For Russia, cyber-operations are a subset of overall information warfare and a way to integrate hacking seamlessly into influence campaigns. Russia considers NATO expansion and Western incursions into post-Soviet space existential threats, providing pressing motivations for a response. Furthermore, Moscow views popular uprisings in Ukraine or the Middle East as results of Western interference campaigns, and Russia is fighting back while reestablishing itself as a great power.
However, it is very difficult to measure the true impact of Russian activities. We can measure the number of clicks, likes and shares, for instance, but how do we make a linear connection to outcomes?
We can’t. Even measuring the number of people who show up for rallies initiated by Russians — a form of disruption — doesn’t give a precise metric. Furthermore, a recent study finds that more than 60 percent of Americans now get their news from social-media platforms such as Facebook, where Russia was very active in spreading disinformation. And 1 in 4 Americans were exposed to fake news as well as Russian bots during the 2016 election cycle. Yet finding the link between Russian actions on social media and vote change remains elusive.
Hillary Clinton not winning the White House was highly likely to be one of Russia’s objectives — but not the primary one, as the Mueller indictments suggest. Long-term strategic thinking in Russia looks far beyond one election cycle, allowing for more comprehensive and long-standing foreign policy goals. The election cycles of Western democracies, in contrast, tend to disfavor long-term strategic planning on foreign policy goals.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...ueller-probe-suggests/?utm_term=.5e82666b8493
However, it is very difficult to measure the true impact of Russian activities. We can measure the number of clicks, likes and shares, for instance, but how do we make a linear connection to outcomes?
We can’t. Even measuring the number of people who show up for rallies initiated by Russians — a form of disruption — doesn’t give a precise metric. Furthermore, a recent study finds that more than 60 percent of Americans now get their news from social-media platforms such as Facebook, where Russia was very active in spreading disinformation. And 1 in 4 Americans were exposed to fake news as well as Russian bots during the 2016 election cycle. Yet finding the link between Russian actions on social media and vote change remains elusive.
Hillary Clinton not winning the White House was highly likely to be one of Russia’s objectives — but not the primary one, as the Mueller indictments suggest. Long-term strategic thinking in Russia looks far beyond one election cycle, allowing for more comprehensive and long-standing foreign policy goals. The election cycles of Western democracies, in contrast, tend to disfavor long-term strategic planning on foreign policy goals.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...ueller-probe-suggests/?utm_term=.5e82666b8493
