Where there is no court, there is no law.
I reject that premise. Where there is no court, there may be no earthly enforcement of the law, but that is not the same thing as no law. A court does not create the law; it has jurisdiction to apply and enforce it. If a man murders someone and escapes prosecution because no competent court can reach him, the law has still been violated. “A man is guilty the moment he commits a crime,” remember? His lack of prosecution does not make murder lawful.
Okay, then it is both you and the proposed Constitution that is trying to have it both ways.
An unenforceable law is no law at all. The fact that the king would answer to God is no different than any other criminal except that right now, the king gets to whatever he desires with no way for the criminal justice system to touch him.
Again, I reject the premise. God’s law does not stop existing simply because He is not presently enforcing it as He will in the Millennial Kingdom, and the Constitution does not cease to bind the king simply because he ignores it. An unenforced law may be practically weak, but it is not therefore “no law at all.” Law does more than punish; it defines righteousness, identifies guilt, declares penalties, teaches the people, condemns the offender, and removes excuse. The king accepted office under a law that explicitly required him to obey it, so if he violates it, the absence of a higher American court does not make him lawful. He is a criminal king whom no superior domestic court has jurisdiction to prosecute. I do not deny that danger, but creating a superior earthly tribunal over him creates a different and arguably worse one.
The difference there is the difference between moral law and criminal law. They are not the same thing. Everyone everywhere is subject to moral law and will answer to God for their immorality. We are here discussing criminal justice and it is that which the proposed system would place the king above.
No, we are not merely discussing criminal justice. We are discussing governmental structure. That matters because the proposed Constitution is theonomic; the Criminal Code is an application of God’s justice to civil government, not just a random collection of civil rules. So separating “moral law” from “criminal law” as though the king is under one but outside the standard of the other misses the point. If the king commits rape or murder, he has violated the Criminal Code and is guilty under that law, whether a court convicts him or not. The issue is not whether the Criminal Code applies to him. It does. The issue is whether a subordinate earthly court has jurisdiction to try the final earthly civil authority.
The difference being that corrupt governing officials can be removed from office as a result of their corruption by the very same legal system in which they are employed.
Yes, because they are
subordinate officials. A judge, police officer, governor, or magistrate has a superior civil authority above him, which is why he can be removed by the system in which he serves. But the whole debate here is whether the king is also a subordinate official, or whether he is the final earthly civil authority. If he can be removed by judges beneath him, then he is not the final earthly civil authority. They are, at least at the decisive point, or whoever controls them is.
The contradiction exists is say that "the king is required to obey the law" and in the same breath, "no American court has standing to prosecute him". The later negates the former. If he can't be prosecuted then he is not required to obey the law, except from a moral perspective, which, once again, is not what we are talking about.
No, it does not negate the former. It only negates prosecution by an American court. You are treating enforceability by a superior domestic court as the thing that makes law binding, but a jurisdictional limit is not a contradiction. Bob made a similar distinction between actual guilt and legal presumption: a man is guilty the moment he commits the crime, though he is presumed innocent in court until proven guilty because that presumption is necessary for a fair trial. The trial does not create the guilt; it establishes guilt judicially. So if the king commits murder or rape, he is guilty when he commits it, and the lack of American court jurisdiction does not make him innocent or release him from the law. It only means there is no superior domestic court with authority to establish and punish that guilt judicially.
And I'm telling you that there'd be no way for that to ever occur.
I think you need to reread what I said. I agree that the judiciary would not become a fiat monarch by committee; I explicitly said that was not my argument. My point is that if the judiciary can remove the king, then it has final authority over whether the king remains king. It does not have to become the king in order to be above the king at the decisive point. If it can remove him, then he rules under its supervision, not as the final earthly authority.
No single judge would be able to do so. Those who bring the charge would have to prove their case in court and are not allowed to sit as judge.
That only means the mechanism is more complicated. It does not mean it cannot be captured or weaponized. Powerful evil men do not need one judge to do everything; they only need enough influence at the right pressure points: accusers, witnesses, prosecutors, clerks, judges, public pressure, institutional pressure, manufactured evidence, selective evidence, or procedural rules. If the court is already inclined against the king, “proving the case” is not much comfort. False witnesses exist. Bad evidence exists. Selective presentation exists. And captured institutions are very good at reaching the result they already want.
In other words, you are presupposing a conflict of interest that would not exist.
I am not arguing that a conflict of interest would necessarily exist on day one, or even that it would always exist. I am saying it would eventually be sought, created, and exploited because sinful men seek power, and because there are forces that hate righteousness. If the removal process exists, then that process becomes a target. Evil will seek to capture it because it is the lawful-looking mechanism by which a righteous king can be removed. That is not assuming a conflict of interest at the start; it is warning that your proposal creates a permanent point of leverage for one to develop.
The provisions in the law that allow for the removal of a criminal king would have to be crafted in such a way as to prevent conflicts of interest such as what I just said as well as things like anyone involved in the prosecution of such a case would not be permitted to gain a promotion in authority as a result of such legal action. One could even make it such that only those with legal standing could bring a charge against the king, just as it is that only those with legal standing could bring a charge against anyone else. In other words, you could make it such that no judge could bring charges against the king simply because he wanted to. There'd have to not only be evidence but the one bringing the charge would have to be either the one directly harmed by the offense or a member of the victims family.
But this is exactly the point at issue. You are assuming the problem can be solved by crafting the right provisions, but Bob denied that assumption because every mechanism is still operated by men. Committees, courts, panels, procedures, conflict-of-interest clauses, evidentiary standards, and legal safeguards do not rise above human nature merely because they are written down. You say the Constitution cannot keep a king from becoming corrupt, and I agree; paper restraints do not sanctify the man holding power. But then why should we believe those same paper restraints will keep corruption out of the removal mechanism? You cannot use human depravity as the reason the king needs a legal check, and then treat the legal check as though it is insulated from the same depravity. If the men operating the mechanism become corrupt, the provisions do not restrain the abuse; they become the language by which the abuse is justified. So “we can craft provisions” does not answer the structural objection; it only moves the trust from the king to the mechanism, and from the mechanism to the men who operate it.
All such details instantly send us off into the weeds, which is why I've actively avoided discussing them with any specificity. The point here being that there are ways to prevent conflicts of interest such as what you are suggesting would be used to coerce the king into being the judiciary's puppet.
I think you underestimate just how evil and cunning man can be. It is easy to say, in principle, that provisions can be crafted to prevent conflicts of interest, but every provision must still be interpreted, invoked, applied, and enforced by men. Unless you can account for every way around those provisions, and no human lawgiver can, evil men will look for loopholes. Modern law tries this constantly with ordinary criminals, yet no mountain of statutes has stopped crime, corruption, procedural abuse, selective enforcement, or institutional capture. More rules do not automatically solve the problem; often they create more handles for clever men to grab. Of course we can imagine safeguards on paper, but when the men operating those safeguards become corrupt, the mechanism no longer restrains evil. It becomes the weapon evil uses.
But it would have to perform every function of the king in order to become a monarchy by committee. A committee, by the way, that is already forbidden by the proposed constitution.
Again, that is not my argument. I am not saying it becomes monarchy by committee; I am saying it becomes authority over the monarchy. Those are different claims. The men who can remove the king do not need to perform every function of the king. They only need final authority over whether the king remains king. That is enough to place the throne under their supervision.
Except that it wouldn't work that way. You're reacting to this as if the judiciary is some body of politicians like a Senate or something. It isn't. The judiciary is just the word we are using to refer to all of the judges around the country. All of whom sit on their own bench in their own home town residing over their own jurisdiction. There is no pool of people exerting political power via a voting process as would be the case in any committee.
That does not change the issue. Whether the judges are gathered in one chamber or spread across the country, if a judicial process can remove the king, then the king is under that judicial process. The question is not whether the judiciary looks like a Senate. The question is whether it has final authority over the throne. If it can indict, try, condemn, remove, and trigger replacement of the king, then it does. Distributed authority is still authority, and a decentralized mechanism can still be captured, coordinated, or weaponized. It does not have to look like a committee vote in order to function as a power above the king.
I'm out of time! I think that pretty much covers it though.
I think it clarifies the disagreement. You are treating court-enforceability as the thing that makes criminal law real, while I am treating criminal law as real even where no superior domestic court has jurisdiction over the final earthly authority. And you are treating judicial removal as a narrow legal remedy, while I am treating it as a structural transfer of final earthly authority over the throne. That is the divide.