanism would operate from within the nation - by people. Your premise negates any logically possible mechanism by definition! You cannot rule out any system other than the one you advocate for and then demand that I present you an alternative. IT IS CONTRADICTORY. Whether you choose to acknowledge as such or not.

It's no different, in principle, from an atheists telling you to prove God's existence without invoking the supernatural. It cannot be done because it's a contradiction.

That framing assumes the very point in dispute. The real comparison is not between “something” and “nothing,” but between Bob’s written proposal, with its existing restraints, and your still-undefined substitute for God’s corrective role. A bad substitute is not better than no substitute; a false safeguard can be worse than an admitted limitation. A mechanism designed to restrain a wicked king can become the lawful-looking path by which ambitious men remove a righteous one. So before we can compare the two, you still have to tell us what your option actually is: what is the mechanism, who controls it, who enforces it, who judges abuse of it, and how does it avoid becoming the real final earthly authority?

Can't be done. I cannot show you a round square either.

I agree that any attempt to learn from Israel’s government has to grapple with the fact that we do not have God’s direct covenantal participation in the same way Israel did, but acknowledging that absence does not prove that your proposed substitute is legitimate, workable, or preferable.

I didn't say it did. What I said was that a system without God's intervening wisdom and power is incomplete in comparison to Israel's system and that it therefore a significantly different kind of system.

The question is not whether God’s direct role is absent; the question is whether we are authorized to replace that role with a domestic human mechanism, and whether that mechanism avoids becoming the real authority over the king. You keep calling it a “safeguard,” but that assumes the conclusion. It may be a safeguard, or it may be a new power center that ambitious men use to lawfully remove a righteous king. “There is a vacuum” does not automatically mean “fill it with this.” You still have to define the substitute and show that it does not create a worse problem than the one it is meant to solve.

For you anything that even looks to you like it sits with any kind of authority over the king automatically defines it as "a worse problem than the one it is meant to solve". Thus your request to see what such a system might look like is a self-contradictory impossibility - BY DEFINITION!

("by definition" is a legitimate argument. That is not me making a bald claim.)

No, I am saying the substitute wheel has to actually function as a wheel.

Except that you've defined the parameters such that nothing other than THE original wheel can function as a wheel at all.

If your replacement is straight tubing welded into a square and bolted to the rim, it is not a solution merely because it occupies the place where a wheel should be. It may move the car for a while, but every corner slamming into the ground will send shock through the whole vehicle until it shakes itself apart. That is my concern with your proposed mechanism.

And by the same analogy, your system insists that driving without a fourth wheel, dragging the front quarter panel on the ground would somehow result in a straight path rather than dragging us all off into the ditch.

You are saying, “The car needs a wheel.” Fine. I am asking whether the thing you want to bolt onto the system is actually a wheel, or a malformed substitute that introduces a new structural failure. Until you define the mechanism, we cannot know which it is.

So do that. Please!

It cannot be done by the standards you have put forward, JR! I'm serious! You've defined the parameters such that it is literally impossible to do. The moment I propose ANY law designed for such a purpose, your mind shuts down the whole thing - no matter what that law says or is intended to do!

Why?

Because laws do not enforce themselves - men do!

You are asking me to draw a square without a single straight line allowed. It cannot be done.

 

[JudgeRightly]

Everything before the bolded comment above was wasted time. Both for you to type and for me to read and even that either missed or ignored the point that had been made. You are asking to prove something that your premises will not allow before it has ever been presented. You've taken away the every hue of blue and asked me to prove to you that the sky is Cyan. It's contradictory whether you choose to acknowledge it or not.



I did not say that you had said that. What you very clearly do believe and have just stated again is the any such mechanism would be fatal to the system (i.e. not damaging, not less than perfect, but destructive - deadly - unworkable - contradictory - impossible - by definition.)


Which demonstrates the validity of my last two posts.


I've warned you about this before. This will be the last time. If you ever say that to me again, I'll put you on ignore and forget you exist.

I spent over an hour this morning writing a post that makes a very clear argument in favor of the supposition. I strongly recommend that you stop responding to my posts one sentence at a time as if each sentence exists on its own without any sort of context or support.


Then, once again, my last two posts have hit the nail on the head.


You just got through doing that! I feel like I'm on Candid Camera!

Above the king, as in the rule of law. Your contention that people performing duties prescribed by the law means that they are somehow themselves above the king who himself is (ideally) only there fulfilling a duty prescribed by the same law.


All of this response was anticipated and dealt with later in the same post. Once again, this was a waste of time to both write and for me to read.


Who said anything about "identical"? It is very obviously modeled after Israel's system. The whole point is that the Old Testament (and parts of the New) describe a complete criminal justice system, which Bob explicitly emulates as much as makes sense to do for a nation that is not Israel (i.e. no sacrificial or other ceremonial statutes, etc).


You stating that it doesn't make it incomplete does nothing to refute the argument that I made that it does make it incomplete.


I already said that.


We would be as authorized to form any form of government as any other people have formed their respective forms of government. God does not demand that any particular people must form a constitutional monarchy. He demands justice but that can be achieved without the need for a king.


You already know and I have repeatedly stated that of course any such mechanism would operate from within the nation - by people. Your premise negates any logically possible mechanism by definition! You cannot rule out any system other than the one you advocate for and then demand that I present you an alternative. IT IS CONTRADICTORY. Whether you choose to acknowledge as such or not.

It's no different, in principle, from an atheists telling you to prove God's existence without invoking the supernatural. It cannot be done because it's a contradiction.


Can't be done. I cannot show you a round square either.


I didn't say it did. What I said was that a system without God's intervening wisdom and power is incomplete in comparison to Israel's system and that it therefore a significantly different kind of system.


For you anything that even looks to you like it sits with any kind of authority over the king automatically defines it as "a worse problem than the one it is meant to solve". Thus your request to see what such a system might look like is a self-contradictory impossibility - BY DEFINITION!

("by definition" is a legitimate argument. That is not me making a bald claim.)


Except that you've defined the parameters such that nothing other than THE original wheel can function as a wheel at all.


And by the same analogy, your system insists that driving without a fourth wheel, dragging the front quarter panel on the ground would somehow result in a straight path rather than dragging us all off into the ditch.


It cannot be done by the standards you have put forward, JR! I'm serious! You've defined the parameters such that it is literally impossible to do. The moment I propose ANY law designed for such a purpose, your mind shuts down the whole thing - no matter what that law says or is intended to do!

Why?

Because laws do not enforce themselves - men do!

You are asking me to draw a square without a single straight line allowed. It cannot be done.

How does authority flow, Clete? From top to bottom, yes? From God, to government, to men?

 

[Clete]

How does authority flow, Clete? From top to bottom, yes? From God, to government, to men?

Ultimately, as is the case for all rightful authority, it originates with God. From there, however, authority is distributed by law from, to and through various offices for various purposes. That is what the rule of law means.

A king does not rule simply by virtue of his birth. He rules because the law identifies him as the lawful king and vests him with the authority assigned to that office.

Notice something important, though. The king does not determine for himself whether he is the lawful king. He does not interpret the portion of the law that creates his own office. That law is applied to him by those whose own offices are likewise established by law.

Does that make those men sovereign over the king? Certainly not!

It simply means that the law is supreme over every office it creates. No office creates itself, defines itself, or perpetuates itself. Every office derives its authority from the law and is limited by the law.

That is why I think your "authority flows downhill" formulation is incomplete. The source of authority certainly flows from God. The administration of authority flows through multiple offices whose jurisdictions are defined by the law itself.

The king has powers that judges do not possess. Judges have powers the king does not possess. Neither office is sovereign over the other. It is the law that is sovereign and both are subordinate to the law that created them.

 

[JudgeRightly]

Neither office is sovereign over the other.

If judges have final say over whether the king remains king, then they are sovereign over the kingship, whatever else you may call it.

They may not be sovereign over every royal function, but they are sovereign over his continued possession of the office.

That's the contradiction I've been trying to point out to you this entire time.

You cannot have your cake and eat it too.

It's one or the other.